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Abstract 
 
Current debates in feminist theory struggle to retain a robust concept of agency in light of 
the rejection of an independent and sovereign subject. The purpose of my project is to 
articulate a feminist concept of agency for a self that is relational and non-sovereign (i.e. 
one that does not equate agency with autonomy) and yet one that remains committed to a 
conception of the self as both powerful and unique.  Narrative agency, which I 
understand as the capacity to say 'I' over time and in relation to others, meets the 
challenge of attending to both the inter-relational and the individually empowering 
aspects of action.  The identity of the ‘I’ is a fleeting configuration of narratives that 
differs from moment to moment; but the capacity to say ‘I’ is constant.  This definition of 
agency is able to account for the extent to which a subject may be constituted by power 
relations but is still invested in the subject’s unlimited emancipatory potential.  In other 
words, a subject, even at the most basic level, may not be free to choose the content of 
certain identity-determining narratives, such as gender narratives; however, she always 
has the capacity to confront and change those narratives.   
 
My project draws on the work of Hannah Arendt to provide a feminist politics based on 
this account of narrative agency.  Arendt’s political theory is chiefly concerned with 
appearance: agency, for Arendt, involves appearing to another member of a plurality 
through speech or action.  This basic schematic is relevant to the analysis of several key 
aspects of a feminist theory of narrative agency: especially identity, mutual recognition, 
solidarity, and judgment.  For Arendt, identity is not reducible to a series of markers such 
as race or gender but is, instead, indefinite—composed of a mutable set of interests, or 
	 4 
narratives.  A subject is constantly negotiating the articulation of these interests, and yet 
she appears to, and is recognised by, others as a unique being.  Solidarity, by these lights, 
arises not through pre-determined similarities but, rather, interests actively held in 
common.  Conversations about these shared interests allow individual agents to articulate 
and negotiate judgments and opinions.  Bringing together these resources from Arendt 
and reading them alongside problems of contemporary feminism allows me to endorse 
mutual recognition, solidarity, and conversation as vital attributes of an emancipatory 
feminist politics. 
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Take the unknowable more seriously than anyone ever has, because most women have 
died without a trace; but invent the capacity to act, because otherwise women will 
continue to. 
 
- Catharine MacKinnon 
 
 
 
The conditions of human existence—life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, 
plurality, and the earth—can never ‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who 
we are for the simple reason that they can never condition us absolutely. 
 
- Hannah Arendt 
 
 
 
It’s the people who love us or hate us—or both—who hold together the thousands of 
fragments we are made of.  
 
- Elena Ferrante 
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Introduction 
 
 
In a popular 2009 talk, the Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie relates two 
anecdotes that illustrate the error involved in reducing other human beings to ‘a single 
story’.  The first is an account of her childhood conception of Fide, a boy who worked for 
her family, as entirely defined by his poverty.  All that she knew about Fide was that he 
was poor—her mother sent food home with him and used stories of his poverty to guilt 
her and her siblings into finishing their own dinners.  And so when Adichie visited Fide’s 
home and was shown a basket woven by Fide’s brother, she was shocked that someone so 
disadvantaged was able to make something so beautiful.  In the second story, Adichie 
attends college in the United States and is a shock to her roommate, who had expected an 
entirely incomprehensible ‘African’ rather than someone with Adichie’s American taste 
in music and perfect English.  Adichie perceived that this roommate had ‘felt sorry for 
[her] even before she saw [her]’, and that all she could see (at first) of Adichie was 
entirely defined by the story she knew of Africa—an exotic and deprived place.1   
Both of these stories illustrate what happens when we fail to recognise that people 
are agents, where being an agent means both being constituted by an impossibly complex 
matrix of stories and having any number of stories of one’s own to tell.  Possibilities for 
recognising one another as agents are at the heart of this project: I am convinced that we 
must prioritise these in order to effect social change.  So often we are blinded to the 
agency of others by an assumption that agency is equivalent to perfect freedom of choice 
or to the absence of coercion.  We are prone to see people, as Kimberley Hutchings puts 
it, as ‘choosers or losers’ rather than as consistently beset both by the capacity to act and 																																																								1 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, “The Danger of a Single Story”, TED 2009. 
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a number of factors that compromise this capacity.2  Adichie is on both sides of this 
dichotomy in the stories she tells—she presumes to be able to define Fide by a single 
story, and her roommate, years later, makes the same presumption.  Both of these errors 
compromise her agency: in the first instance, she is limited in her capacity to tell the story 
of who Fide is and, in the second, she is unable to appear to her roommate as a human 
being with stories to tell.    
This is not to say that being blind to the agency of another and being perceived by 
another as lacking agency are equivalent.  Substituting a single story for the complex and 
heterogeneous stories that make up another person—failing to see another as an agent, in 
other words—is an exercise of power.3  Adichie says that because of her roommate’s 
prejudice, ‘there was no possibility of Africans being similar to her in any way, no 
possibility of feelings more complex than pity, no possibility of a connection as human 
equals.’4  To harbour this kind of defining narrative, even when one’s intentions are 
benign, is to contribute to the systematic misrecognition of the subject of that narrative.   
The point is that each of us is guilty of misrecognition, no matter who we are.  Fide, 
																																																								2 Hutchings 2013, 14. 3 Adichie elaborates on this point: ‘It is impossible to talk about the single story without 
talking about power. There is a word, an Igbo word, that I think about whenever I think 
about the power structures of the world, and it is nkali. It's a noun that loosely translates 
to “to be greater than another”. Like our economic and political worlds, stories too are 
defined by the principle of nkali: How they are told, who tells them, when they're told, 
how many stories are told, are really dependent on power. Power is the ability not just to 
tell the story of another person, but to make it the definitive story of that person. The 
Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti writes that if you want to dispossess a people, the 
simplest way to do it is to tell their story and to start with, “secondly”. Start the story with 
the arrows of the Native Americans, and not with the arrival of the British, and you have 
an entirely different story. Start the story with the failure of the African state, and not 
with the colonial creation of the African state, and you have an entirely different story.”  
Adichie 2009, emphasis added.	4 Ibid. 
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surely, would have a story to tell about a person he imagined to be entirely defined by 
some specific narrative and was then startled to recognise as a complex human being. 
And each of us, though certainly some much more than others, is subjected to harmfully 
reductive narratives. The work of maximizing agency, then, requires that we understand 
that everyone is both embroiled in inescapable power relations and capable of moments 
of recognition.5 
Much of the work on agency in feminist theory is proceeding along these lines 
(Allen 2008, Krause 2011, Madhok et al 2013).  Feminists are interested in uncoupling 
the notions of agency and autonomy so as to defend a definition of agency that is resilient 
in the face of coercion, oppression, and systematic marginalisation.  Thinking of agency 
in this way (as the capacity for meaningful action rather than as unfettered individual 
choice) takes into account structural inequality and injustice but does not see this 
inequality or this injustice as an insurmountable obstacle to agency.  When we dispense 
with the idea that we are either free or unfree, either agents or victims, either ‘choosers or 
losers’, then perhaps we can challenge the tendency to think of the poor, the global South, 
people of colour, women and other marginalised groups as passive victims of coercion 
and the rich, the global North, white men, and other dominant groups as composed of 
self-legislating and wholly autonomous individuals.  We are able to recognise, instead, 
that agency is possible no matter how oppressed by or attached to subordinating relations 
of power we are (and that recognising agency in others is possible no matter how 
privileged we are).  We are able to see other human beings as agents capable of 																																																								5 As Amy Allen writes, one way to understand Foucault’s notion that there is no outside 
to power is that, immanent to relations of power, is ‘the possibility that other kinds of 
social relations are possible and may, at times, be more salient as a feature of social-
theoretical analysis than power relations are.’ 2008, 178. 
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unpredictable action, instead of defining people by received narratives about what they 
are.  We are much more likely to strike up productive conversations with others when we 
see them this way because we will be open to what they have to say, rather than hearing 
what we expect to hear.  Agency, by these lights, is not equivalent to autonomous choice 
at all but is rather ‘a mode of reflection…a way of taking responsibility for one’s location 
in the world, a location that is not only or fully knowable by the subject.’6  The task of 
this thesis is to give an account of such a non-sovereign narrative model of agency. 
 
(Non-Sovereign) Agency 
 
At first glance, the phrase ‘non-sovereign agency’ seems an oxymoron.  Agency, as it is 
traditionally understood in philosophy, is the result of individual intention carried out as 
action through the exercise of the will.7  If this is true, how can a non-sovereign, 
heteronomous self be said to have agency?  This thesis rests on two claims—more 
compatible with one another than they may appear—that frame the answer to this 
question.  The first is the ontological claim that the ‘individual’ is entirely constituted 
																																																								6 Madhok et al. 2013, 4. 7 This definition of agency is taken for granted by a number of philosophers in moral 
philosophy and (liberal and normative) political philosophy.  Though there are, of course, 
disagreements about how to understand the concept of intention, about the extent to 
which the will may be constrained in action, over the role which ‘character’ plays in 
autonomy, and so on, most definitions of agency rest on the assumption that the will is 
sovereign (which is to say self-legislating).  This understanding of the will is the legacy 
of the Kantian model of autonomy, which is foundational for liberal political philosophy.  
Notable contemporary accounts of agency as an exercise of the sovereign will include 
Christine Korsgaard’s (2009), Donald Davidson’s (1980), and Harry Frankfurt’s (1978).  
For an overview of understandings of autonomy in contemporary philosophy, and an 
interesting discussion of the role self-reflection plays in autonomy, see Christman (2009).   
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through relationships.8   The second is the practical-normative claim that the individual 
has a narrative understanding of herself as an ‘I’ when she acts.  Understanding and 
accepting these claims will require that I develop slightly unconventional definitions of 
both autonomy and agency/action.   
 Feminists have long challenged the conventional philosophical definition of 
autonomy as self-legislation by an independent will.9  Many of these feminists point out 
that this notion of autonomy grew out of the traditionally masculine virtues of 
independence and rationality and thus intrinsically marginalised women’s experiences.  
To right this wrong, feminists have argued for relational concepts of autonomy, agency, 
and the self.10   They advocate a shift in the focus of political theory and social 
organisation from the self-sufficient individual to the relationships that constitute an 
																																																								8 I understand self to mean the ever-shifting socio-cultural construct that is identity.  In 
my view, the self is always comprised of narratives (is a narrative self).  By individual, I 
mean a unique self or subject.  The term individual is one that has the benefit of referring 
to a discrete subject position without being too much troubled by questions of subjection 
or subordination.  Subject I use both to mean the exerciser of narrative agency and as a 
word that captures the subordinating power relationships to which the self is necessarily 
subjected during the ongoing process of identity formation.  The narrative agent is always 
all of these other things too: a contingent narrative self, a unique being, an agent with 
power, and a subject of power. 9 Not all feminist theorists want to challenge this definition of autonomy.  Indeed, there 
are many feminist theorists working within the liberal paradigm who accept the 
conventional view of autonomy as self-sovereignty (though they put forth other criticisms 
of liberalism’s failure to improve the status of women).  See especially Nussbaum (1999), 
Okin (1999), and Phillips (2010).  On the other hand, feminist theorists are certainly not 
the only ones to have challenged this definition.  Calling into question liberalism’s 
reliance on the idea of an individual with an independent capacity to govern herself is a 
hallmark of communitarianism, critical theory, poststructuralism, and an array of other 
contemporary areas of inquiry.  10 For work that sets out to define autonomy as relational, see especially Mackenzie and 
Stoljar (2000) and Nedelsky (2012).  For feminist conceptions of selfhood as essentially 
relational, see Benhbabib (1999) and Brison (2002). 
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individual.11  In this view, it is our relationships with others—partners, parents, 
employers, teachers, and so on—that form our beliefs, opinions, and judgments (these 
relationships also include structural relations of power, such as socially accepted beauty 
standards, which tend to be enforced through specific relations with others but are also 
transmitted through art, the media, and the law).  This does not mean that we are 
influenced by these relationships before, ultimately, becoming fully autonomous beings; 
it means, rather, that we are inescapably constituted by and through these relationships at 
all stages of our lives. 
Shifting our understanding of the self as independent and in possession of a 
sovereign will to an understanding of the self as wholly constituted by her relationships 
with others does not require, it is important to note, that we throw out the notion of 
autonomy, which is both essential to the feminist goals of empowerment and self-
actualisation and at the heart of feminist definitions of choice and consent.12  Neither 
does it mean that we must reject individual accountability, especially in the juridical 
sense.  It does mean, however, that we understand the goals of empowerment and self-
actualisation as grounded in mutually recognitive relationships with others and that we 
enquire after collective responsibility for individual actions.     
																																																								11 Nedelsky 2012, 2.   12 There is disagreement within feminism about whether empowerment and self-
actualization are appropriate goals.  Some feminists warn that to focus on these things is 
to implicitly endorse liberal and neoliberal values (Wilson 2013, Fraser 2013).  Others 
see the ideas of empowerment and self-awareness as mirages which obscure the fact that 
subordinating power relationships relentlessly structure our very understanding of what it 
means to be ‘empowered’, ‘authentic’, or ‘self-aware’ (Brown 1995, Butler 1997b).  I am 
sympathetic to both of these critiques but want to argue that we can productively 
understand empowerment as confidence in one’s own capacity to introduce new meaning 
into the world and self-actualization as confidence that one will appear to others.  I touch 
on this discussion throughout the thesis, and I treat it at length in Chapters 1 and 6. 
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A relational theory of autonomy rejects the idea that independence is a necessary 
condition of autonomy; indeed, it sees independence (from the influence, need, or care of 
others) as an illusion.  Each of us is essentially dependent on others—for the fulfilment of 
our needs, for the way in which we understand ourselves, and as the source of what we 
care about.  Autonomy, then, is realised in moments of recognition.  These moments are 
always shifting—we find them in certain relationships some of the time and in other 
relationships may be denied them completely.  An increased sense of autonomy depends 
on recognition by others—as Jennifer Nedelsky puts it, ‘[w]e can engage in creative 
interaction with the relations that shape us, but we cannot simply determine who we 
are.’13  This tension between self-determination through the creation of meaning (which I 
will call ‘making sense’) and the oppressiveness of the norms that define us is one of the 
central concerns of a feminism grounded in narrative agency, and I will return to it many 
times over the course of this thesis. 
If we understand relational autonomy to be the goal of human interaction (and as 
a potential way to identify a positive politics of recognition), then we can think of agency 
as the irreducible and constant individual capacity to achieve such a goal.  A relational 
self is, after all, still a discrete self, capable of thought, speech and action.  Discrete 
selves exist in a plurality of other selves, each self unique because it is made up of an 
unrepeatable configuration of narratives about what is important, what is normal, and so 
on.  In action, the self has in mind a concept of herself as a self.  When giving an account 
of something she has done, taking responsibility for an action, and articulating judgments 
																																																								13 Nedelsky 2012, 8.  
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about what ought to be done, the acting subject has in her mind a practical sense of 
herself as an ‘I’.  
Moreover, each acting subject is a unique ‘I’, in that the perspective from which 
she speaks or acts is different from any other ‘I’s’ unique perspective.  Each ‘I’ is 
constituted by its own unique configuration of relationships. Action involves 1) the 
appearance of the ‘I’ as unique and 2) the ‘I’ having confidence that she will appear to 
others as an ‘I’.  I argue in this thesis that all action, because it involves making sense of 
the ‘I’, is narrative.  It consists of creating a narrative about what has happened, what is 
happening or what will happen.  Narrative can take a number of forms, as we shall see, 
but, practically speaking, narrative is the sense one makes of oneself as an ‘I’ in time and 
in relation to other ‘I’s’.   
 
Hannah Arendt: Identity, Communicability, Narrativity 
 
It is my aim in this thesis to tie this view of narrative agency to practical feminist political 
action as clearly as possible.  I attempt to suggest forms of political interaction that 
maximise agency, and I advocate practices essential to increasing agency, such as civic 
friendship (Benhabib 1995) and receptivity (Nedelsky 2011).  I turn to the political theory 
of Hannah Arendt for help defining these goals.14  The possibility of reading Arendt into 
																																																								14 It is not my intention to offer a comprehensive interpretation of Arendt’s work, and, as 
a result, there are a number of issues in Arendt scholarship glossed over in (or entirely 
absent from) my analysis.  Instead, I treat Arendt much the way she treated many of the 
thinkers from whom she extracted her own ideas—as a thinking partner.  Rather than 
looking for consistency across her work, I engage in deep reading of selected texts (The 
Human Condition, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, and The Origins of 
Totalitarianism) in order to extract from them concepts particularly useful for, and 
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feminist philosophy was a topic on the minds of many feminists during the heat of the 
identity politics debates of the 1980s and 1990s.15  There is still much to be said on 
reading Arendt for the insights she might have to offer a post-identity politics incarnation 
of feminist theory, as many twenty-first century feminists have tried to do.16  Like those 
feminists, I do not want to offer a feminist reading of Arendt or to seek out kernels of 
feminist sympathy in Arendt but, instead, after Amy Allen, to ‘cull from Arendt’s work 
[resources] that might then be put to use in a feminist critical theory of power designed to 
illuminate the intersecting axes of domination of gender, race, class and sexuality’ and, 
further, ‘to highlight the possibilities for individual and collective resistance to such 
domination.’17   
Arendt herself was unsympathetic to the ‘woman question’, and she was reluctant 
to discuss herself in terms of gender, which she considered a private matter unfit for 
discussion in the public sphere.  To her, the nascent women’s movement represented the 
infiltration of politics by social concerns.  Any movement based on ‘natural facts’ of 
identity, such as gender or race, was for Arendt essentially non-political because it was 
mired in necessity, rather than arising out of free speech and action.  I argue in this thesis, 
however, along with other feminist interpreters of Arendt, that race, gender, class, and 
other aspects of identity are relevant to Arendtian political action (are properly political, 
in other words) because they are interests held in common between agents.  The struggle 																																																																																																																																																																					
relevant to, feminist political theory.  Though there may be occasions in this thesis when 
I use concepts from Arendt in ways that she might not have intended (indeed, in ways of 
which she might not have approved), in mining her work for political resources, I have 
tried to remain faithful to her own hermeneutical method of ‘diving for pearls’.      15 Honig et al, 1995.   16 Benhabib (1990, 1993, 2000, 2010), Allen (1999, 2002, 2008b), Dietz (2003), Zerilli 
(2005), Borren (2013).   17 Allen 1999, 98. 
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to articulate publicly judgments about harms against women, or poor women, or poor 
black women (and so on) is a political struggle, one that brings previously untheorised 
problems into the public sphere. 
In spite of her ambivalence toward her own identity as a woman and her 
disavowal of gender politics, Arendt’s work has appealed to contemporary feminist 
theory because of her conception of identity as dynamic and relational rather than as a 
predetermined category.  Contemporary feminist concerns are intersectional, varied, and 
non-essentialist.  Claims made on behalf of ‘women’ must include the recognition that a 
complex configuration of factors other than gender (race, class, religion, and so on) is 
always also at work.  A key assumption of contemporary feminism, in other words, is that 
identity is never reducible to its markers, but is a mutable and socially constructed 
understanding of these factors.  Arendt adds to an intersectional understanding of identity 
the idea that who an agent is always more than just the sum of what that agent is.   
Naming all of the markers of identity (race, class, profession, physical appearance, etc.) 
never gives a full account of identity; instead, the agent’s unique identity emerges in 
action. 
Action, or that which occurs between people in the public sphere, is what 
constitutes politics in Arendt’s account.  Many feminist readings of Arendt have put forth 
a world-centred account of politics as a realm in which radically new meaning emerges 
through spontaneous and unpredictable action.18  In this view, Arendt is an important 
resource for theorising a politics that is not beholden to a strong notion of identity as 
static or unchanging.  This thesis will argue that such an understanding of Arendt misses 
																																																								18 Honig (1995), Zerilli (2005, 2009), Disch (1995). 
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two important things: first, it does not take seriously enough the importance of the 
individual as the unique site of meaning creation and, second, it does not appreciate the 
extent to which mutual recognition is necessary for sustaining political action.  I argue in 
this thesis that the individual subject’s understanding of herself as an ‘I’ is a precondition 
for exercising political agency (articulating opinions in public, for instance).  I argue, 
further, that entering into the sphere of action, or exercising one’s political agency, is 
only possible when one can reliably exercise what I will call one’s ontological agency: 
that is, the confidence that one will appear in the world and be recognised by others as a 
unique being.19   
In this thesis, I emphasise the importance of association and mutual recognition in 
Arendt’s thought, though I also incorporate feminist readings of Arendtian politics which 
emphasise radical freedom into my account because such readings underscore the non-
sovereign nature of narrative agency.20 Across Arendt’s work, the theme at the heart of 
all of her arguments seems to me to be the primary importance of collectively creating 
and maintaining the world.  To the question ‘Why are there people rather than just one 
person?’ Arendt would give the same answer she imagines Kant would give: ‘so that they 
																																																								19 Having the confidence that one will appear to others as a unique ‘I’ is not the same 
thing as being able to see or to explain one’s own appearance.  I will argue in Chapter 2 
that each of us, in action, has a sense of oneself as an ‘I’ as a matter of practical 
necessity; however, this ‘I’ is in every way constituted by relations with others and would 
be meaningless apart from the presence of others.  Arendt writes in The Human 
Condition: ‘Although nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed 
or word, he must be willing to risk the disclosure…’ 1958, 180. 20 I will make clearer what I mean by mutual recognition over the course of the thesis.  In 
short, it refers to the shared recognition between specific agents of the other’s uniqueness 
and unpredictability.   
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might talk to each other’.21  To her mind, the collaborative articulation of differences 
between unique human beings (the desire of each agent to participate in the common 
world) is the driving force of action, and of all politics.  And, further, the basic 
recognition of one another as unique agents capable of action forms the very world which 
makes possible both action and politics.  
This thesis draws on Arendt’s political theory to support both of the claims upon 
which my concept of non-sovereign narrative agency rests: the ontological claim that 
selves are entirely relational and the practical-normative claim that each individual is a 
unique site of meaning creation.22  I work with an interpretation of Arendtian politics 
built around non-sovereign agency, and with an interpretation of Arendt’s concept of 
identity as a complex configuration of an indefinite number of narratives.  These two 
aspects of Arendt’s thought form the foundation for a theory of identity that overcomes 
the pitfalls of identity politics.  Instead of understanding politics as organised around 
special interests, Arendt helps us to see politics as the constant, open-ended negotiation 
of interests in common between agents capable of expressing unexpected and 
unrepeatable points of view.  Recognition between these discrete agents enables the 
extraction from action more lasting meaning in the form of political judgments and other 
kinds of narratives.  
																																																								21 Arendt 1989, 40.  In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt emphasises 
the importance of communicability and, by extension, communication (I will expand 
upon this point at length in Chapter 5).  22 Meaning is arrived at collectively in action, as we shall see.  I will make a distinction 
throughout between meaning (which is arrived at collectively) and making sense (which 
is a capacity of the unique ‘I’ to have a sense of herself in time and with relation to other 
‘I’s’). 
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 Throughout my discussion of feminist politics, I draw from Arendt’s political 
theory a notion of what Seyla Benhabib has called narrativity, which is the basic mode of 
human understanding.  Narrativity is, as Benhabib puts it, both ‘the mode through which 
the self is individuated’ and ‘the mode through which acts are identified.’23  Narrativity 
operates on two levels: 1) we have a narrative understanding of ourselves as ‘I’s’ and 2) 
we have a narrative understanding of action. The meaning we take away from action, the 
articulation of opinions and beliefs that we make patent in judgment, and the world of 
shared interests which forms the context for action are all understandable because we are 
able to share stories about them.  What happens between human beings in the present 
moment rises up and fades away.  It is by piecing together stories about action that we are 
able to collaboratively make sense of the world.  Through mutually recognitive 
conversation, it is possible to glean meaning from an endless variety of media, memory, 
and art and to configure this meaning as relevant to specific interests or as revelatory of 
specific harms. Across this thesis, narrativity refers to the everyday experience of making 
sense, whether of one’s own practical identity, of one’s memories, of other people’s 
opinions, or of events of the distant past.   
 
This thesis proceeds in two parts, each of which is comprised of three chapters.  Part I 
situates my narrative model of agency within feminist and philosophical discussions of 
agency and identity.  Part II lays out the political implications for this view of agency.  In 
the first chapter, I argue that it is essential to preserve a definition of agency in feminist 
theory, no matter how subordinating systematic relations of power may be (and even 
																																																								23 Benhabib 1992, 127. 
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though we are often deeply attached to these subordinating relations).  Feminists having a 
sense of individual agency is a precondition for the kind of political action with which 
feminism is concerned, and yet, over the past thirty years, subjectivity debates have made 
it very difficult to posit a definition of individual agency at all.  These debates can be 
roughly divided into two strands.  The first, the so-called ‘category of woman’ debate, 
asks who makes claims on behalf of feminism.  The second is concerned with the 
formation of the individual subject, and the power relations that are at work in that 
formation.  Through a careful reading of the identity politics and subjectivity/subjection 
debates (starting with the 1995 discussion between Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, 
Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser in Feminist Contentions), I endorse those feminists 
who stake out a middle ground between identity and non-identity and subjectivity and 
subjection and argue that the best model of agency for such a middle ground is a narrative 
model of agency.24 
I canvass a more recent incarnation of the subjectivity/subjection problem through 
prolonged discussion of both Amy Allen (who presents a ‘middle ground’ theory of 
agency and subjection) and Linda Zerilli (who argues that we should focus on the world 
in which action emerges rather than on the agent).  From Allen, I borrow the insight that 
moments of mutual recognition must be an essential goal of any feminist theory.  From 
Zerilli, I take a definition of politics as an open-ended and constantly unfolding field of 																																																								24 Throughout, I use ‘poststructuralism’ to refer to those theories descended from 
psychoanalysis, Marxism, and existentialism down through Nietzsche and Freud to 
Foucault (who rejects many of the claims of these three approaches but is in dialogue 
with all of them).  I use ‘critical theory’ to refer to the legacy of Kant, the Frankfurt 
School, and Habermas.  This is something of an oversimplification of two complex and 
overlapping methodologies in contemporary continental philosophy, but I use these terms 
in the interest of being able to refer, though more general terminology, to the theories of 
Foucault, Butler, Habermas, and Benhabib so that I may compare them. 
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interaction in which unpredictable new meaning emerges.  Reading the two theorists 
together allows me to combine the goal of mutual recognition between unique agents 
with an understanding of freedom and agency as radically non-sovereign.  I conclude by 
defining narrative agency as follows: (1) it is primary to narrative content; (2) it is 
grounded in uniqueness;  (3) it is non-sovereign; (4) it is essentially communicative; (5) it 
is (theoretically) infinitely generative. 
Chapter 2 shifts the discussion from agency to identity.  I examine the hefty body 
of literature on narrative and identity in the philosophy of personal identity.  It may seem 
methodologically unorthodox to ‘mix’ this literature with the work in feminist theory 
with which this thesis is concerned, but an interrogation of the assumptions and 
conclusions of a more conventional philosophical approach to personal identity (with a 
focus on its feminist incarnations) allows me to endorse a non-reductionist, practical view 
of narrative identity similar to the one defended by Catriona Mackenzie.  Such a view is 
invested in the idea that there exists over time a singular self who is responsible for her 
actions, who always has a concept of her self as an ‘I’, and who is capable of changing 
who she is.  However, I take issue with the thesis that a narrative theory of identity 
requires (a) a strong notion of narrative unity (especially in the form of continually held 
evaluative commitments) and (b) that we are able to construct coherent or complete 
narratives about our lives from a position somehow apart from our constitution by pre-
existing narratives and norms.  I argue instead for a view of narrative identity that 
emphasises the generative capacity of the narrative agent who is embedded in and 
constituted through a web of narratives.  I argue that the benefit of a narrative theory of 
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identity is that it allows us to emphasise the potential for the unique but relational ‘I’ to 
create new narratives. 
There are two challenges to a narrative theory of identity that come up in this 
chapter.  The first is Galen Strawson’s critique of the understanding of the self as 
narrative.  For Strawson, the notion that we construct our identities through narrative is, 
at best, empirically false, and, at worst, untenably proscriptive.  The second is the 
problematic reduction of identity to what I have called ‘a single narrative’, as so often 
happens in political discussions of identity.  Against Strawson, I will argue that 
conceiving of identity as narrative does not unduly constrain the way we understand our 
experience and, moreover, does not require that we adhere to a strong notion that 
narrating our lives is an ethical practice.  In the face of the tendency to reduce identity to 
a single narrative (to practice an overly reductive identity politics, in other words), I 
argue that identities are made up of an indescribably complex web of narratives, and that 
one’s conception of one’s self (one’s practical identity) is constantly changing as one 
navigates this web.       
In Chapter 3, I pursue the idea that narrative identity is constantly being shaped 
and reshaped by narrative agency.  First, I ask how the narrative agent can create new 
meaning even in the face of deeply constituting and oppressive norms, especially gender 
norms.  Second, I ask whether the narrative agent can ‘make sense’ when her speech and 
action are not recognised.  I first make clearer the distinction between narrative agency 
and narrative identity through a reading of Seyla Benhabib’s early work on narrativity 
(which is very much grounded in Arendt). Narrative agency is the constant capacity to 
introduce new meaning into the constellation of relationships into which the subject is 
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thrown.  Narrative identity is a subject’s practical self-perception, which may be riddled 
with subordinating attachments, but which can always change.  The narrative agent is 
able to confront subordinating norms (again, I focus on gender norms) in a variety of 
ways; she is able to read their meaning differently at different times and in different 
contexts.  She may then choose to incorporate them differently into her story about who 
she is. However, confronting subordinating norms, and creating new meaning in the face 
of such norms, is much more difficult in the absence of a community that listens to and 
recognises one.  It is impossible without some recognition of the subject’s speech and 
action.   
At this point, I shift from a focus on the narrative self to an attempt to stake out a 
feminist politics built on a notion of narrative agency.  I take resources from the political 
theory of Hannah Arendt to flesh out such a politics.  Chapter 4 argues that Arendt’s 
action-based politics is a productive alternative to identity politics for two reasons.  First, 
it is concerned with interests actively held in common, as opposed to the consideration of 
pre-existing categories of identity.  Second, Arendt conceives of identity as a unique 
configuration, which she calls whoness, which is always more than the sum of its parts.  
An individual, by this account is never reducible to a single story or set of stories about 
what she is (is never reducible, in other words, to political narratives).  Instead, identity is 
something that emerges in action such that who we are becomes apparent through what 
we do.  Identity in politics is thus a constantly shifting and shiftable construct, and the 
purpose of politics is to address interests and concerns contingently held in common. 
After an examination of Arendt’s thoughts on identity in politics, I look to her 
work for a political grounding for my narrative model of agency.  Through a reading of 
	 27 
The Human Condition, I argue that plurality, natality, and narrativity are conditions for 
narrative agency.  Plurality, which is the condition of distinct and multiple perspectives, 
is a condition for narrative agency because it allows us to understand our own constant 
uniqueness as ‘I’s’.  Natality, which is the initiative to insert oneself into plurality 
through action, is a condition for narrative agency because it confirms the irrepressibility 
of political action—a human being cannot resist the initiative to act.  Finally, narrativity 
is the mode through which political action is experienced.  It is the content of the sense 
the self makes, so we might say that it is both a condition for and a product of agency.  
When the ‘I’ makes sense of herself as an ‘I’, in other words, she expresses that ‘sense’ in 
narrative form—whether she is telling a story about her childhood or explaining a 
preference or taking responsibility for an action.  The ‘I’ the self has in mind when she 
acts always has some content (and in this way narrativity is a condition for agency), but 
the ‘I’ also shifts her understanding of herself as an ‘I’ in and through action (and in this 
way narrativity is the product of agency).  These three conditions for narrative agency, 
combined with our preliminary insights into Arendt’s thoughts on identity, give us a 
compelling picture of agency, shared interest, and action in concert in feminist politics. 
The concern of Chapter 5 is to examine judgment-making in an action based, 
association-centred feminist politics.  I address the question of how a self without a fixed 
identity is able to make judgments. I consider how, in other words, does the narrative 
agent make ‘legitimate’ political and moral judgments, considering the fluidity of her 
normative commitments?  The gendered norms and practices we confronted in Chapter 3 
must be judged as harmful, unfair, and/or deleterious to feminism’s goals of equality and 
empowerment for women.  But what is the process by which we make and validate these 
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judgments? To address this problem, I offer a brief overview of Arendt’s ideas about the 
importance of judgment to a post-metaphysical political theory and the phenomenology 
of judgment she extracts from a reading of Kant’s Third Critique.  I then look at some of 
the feminist appropriations of this part of Arendt’s work, focusing especially on the 
importance Linda Zerilli grants judgment for the formation and continuation of 
communities and on Seyla Benhabib’s insistence that we pay attention to the inherent 
moral content of judgment-making.   
Zerilli sketches a very useful account of feminist judgment, one which prizes the 
narrative agent’s capacity to create the unexpected.  However, I argue that Benhabib, by 
her careful analysis of some of the seeming contradictions in Arendt’s incomplete 
account, is better able to construct a productive feminist theory of judgment, one which 
prioritises democratic dialogue, mutual respect and narrative agency.  Finally, I confirm 
the unique value of Arendtian judgment for feminist thought and argue that a theory of 
judgment which emphasises mutually respectful conversation between narrative agents is 
the most productive for feminist theory.  To illustrate the essential connection between 
feeling respected and seen and being able to risk making judgments in public, I look at 
Susan Brison’s account of her recovery after a violent sexual assault. Brison has been 
involved in the feminist project of defining the harm of rape through political judgments 
made in the arenas of philosophy and activism, but being able to make these political 
judgments has only been possible through Brison’s reconstruction of the sense of herself 
as an ‘I’ through sustained recognition by others. 
Chapter 6 is something of a coda to the rest of the thesis: what, I ask, might it 
mean to lack the capacity to make sense?  I posit loneliness, as Arendt defines it in the 
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final chapters of The Origins of Totalitarianism as the conceptual opposite of agency.  
Loneliness is the total loss of the common world, the state in which one is incapable of 
being an interlocutor through thought, speech or action, with others—is incapable of 
appearing to others as a unique ‘I’. Though loneliness is realised in its most extreme form 
in the concentration camps, it is a problem that haunts all human interaction: the problem 
of incommunicability.  It is often very difficult, especially for marginalised and 
traumatised subjects, to give an account of themselves; indeed, to make any sense of their 
lives at all.  Through a reading of Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan novels, I argue that this 
difficulty is not insurmountable and re-emphasise my claim that narrative agency is a 
capacity, though sometimes a latent capacity, of every subject, no matter how deeply 
silenced or oppressed she is or may have been. I argue that appearance in the world and 
communicability are mutually sustaining. Exercising one’s capacity for narrative agency 
within a community that recognises one can allow even the most marginalised and 
subordinated subject to act. 
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Chapter One: The Stakes of the Agency Debate 
 
The notorious ‘subject question’ in feminism has been interpreted in two conceptually 
distinct ways.  On the one hand, it has been treated as a question about solidarity and 
identity: who are the ‘women’ who make claims on behalf of feminism?  And if we find 
there exists no shared identity corresponding to the category of woman, then who is left 
to pursue the goals of feminism?  On the other hand, it has been seen as a question of 
agency: What empowers (and disempowers) individual women?  If we heed the 
convincing accounts given by Wendy Brown, Judith Butler and others of subject-
formation through attachment to disciplinary relations of power, then what meaningful 
definition of agency can we say remains to the subject?  Feminist theory has, at times, 
seemed to collapse under the weight of this double aporia.  How might feminists get 
beyond it without getting so wrapped up in the terms of the question that they fail to 
effect the self and social transformations they have set out to inspire?   
Some feminists have argued that feminism no longer needs to theorise through the 
lens of the second question, the question of individual agency.  They think we ought to 
ask other questions, to better effect.  Linda Zerilli, for example, has made a strong 
argument for shifting feminist theory from a subject-centred frame to a ‘world-centred’ 
frame, one that prioritises a radically open-ended set of ‘practices of freedom’ instead of 
attempting to define a static set of rules for making feminist claims. In this approach and 
others like it, the work of feminist politics arises around a contingently relevant claim 
made by a woman or group of women affected by a particular harm. As I discuss in this 
chapter (and in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5), this is a useful model for feminist 
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politics—taking, as it does, the view that the claims women make are particular claims, 
meaningful in a particular way and at a particular time, and subject to revision as other 
voices enter the conversation.  It seems to me, however, that pursuing such a vision of 
plural feminist politics while attempting to jettison feminism’s subject question have 
resulted in a potentially harmful de-emphasis on imagining possibilities for individual 
feminist agency. As I argued in the Introduction, it is essential that we continue to extend 
the way we imagine such possibilities so that all kinds of women in all kinds of 
circumstances are able to understand themselves and others as agents.   
The goal of maximising agency is not an unproblematic one—often, as we shall 
see, emphasising individual emancipation or empowerment involves ignoring the 
systematic oppression of women and affirming the choices that only privileged women 
are in a position to make, such as whether to choose a career over children.  Intersectional 
feminism has shown that, more often than not, the claims that are successfully voiced by 
women are those claims voiced by able-bodied, upper-middle class, well educated, cis-
gender, heterosexual white women who conform to generally agreed upon standards of 
beauty.25  Many feminists26 have become rightly sceptical of feminisms that emphasise 
																																																								25 Nira Yuval-Davis defines intersectionality as “a metaphorical term, aimed at evoking 
images of a road intersection, with an indeterminate or contested number of intersecting 
roads, depending on the various users of the terms and how many social divisions [which 
are theoretically infinite but may include race, class, religion, gender, etc.] are considered 
in the particular intersectional analysis” (2011, 8).  The term was coined by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw in 1989, but has become a ubiquitous concern for any kind of social or political 
theory.  I will touch on the importance of intersectional approaches to feminist politics 
(and claims made by women) over the course of this thesis, and in some detail in chapter 
4.  The work being done in philosophy departments on social epistemology (on, in other 
words, the indispensable importance of interrogating the social and cultural particularity 
of the knower in order to determine who can possess certain kinds of knowledge) is an 
important new methodological direction in feminist theory.  See especially Fricker 
(2007), Haslanger (2012), Yuval-Davis (2011), and Medina (2012).  I will engage with 
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the importance of individual, rather than collective, transformation in discussions of 
agency.27 And yet, without a conviction that the individual’s sense of her own agency 
(which I define as the capacity to make sense, rather than the capacity to make 
autonomous choices) is important, we end up with a feminist politics that can be both 
alienating for those women who struggle to articulate the specific harms they suffer and 
inadequate for revealing to women that parts of their own lives as women are harmful.  
Articulating these specific harms might not necessarily involve political resistance or the 
identification of broader feminist goals, but it always requires recognition.    
Agency, then, is itself a relational concept.  It is not an innate or transcendent 
capacity, exercisable by the self-governing subject; it is, rather, the capacity to appear to 
another within a plurality of subjects, each of whom is constituted by shared norms and 
narratives.28  A non-sovereign concept of agency, one that is predicated on this kind of 
intersubjectivity, can still provide a strong sense of individual freedom and 
empowerment.  Articulating a strong definition of agency in feminist political theory will 
allow us to address a series of interrelated problems in contemporary feminism, from the 
continued suffering in silence of so many women who do not have a sense of their own 																																																																																																																																																																					
the scholarship in this emerging field in a somewhat tangential way throughout the thesis, 
but I think that there is interesting future work to be done applying the theory of narrative 
agency I present in this thesis within the philosophical framework of socially determined 
epistemology.   26 McNay (2000), Zerilli (2005), Mahmood (2005), Hemmings and Kabesh (2013). 27 Saba Mahmood (2005) and Hemmings and Kabesh (2013) give an especially 
interesting account of the dangers of acquainting “agency” with “choice”—I will come 
back to this distinction at the end of this chapter and will continue to parse it in chapters 2 
and 3.   28 In this chapter, I am chiefly interested in introducing the idea that agency is relational 
(that agency always involves the capacity of a unique individual exercised within a 
plurality of other unique individuals).  As I mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, I 
also endorse the feminist claim that autonomy is relational. See Nedelsky (1989, 2012) 
and Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000). 
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agency to the problematically reductive solidarity of identity politics (a solidarity often 
based on the sharing of a single narrative).  Much of the work in feminist theories of 
agency has rightly prioritised belonging as a source of freedom29, but it is important to 
add to that work themes of individual emancipation and freedom within the context of 
solidarity and belonging.  
Thinking about the subject question in feminism, then, cannot be merely a project 
of redefining the category ‘woman’; it must ask after the individual agency and identity 
of each woman.  Sharon Krause, in a recent overview of current trajectories in feminist 
political theory, highlights the move in contemporary feminism toward ‘contesting the 
old assumption that agency equals autonomy, and making room within agency for forms 
of subjectivity and action that are non-sovereign but nevertheless potent.’30  The two 
most important questions I want to pose in this chapter arise out of this particular 
iteration of the feminist conversation.  They are: (1) what does it mean to have a non-
sovereign definition of agency? and (2) how can feminist theory emphasise individual 
freedom and empowerment even as it calls into question the assumptions of liberal 
individualism?  I argue here for a concept of narrative agency that insists upon the 
importance of uniqueness, freedom, and empowerment even though it sees agency as 
intersubjective and non-sovereign.  Following from this, I define agency as the capacity 
to make sense, rather than the capacity to make autonomous choices. 
I build a model for this narrative agency that stays with the problem of the 
subject.  First, I give an account of this problem as it was discussed in Feminist 
																																																								29 Or has at least been interested in drawing out the connections between belonging and 
freedom.  See Zerilli (2005); hooks (2009); Allen (1999); Weir (2013). 30 Krause 2011, 4. 
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Contentions, which remains perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the subject 
question to date.  Then I turn to a contemporary re-reading of this debate by Amy Allen 
and—through a consideration of her reframing of the question—arrive at a definition of a 
subject who possesses narrative agency, defined as the capacity to make sense of herself 
in a web of relationships.  But can this definition of agency hold up in the face of a 
feminist theory that wants to dispense with the subject altogether?  I canvass Zerilli’s 
argument for leaving behind the subject question and find in her work some important 
addenda to a definition of agency, namely a double emphasis on non-sovereignty and 
freedom.  Ultimately, however, I find that Zerilli underestimates the importance of 
conceiving of the subject as a unique individual who depends on recognition in order to 
act.  Finally, I offer a definition of narrative agency as the capacity of a unique, situated, 
non-sovereign subject to make sense of her self in the world. 
 
1.1 Foundations of the Debate 
 
The agency debate in third wave feminism was concerned with the problem of theorising 
the subject, given that liberal conceptions of the subject as a purely autonomous being are 
untenable and often harmful.31  Following Foucault, many poststructuralist theorists 
argued that power is inherent in all relationships—between one person and another, 
																																																								31 Whether feminism is still in its third wave or has entered its fourth is a matter of some 
debate, but the third wave is generally defined as the immanent feminist critique of the 
second wave’s failure to take into account differences among women.  As important, I 
would argue, to the shift from second to third wave thinking in feminism is the 
acceptance of the insights into subordination by power relations theorised by 
poststructuralist feminists.   
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between people and institutions, within the self, and so on.32  In this view, we can never 
be completely aware of power at work in our relationships with others or within 
ourselves.  Every relationship, even the relationship between the subject and her self, is a 
political relationship, in that it is predicated on differentials of power.  Accounts of the 
subject on the critical theory side of the debate, on the other hand, have their roots in the 
rational and robustly autonomous subject of Habermasian communicative ethics.  This 
view suggests that we may be able to identify and eliminate harmful asymmetries of 
power at work within our relationships with others and within ourselves.  
Foucault and Habermas agree that there exists no self that transcends society.33  
The points of contention between them, argued out in many different ways and by a 
diverse group of theorists over the last thirty or so years, arise around how to define 
power and autonomy for the situated self.  The foundational arguments in the feminist 
incarnation of this broader debate were first articulated more than twenty years ago in the 
now canonical discussion between Judith Butler, Seyla Benhabib, Drucilla Cornell and 
Nancy Fraser, published as Feminist Contentions (1995).  This debate took place within 
the context of theorising the challenges that the indeterminacy of ‘postmodernism’ might 
have posed for normative feminist claims against patriarchal power.  Though the 
discussion in feminist political philosophy has long since moved away from the term 
																																																								32 Foucault understands power as everywhere and in everyone.  A summary of his view: 
‘Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which 
only functions in the form of a chain. It is never located here or there, never in anybody’s 
hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and 
exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between 
its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising 
power.’ 1980,89. 33 The notion that selves, beliefs, norms, culture, and so on are socially constructed is a 
central assumption of this thesis. 
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‘postmodern’, a revision of the original debate reveals that the positions set down therein 
by Butler, Benhabib, and Fraser are still relevant in their assessment of the subject, 
agency, and identity.34  The major legacy of this discussion is the insight that the concept 
of agency will always be compromised by subjection.  The notion of narrative agency I 
defend over the course of this thesis emerges especially from Benhabib’s conception of a 
self able to make sense of herself as an ‘I’ over time and in relation to other ‘I’s’.  This 
notion of agency must relentlessly, constantly be tempered by the realisation that selves 
are inextricably embedded in relations of power. 
Benhabib is chiefly concerned with contextualising the feminist conversation, so 
that we can understand one another within the confines of the various relationships that 
define us.  A subject, in this view, has agency because she is able to make sense of her 
position in a world of other subjects.  This sense-making capacity, as I argue in Chapter 
3, is the constant across time, space, and changing cultural conditions.  In order to have 
meaningful conversations about theory, and about what feminism is and should be, we 
need to understand ourselves as sense-making agents.   In her opening essay, “Feminism 
and Postmodernism”, Benhabib questions the implications of what Jane Flax identified as 
the three central theses of postmodernism—the Death of the Subject, the Death of 
History, and the Death of Metaphysics—for feminism.  Can we accept these theses, she 
asks, if we are to remain faithful to the feminist commitment to emancipation?  
																																																								34 Drucilla Cornell’s contribution to the discussion falls within a psychoanalytic 
paradigm which depends on assumptions and a vocabulary different from those on either 
the critical theoretical (Benhabib) or poststructuralist (Butler) sides of the debate.  The 
productive disagreement I discuss here arises out of the central question about the extent 
to which political power relations compromise our agency disputed by Benhabib and 
Butler.  As a consequence, the discussion of agency in psychoanalytic feminism, though 
it has some overlap with Butler’s work, is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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According to Benhabib, these postulates are only useful if taken up in their ‘weaker 
formulations’, meaning that we must accept that the transcendent subject of pure reason, 
the metanarrative of historical progress, and the notion of an Archimedean point from 
which to view this progress are all illusions of Enlightenment philosophy.35  However, 
Benhabib argues, we must not take the acceptance of these theses to mean that we can no 
longer posit any norms by which to exercise critique.   
The question, rather, is how might we posit more self-conscious, relational, and 
contextual norms?  For example, in her reformulation of the Death of the Subject thesis, 
which she reads as the death of the sovereign male subject, she argues that feminist 
critical theory must recognise the subject as ‘situated’, ‘gendered’, and ‘heteronomously 
determined’ but must avoid theorising a subject that is ‘just another position in 
language/discourse’.36 The subject is not an a priori formation, but each subject is 
capable of telling her own story and creating her own meaning.  This process of meaning 
creation is the foundation of Benhabib’s notion of narrativity, and it is the conceptual 
bedrock for my definition of narrative agency.37  The subject always acts as both author 
of and character within her own story and has the capacity to make meaning by bringing 
together the narrative of her life, even as she recognises her situatedness as a character in 
her own narrative and in the narratives of others—and, by extension, her limited authorial 
control.38 
Instead of metanarratives, then, we should concern ourselves with these small 
narratives, all of which necessarily involve the self in relation to others.  They may be in 																																																								35 Benhabib et. al. 1995, 18. 36 Ibid., 18. 37 Benhabib 1992, 126. 38 Benhabib et. al. 1995, 47.
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conflict or contrast with others’ narratives, and so they do not have access to any 
transcendent truth; nor can they be completely controlled by the subject.  Benhabib 
argues that each subject, situated within a particular episteme with all of its specific 
norms and assumptions, can reflexively experience her self through the process of 
making sense of the world around her and her position within it.39  It is within this 
episteme, then, that the subject conducts her critique—philosophy is carried out 
according to the ‘knowledge-governing interests which mark and direct its activities.’40 
The subject of practical philosophy does not have to be concerned with metaphysical 
truth in order to confront the claims made by preferential and prejudicial norms and to 
make narrative sense of her life. 
Further, if one were to accept too strong a version of the ‘Death of Man’ thesis, 
one could not address the transformative and emancipatory goals of feminism.  Benhabib 
sees in Judith Butler’s model of a subject who is nothing more than the norms which 
define her ‘a complete debunking of selfhood, agency and autonomy.’41 Conceiving the 
subject as having no identity other than that which she performs seems, to Benhabib, to 
be counter-productive for feminism.  Isn’t it already difficult enough for women to 
express themselves, to tell their stories, without conceiving of those stories as nothing 
more than performances?  The theoretical move of ‘reducing female agency to a “doing 
																																																								39 I use the word episteme here as Foucault uses it: to refer to the historical conditions 
which make knowledge possible (Foucault 2002, 211).  Benhabib herself plays with the 
tension between the classical notion of episteme as the justification of true belief and the 
Foucaultian, what she calls ‘postmodern’, understanding of an as the shifting ground of 
the knowable (1992, 203-241).  All this to say, the concerns of a particular episteme are 
by no means exhaustively articulable; but it is important here to contextualise the goals of 
feminist critique within the framework of feminist critical theory. 40 Ibid., 19. 41 Ibid., 21. 
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without the doer”’ relegates the subject to ‘just another position in language.’42 Rather 
than understanding the subject as totally constituted by speech acts, the important thing is 
to see in the subject a tendency to use language pragmatically, to make sense of the 
uniquely situated and embedded self rather than to think of the self as engaged in an 
interminable process of resignification. 
Butler, on the other hand, sees Benhabib’s assumption that the subject is capable 
of having access to her own story as counterproductive, even dangerous, because it 
prevents a sufficient interrogation into the possibility that the subject is completely 
constituted by power.  We cannot simply situate the subject within the power structure, 
Butler argues: we must conceptualise the subject as part of that power structure, imbued 
with and embodying all of the mechanisms of power.  However, in her response to 
Benhabib, “Contingent Foundations”, Butler claims that she is not advocating the death 
of the subject altogether.  On the contrary, she sees the subject as having agency in 
recognising power at work within herself.  As Butler puts it: ‘the constituted character of 
the subject is the very precondition of its agency.  For what is it that enables a purposive 
and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can 
be turned against itself, reworked, resisted?’43 It is through an engagement with and a 
reorganisation of technologies of domination that the subject exercises her agency, rather 
than through the construction of a narrative about her experience.  
For Butler, as for Foucault, political theory does not ‘require a notion of the 
subject from the start’; rather, its task is ‘to ask after the process of [the subject’s] 
																																																								42 Ibid., 22.   43 Ibid., 46. 
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construction’ and to consider how this construction, in turn, relates to political theory.44 
In other words, the process of critique is responsible for the immanent interrogation of all 
normative constructions.  Indeed, Butler sees in Benhabib’s concise refutation of all of 
postmodernism with the confrontation of three theses a distressing oversimplification.  To 
group together a vast and heterogeneous field of theory under the term ‘postmodernism’ 
and then to proceed to theorise the strengths and weaknesses of this ‘artificially 
constructed whole’ is to enact a harmful normative dominance by enforcing these 
arbitrary norms.45 
Power, according to Butler, is ubiquitous; it operates in both the ‘conceptual 
apparatus’ that seeks to negotiate the terms of critique and in the ‘subject position of the 
critic’.46  Any critique must start from a perspective which determines the pervasiveness 
of power and must also concern itself with an examination of the authority granted within 
the foundations of ubiquitous power.  We must ask: Who or what is excluded by the pre-
existing norms?  Who benefits from the preferences and prejudices implicit in these 
norms?  How can we stretch and re-interpret these norms to be more inclusive?  For 
Butler, answering these questions must be a perpetually discursive process, one which 
involves resignification rather than the artificial assumption of normative legitimacy. 
So too, for Butler, must any discussion of agency and the subject grow out of this 
process of admission, examination, and resignification.  The subject cannot be seen to 
exist outside of or apart from his or her social and discursive positions.  The will of the 
subject and her actions, will always depend on her constitution and subordination by a 
																																																								44 Ibid., 37. 45 Ibid., 51. 46 Ibid., 47. 
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certain set of norms and commitments to those norms.  These subordinating 
commitments, then, are a precondition for subjectivity: ‘subjects who institute actions are 
themselves instituted effects of prior actions, and...the horizon in which we act is there as 
a constitutive possibility of our very capacity to act.’47  The conventional notion of 
autonomy as reflexive critical capacity relies on the misguided belief that an individual 
can have control over her own action in the world.  However, according to Butler, the 
subject constituted by this ubiquitous structure of power is not necessarily determined by 
it.  We can, she argues, interrogate possibilities for agency by asking after ‘possibilities 
of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the 
legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of 
regulation that can destabilize existing power regimes.’48 
Agency, in Butler’s account, involves a constant reworking of the foundations of 
every relationship—of self to society as a whole, of self to other, of self to self—and an 
unflinching interrogation of power at work in these relationships.  Agency is resistance, 
in this view, rather than a capacity.  The self cannot hope to exist outside of or apart from 
these relationships of power (to seek such universality is to fail to recognise that all 
relationships of power are necessarily exclusionary and limiting).  The function of the 
agent vis-à-vis these relationships and the norms they foster is, as Butler puts it, ‘to 
continue to use them, to repeat them, to repeat them subversively, and to displace them 
from the contexts in which they have been deployed as instruments of oppressive 
power.’49  The goal, then, is to knowingly re-inscribe these relationships and norms in 
																																																								47 Ibid., 43. 48 Ibid., 47. 49 Ibid., 51. 
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ways that subvert or challenge them.  These re-inscriptions may take the form of parody, 
of art, of text, of discursive theory—in short, of performance.  Feminist concerns, Butler 
argues, can be more productively addressed by this subversion of pre-existing norms 
rather than through a somewhat naïve and necessarily exclusionary positing of feminist 
norms as universal or universalisable.50 
The perspectives of Butler and Benhabib have seemed to many theorists to be 
polar opposites.  On the one hand, Benhabib argues for the importance of protecting the 
presence of certain values—emancipation, agency, universality—in theorising the 
feminist subject.  On the other hand, Butler argues against putting any such values 
beyond question.  However, in her rebuttal to Butler and Benhabib, Nancy Fraser 
proposes that these two accounts of critique and the subject are bound by ‘false 
antitheses’ and that, with the right reformulations, the empirical insights proposed by 
poststructuralists may be integrated into the normative processes advocated by critical 
theorists.  Both points of view offer important insights into critique, the subject, and 
agency. 
Fraser argues that both Benhabib and Butler have posed too inflexible a 
distinction between poststructuralism and critical theory: Benhabib is reluctant to admit 
the possibility of a social criticism apart from philosophy, and Butler is unwilling to see 
the viability of Benhabib’s ideas about communication, transformation and emancipation.  
These false antitheses compromise the force of each argument, and they present the 
																																																								50 And yet, without communicative mutual recognition, it is hard to imagine how 
performance can effectively resist and challenge power.  The peformative model of 
agency, I will argue, is only effective when underscored by a notion of agency that can 
explain how parody, art, and so on, are meaningful. 
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reader with the impression that feminists must choose between either Butler’s or 
Benhabib’s feminism—that there is no middle ground between the situated, normative 
work of critical theory on the one hand and the empirical interrogation of power on the 
other.  For Fraser, this dichotomy is irrelevant and unnecessary.  Benhabib’s conception 
of a subject who subscribes to values such as emancipation is not negated by the 
poststructuralist insistence on leaving those very values ever-open to interpretation.  By 
the same token, Butler’s conception of a subject who is constituted by power does not 
take sufficiently into account the importance of liberation as an ideal.  As Fraser puts it: 
‘Feminists do need to make normative judgments and to offer emancipatory 
alternatives...[they] need both deconstruction and reconstruction, destabiliation of 
meaning and projection of utopian hope.’51  Fraser proposes, as a result of her reading, an 
enduring task for feminism: ‘[to] integrate the insights of critical theory with the insights 
of poststructuralism.’52   
 
 
1.2 The Politics of Ourselves: Between Agency and Subjection 
 
 
Different feminists have reworked the terms of this debate in different ways.  Amy Allen, 
for one, takes Nancy Fraser’s “False Antitheses” essay as the starting point for 
constructing her framework for subjectivity in The Politics of Ourselves (2008).  Allen 
agrees with Fraser that there is a fertile middle ground to be explored between Butler and 
Benhabib.  However, she reads Fraser as overly optimistic about the possibility of using 
poststructuralist insights in order to carry out critical theory.  For Allen, the terms of the 																																																								51 Ibid., 71.  I will return to the importance of making judgments in feminism in Chapter 
5. 52 Ibid., 73. 
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Butler-Benhabib debate must be reformulated in order to successfully theorise the middle 
ground between the two: in other words, it is important to incorporate both ways of 
thinking about subjectivity. Allen provides the basic methodology for this thesis: a 
concrete theoretical framework based on close comparative reading.  The task for 
feminist political theory, therefore, is not just to integrate the ‘explanatory-diagnostic’ 
insights of poststructuralism with the ‘anticipatory-utopian’ process of critical theory; 
rather feminist theory must re-conceptualise the central insights at the foundation of the 
development of this debate.53  The anticipatory-utopian aspects of poststructuralism must 
be drawn out and expanded upon: Is there room in poststructuralism for moments of 
recognition?  For feminist ideals of emancipation and mutual recognition?  By the same 
token, critical theory must be re-examined and re-evaluated where it retains a rationalist 
reliance on claims to transcend context or an overly optimistic account of autonomy vis-
à-vis relationships of power.  For Allen, this project of re-reading and re-formulating is a 
question of looking at the work of Foucault and Habermas, as well as that of Butler and 
Benhabib.  As Allen puts it: 
Some modifications in each of these perspectives will be necessary: for instance, 
some room for an account of intersubjectivity will have to be found—or created—
in Butler and Foucault; conversely, strong Habermasian claims about the status of 																																																								53 Allen’s agency-subjection framework is based on the idea that feminist theory must be 
both ‘explanatory-diagnostic’ and ‘anticipatory-utopian’ in its aims.  Allen 2008, 3.  The 
distinction between these twin tasks is originally made by Benhabib: ‘…the historically 
known gender-sex systems have contributed to the oppression and exploitation of 
women. The task of feminist critical theory is to uncover this fact, and to develop a 
theory that is emancipatory and reflective, and which can aid women in their struggles to 
overcome oppression and exploitation. Feminist theory can contribute to this task in two 
ways: by developing an explanatory-diagnostic analysis of women's oppression across 
history, culture and societies, and by articulating an anticipatory-utopian critique of the 
norms and values of our current society and culture, such as to project new modes of 
togetherness, of relating to ourselves and to nature in the future.’ Benhabib 1992, 152, 
emphasis added.  
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his idealizations and the possibility of the context transcendence of validity claims 
will have to be attenuated.54 
 
Thus Allen reads Foucault, Butler, Habermas, and Benhabib and reinterprets the work of 
each with the others in mind.  This feminist theoretical methodology is marked by two 
things: 1) an expanded and generous reading of both poststructuralist and critical 
theoretical perspectives on agency and 2) a constant awareness of both the reality of 
subjection and possibilities for agency. 
To develop such an integration, Allen argues, contra Fraser, that it is not 
sufficient to use poststructuralist accounts of subjectivity to understand the limits of the 
autonomy of Habermas’ subject of critical theory.  Instead, she attempts to mine the work 
of Foucault and Butler for the ideas of mutual recognition and reflexivity—to actually 
look through their work in the interest of finding those moments when mutual recognition 
and reflexivity are implied.  She then rigorously interrogates and reworks the versions of 
subjectivity put forth by Habermas and Benhabib in order to ensure each theory fully 
accounts for the extent of the subject’s inability to transcend subordinating power 
structures.  Importantly, Allen argues that this task of reinterpretation looks different with 
regard to Habermas and Benhabib than it does with regard to Foucault and Butler.  
Whereas Allen looks at poststructuralism with the intention of identifying moments of 
implicit mutual recognition, she looks at critical theory with the intention of assessing 
whether or not explicitly identified moments of mutual recognition are reliant on an 
overly-robust definition of autonomy.   
The stated goal of Allen’s project is ‘to develop a framework that does justice to 
both aspects of the politics of ourselves: a framework that theorizes subjection without 																																																								54 Allen 2008, 8. 
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sacrificing the possibility of autonomy and that theorizes autonomy without denying the 
reality of subjection.’55  The purpose of developing such a framework is, ultimately, to 
cultivate possibilities for ‘critical self-constitution and progressive social 
transformation’.56 She painstakingly reworks the theories of Foucault, Butler, Habermas, 
and Benhabib with the purpose of keeping both aspects of this framework, subjection and 
agency, in mind at all times.  Foucault provides Allen with the conception of power as 
ubiquitous in society and in the subject.  The subject’s passionate attachment to 
subordinating power relationships even when they have been rationally demystified is 
drawn out in Butler’s analysis of psychic attachment.  In Foucault and in Butler, 
however, Allen argues for an expanded concept of the social, one which would be able to 
account for mutual recognition and to recognise positive resignification.  Habermas, 
whose work often draws on the primacy of mutual recognition, must be reminded that 
power is at work in even the most intimate of relationships and that claims of ‘positive’ 
resignification must always be recognised as contextual and contingent.  
However, Benhabib’s radically contextualised critical theory, combined with her 
notion of agency as narrative capacity, seems to meet the challenges posed by Allen’s 
framework. For Benhabib, it is not enough to say that critique is situated and contextual.  
The critic must also admit that the claims made by critique are themselves contingent and 
in no way transcendent, and she must be able to recognise that the norms she posits for 
the sake of theory arise out of the concerns of her particular episteme.  In her final 
chapter, Allen explicitly relies on Benhabib’s framework to support the normative claims 
she has made over the course of her book: 																																																								55 Allen 2008, 172-173. 56 Ibid., 177. 
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It is a mistake to assume that our only options are either to hold on to the 
dangerous illusion of genuine context transcendence...or to accept a radically 
contextualist form of relativism.  Instead, as Benhabib has shown, we can only 
rely on the normative ideals of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity in 
making normative judgments while at the same time acknowledging that these are 
ideals that are rooted in the context of late Western modernity.57  
 
In order to argue that critical reflection and social change are possible and desirable in the 
face of ubiquitous power, Allen has had to make claims about the desirability of certain 
norms: namely, emancipation and mutual recognition. It is Benhabib’s contextualised 
critical theory that allows Allen to make these (admittedly contingent) validity claims. 
 Allen thus admits that Benhabib’s model of critical theory fulfils her framework 
for a critique in that it is ‘capable of an empirically grounded critical diagnosis of the 
central crisis tendencies and social pathologies of the present’ even as it ‘charts paths for 
future transformation’.58  However, Allen is reluctant to allow that Benhabib’s 
conception of the subject is equally suited to this framework because she finds that it 
does not sufficiently take into account the severity of the influence subordinating gender 
norms on the process of individuation.  I discuss this difference between Allen and 
Benhabib in detail in Chapter 3, but note here that narrative agency stands up to this 
critique.  Narrative is antiessentialist in that it does not require the subject to make any 
evaluative commitments, contingent in that it depends on the situatedness of the subject 
within a particular historical and cultural context, and fragile in that it is subject to the 
limitations of the subordinating claims made on the subject.  The deeply ingrained system 
of subordinating gender norms into which all humans are born will, as Allen argues and 
as Benhabib would agree, limit the subject’s capacity for autonomy vis-à-vis these 
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norms; it will not, however, compromise the subject’s narrative capacity. The subject will 
make sense of herself as an ‘I’ in the world whether or not she accepts or questions the 
claims of stereotypical gender norms, when she is able to recognise them at all. 
In her chapter on Judith Butler, Allen points out that the performative model of 
agency cannot account for mutual recognition or positive resignification.  Collective 
social movements must posit these two values in order to cultivate progressive social 
change.  As she puts it, social movements must ‘acknowledge mutual recognition as an 
ethical ideal and understand[ing] it as a permanent—though temporally fleeting—
possibility in human relationships.’59 Collective action must also create ‘conceptual and 
normative resources on which individuals can draw in their own attempts at critical 
resistances.’60  Such normative resources are a hallmark of Benhabib’s interactive 
universalism, in which she argues that meaningful community arises out of ‘common 
action, engagement and debate in the civic and public realms of democratic society’.61 
Plurality and collective political action are indispensable heuristics for feminism, 
according to Benhabib.  Furthermore, she conceives of collective identity in just the way 
Allen suggests.  Group narratives depend on the interplay of similarity and difference, on 
‘the fluidity of the boundaries between the self and others.’62 Relationships within 
collective social movements can never be free from the silencing that accompanies 
asymmetries of power and negation, but they are, by their very nature, implicitly 
dependent on moments of mutual recognition. 
																																																								59 Allen 2008, 95. 
60 Ibid., 183. 61 Benhabib 1992, 11. 62 Benhabib 1999, 351. 
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Narrative agency may also occur to the creation of art, which Allen argues is a 
possible site for social and self transformation: ‘narratives embedded in literary fiction 
and autobiography can generate new cultural understandings of concepts such as 
democracy, equality, the good life, and the public sphere.’63  Narrative agency is the 
capacity to make meaningful the ways in which we interact with one another precisely 
because it can generate such new understandings.  The resignification of norms carried 
out by the performative model of agency always creates a ‘surfeit of meaning, creativity, 
and spontaneity’.64 Narrative can address and account for this positive resignification.  
Benhabib discusses the work of author Toni Morrison as an example of narrative art 
which has effected and is still effecting social change.  She writes: ‘It is thanks to Toni 
Morrison’s tremendous contributions in giving voice to Black Americans, and African-
American women in particular, that we have learned something about the variability of 
“narratives and codes” across groups and cultures and genders.’65 Art has the potential to 
address social concerns and affecting social transformation in just the way Allen 
suggests.  
 Thinking of the subject as simultaneously informed by subjection and agency is a 
difficult endeavour, one which does require a broad, cross-theoretical understanding of 
both power and agency.  The feminist theorist does, indeed, have a responsibility both to 
analyse carefully the reality of subordination, even as she looks toward possibilities for 
transforming subordinating power structures.  The first task involves admitting that there 
is no outside to power and that the subordinating structures that define us are a 
																																																								63 Allen 2008, 184. 64 Benhabib 1999, 341. 65 Ibid., 344-345.  
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precondition for identity.  But this ubiquitous subordination does not preclude 
possibilities for agency.  Though power is at work in every relationship, it is, as Allen 
points out, not the only thing that constitutes every relationship; so we must ‘think of 
mutual recognition and normative reciprocity not as static end states but as moments 
within such relationships.’66 Positing these fleeting moments of mutual recognition as 
possible sites for transformation seems to me a very productive way to conceptualise the 
ever-changing task of the feminist theorist.   
 
 
1.3 Escaping the Subject-Centered Frame? 
 
Drawing on Benhabib and Allen, I think of agency as the ever-present capacity for 
recognition and reciprocity: in short, as the capacity for making sense between ourselves.  
Agency is the subject’s potential to create new meaning in the space between herself and 
other subjects.  There are several possible challenges to such a conception of agency, but 
the most salient seems still to be: does this conception of the subject allow for a plurality 
of feminisms?  Or does theorising the subject, any subject—even as an ever-shifting 
formation, totally dependent on the web of relations into which she is born—necessarily 
commit us to a limited and exclusionary notion of feminist freedom? Does imagining a 
subject who is the site of recognition and reciprocity come too close to positing an 
unproblematic autonomy?  In other words, does a theoretical framework that keeps in 
mind both subjugation and agency carry with it a hidden, and potentially harmful, 
reliance on a subject wrongfully construed as sovereign? 
																																																								66 Allen 2008, 179, emphasis in original. 
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 In Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom (2005), Linda Zerilli offers a compelling 
argument that any conception of the feminist subject succumbs to these problems because 
such a conception forces us to theorise from within an intrinsically paradoxical ‘subject-
centred’ frame (any discussion of the subject leads to an unanswerable question about the 
balance of subjectivity and subjection).  There has never, she argues, been a coherent or 
easily definable subject of feminism; rather, the essence of the feminist subject has 
always been collective and, moreover, fraught.  The legacy of feminism ‘was divided 
from the start, wracked by differences over the causes or form of oppression, disputes 
over the meaning of liberation, and competing understandings of what democratic ideas 
like freedom and equality…should even look like.’67  Radically democratic movements 
are always marked by this kind of uncertainty because they are invested in creating 
something new and cannot predetermine what they will create.  Like democracy, 
feminism is plagued by the paradox of its founding: it had to declare its subject (its 
identity as a women’s movement) when it first declared its political aims. To make 
claims on behalf of women is to count oneself as a member of the feminist fold, and this 
move, like the move to include everyone within democracy, is always exclusionary in 
practice.  
Theories of the subject cannot help but be influenced by Enlightenment ideals of 
freedom of the will and, therefore, conflate the autonomous capacity to understand and 
control our actions (which Zerilli calls, after Arendt, the ‘I-will’) and the freedom to act 
(the ‘I-can’).  As long as we keep trying to define a subject, she argues, we keep re-
inscribing a ‘dangerous fantasy of sovereignty’ because we implicitly endorse the 
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Enlightenment ideal of the Subject of pure reason.68  Instead, we should try to cultivate a 
political freedom focused on acting and doing in the world by shifting our inquiry from a 
subject-centred to a world-centred way of thinking about feminist politics.  Where Allen 
wants to give a revised account of the subject of feminism and of subject formation itself, 
Zerilli wants to do away completely with both variations of the subject problem.   
Feminist theory is haunted by the ghost of autonomy as sovereignty when it takes 
on the subject question, for a discussion of ‘subjectivity’ is always either about 
reinterpreting autonomy so that it is available to the less-than-sovereign subject or 
revealing the extent to which power relations compromise sovereignty of the will and 
make autonomy impossible.  This confusion of freedom with sovereignty is a conceptual 
inevitability, Zerilli argues, so long as we frame questions about agency and autonomy as 
subject questions.  Theories in the latter camp are still immersed in discussions of the 
subject; they just theorise subject formation in subjectivity’s ‘negative space’.  So, 
feminism remains ‘ambivalently beholden to the terms of the subject question’.69 
However, Zerilli’s emphasis on action in the political, though intended to move us 
away from theories of the subject, may actually help us better articulate what happens in 
those moments of mutual recognition and normative reciprocity Allen finds room for in 
her framework for subjectivity.  In other words, we can start to isolate and imagine 
moments of narrative agency by taking into account Zerilli’s new model of 
communicative political action, one that does not reinscribe overly demanding validity 
claims.  Zerilli would almost certainly object to my reading of her as a theorist of 
narrative agency, but I think she can be (quite productively) read this way for several 																																																								68 Ibid., 9. 69 Ibid.,12. 
	 53 
reasons:  first, she makes the important distinction between the capacity to act and the 
capacity to exert control over one’s actions (though, in the process, she problematically 
jettisons the concept of individual agency); second, she gives us a very compelling 
definition of feminist freedom through action in the world; third, she emphasises the 
essential intersubjectivity of action; and, finally, she endorses the practice of reclaiming 
and retelling feminist narratives, which, I will argue, is itself an exercise of narrative 
agency.70 
 The danger of conflating autonomy and agency, as mentioned in the Introduction 
to this thesis, is a very important consideration when developing a definition of feminist 
agency because the autonomous subject of western philosophy, as many feminists in the 
second and third wave have shown, has always been implicitly (and often explicitly) 
masculine.71  Autonomy has traditionally been associated with the exercise of the will 
(which Kant tells us is a law unto itself) of this sovereign male subject, whose ‘death’ 
was debated in the first section of this chapter.  The exercise of sovereign free will has 
depended, as de Beauvoir famously showed us, on the submission of others, especially 
women.72  Dethroned though this sovereign subject has been by feminist and other kinds 
of theories (psychoanalytic, poststructuralist, critical, and political, to name a few) 
discussions of autonomy often still presuppose the subject’s capacity to freely and 
critically reflect upon and, through the use of reason, make judgments about, the world. 
Feminists who have lamented this untenable assumption of the individual subject’s 
																																																								70 I also engage with Zerilli’s vision of feminist politics through a discussion of her work 
on judgment in Chapter 5.   71 Feminists who have argued that the conventional autonomous subject is male include 
de Beauvoir (2011), Lloyd (1993a), Gatens (1991), LeDoueff (1991).  72 De Beauvoir (2011)  
	 54 
freedom of the will, from de Beauvoir to Butler, have argued that women cannot claim 
this sovereign subjectivity and still unproblematically identify as women.73  And yet, 
women must confront the fact that they are women, and so they are caught in a cycle of 
unfreedom; their gender gets in the way of their sovereignty.74  
 The tendency to read feminism through a subject-centred lens has arisen, 
according to Zerilli, out of a confusion of political freedom, which is the condition of 
democratic uncertainty, and philosophical freedom, which is bound up in the canonical 
definition of freedom as sovereignty of the will.  Non-sovereignty of the will is only 
compatible with freedom when we think of freedom as arising out of action.  This 
definition of freedom, which Zerilli borrows from Arendt’s notion that ‘there…exist[s] a 
freedom which is not an attribute of the will but an accessory of doing and acting’75 is the 
proper one for feminism because feminism (like many other strands of political theory) is 
concerned with the ongoing creation of radically new ways of thinking about the world: 
The theory appropriate to politics…is itself a doing not a knowing to guide doing 
from a place outside it.  Such theory would turn on the ability to form critical 
judgments from within the ordinary, that is, on the reflective ability to relate 
particulars to each other in unexpected (not necessary or logical) ways by creating 
new forms for organizing our experience.  Above all, such a theory could not be 
given in advance of experience, including of course our political praxis, for it 
emerges out of our activity itself.76 
 																																																								73 ‘…the masculine fantasy of sovereignty…turns on women’s submission, it nonetheless 
inclined toward a conception of freedom that either sets the individual woman against 
“all her sex” (that is, the exceptional woman who escapes or denies the social condition 
of her gender) or requires a woman’s full identification with “her sex” (that is, an 
antipolitical kinship relationship in the form of an all-powerful sisterhood that obliterates 
particularity and with it plurality).  In both cases, freedom is articulated as sovereignty, 
be it an “I” against all the other or an “I” multiplied and extended into an omnipotent 
“we”.’  Zerilli on de Beauvoir, 2005, 10. 74 Women may ‘confront’ gender in any number of ways, but confront it they must.   75 Arendt 2006c, 165. 76 Zerilli 2005, 64. 
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So far, so good.  I applaud Zerilli’s emphasis on freedom in action, rather than freedom 
of the will because it reflects the commitment (which I share) to the idea of the subject as 
non-sovereign.  Much better to think of agency as the initiation of action in the world 
than to think of it as an exercise of control over action or as the institution of a static rule, 
law, or normative judgment.  Strangely (or, perhaps, predictably since she expunged from 
her theory of freedom all of the terms of the subject question, including agency), Zerilli 
cannot see that the capacity to ‘form critical judgments from within the ordinary’ might 
constitute, in itself, a compelling definition of agency.   
 Zerilli is right to say that feminists have so thoroughly accounted for subject 
formation by and through relations of power (whether the subject in question is the ‘I’ of 
the individual or the ‘we’ that speaks for women) that they have ‘tended to lose sight of 
freedom as a political problem of the “I-can”.’77  She is wrong, however, in thinking that 
redefining freedom as a political problem allows us to shrug off the subject-centered 
frame.  Moreover, her move to conceptualise political freedom outside of the subject 
question compromises the potential for individual emancipation which arises out of 
acting politically in the first place.  She explicitly denies that the question she poses is 
one of agency:  
Ambivalently beholden to the terms of the subject question, however, [feminist 
theorists of subjectivity] remain tied to a conception of politics that makes agency 
the condition of any political existence whatsoever.  Accordingly, the political 
formation of the “we” in a feminist practice of freedom seems wholly contingent 
upon the subject’s capacity for agency, thus forever returning the subject to the 
vicious circle in which it plays out the drama of its subjection.  Rather than rush 
to solve the problem of agency, however, let us pause and ask why we think that 
agency is the paramount problem for feminism after identity problems.78 
 																																																								77 Ibid., 11. 78 Ibid., 12. 
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But the political freedom Zerilli invites us to pursue here is grounded in agency—the 
capacity to act politically (in the context of a plurality of other actors) is an indispensible 
aspect of, and, indeed, a precondition for, action.  Rather than throwing out the subject 
question, we ought to reframe it along these lines: enquiring after the subject (as Allen 
and Benhabib have argued) requires that we first identify some capacity of the subject 
and not that we identify the subject herself.  We must establish a subject’s agency before 
we can say anything about political action.79  
 Shifting our thinking from a concern with means-ends politics to an interest in 
open-ended, action-based politics, as Zerilli suggests we do, helps with this reframing.  
The question of agency in feminist philosophy ought to be a question of what we do 
when we act politically, and not whether or not we can determine, through political 
claims-making, a static set of rules about how politics can help us achieve our goals.  
Politics must, instead, remain open-ended and must shift its focus depending on the new 
ideas introduced into the political sphere by acting and speaking agents.  Political 
participation, when it involves the kind of reciprocity and recognition we set as our ideal 
in section 2, is an end in itself.  Zerilli rightly endorses a view politics as action between 
members of a plurality, a view which she gets directly from Hannah Arendt.  I will have 
much more to say on reading feminist theories of agency through Arendt’s conceptual 
vocabulary in the Chapter 4, but, for now, suffice it to say that the insights into political 
freedom Zerilli offers through her reading of Arendt are important because they 
emphasise the necessarily intersubjective nature of all political action.  Freedom, which 
for Arendt involves both the initiative (and she does insist that it is an initiative, albeit an 
																																																								79 I will come back to the relationship between agency and identity in Chapter 3. 
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irresistible one) of inserting oneself into the world and being recognised by others in the 
world.80  Decentring freedom in this way automatically defuses the ‘dangerous fantasy of 
sovereignty’ that looms over our discussions of the subject.   
Unfortunately, Zerilli does not recognise that the initiative to act in the world, to 
insert oneself into a plurality, is a matter of exercising agency: ‘Foregrounded in Arendt’s 
account of action is something less about the subject (for example, its stability/instability 
or its capacity/noncapacity for agency) than about the world (for example, its 
contingency) into which the subject is arbitrarily thrown and into which it acts.’81  It is 
true that Arendt does not recognise the necessity of defining the subject’s identity; 
however, she puts much more emphasis than Zerilli suggests on the importance of the 
uniqueness of the subject’s disclosure, which she calls whoness.  It is only because the 
subject is unique that her action is able to introduce new meaning into the world.  Zerilli 
seems to read the subject’s initiative toward action as purely arbitrary, almost accidental 
when it is, in fact, the action itself, and the results of that action, which Arendt sees as 
arbitrary and unpredictable.82  The initiative to act is always there, is ultimately 
irresistible, and the product of the complex and constantly changing factors—belief, 
desire, predisposition, and so on—that make up a unique individual’s place in the world.  
Action is particular to the set of circumstances in which it takes place, but agency is 																																																								80 Arendt 1958, 176.   81 Zerilli 2005, 14, emphasis in original. 82 ‘If we look upon freedom with the eyes of the tradition, identifying freedom with 
sovereignty, the simultaneous presence of freedom and non-sovereignty, of being able to 
begin something new and of not being able to control or even foretell its consequences, 
seems almost to force us to the conclusion that human existence is absurd.  In view of 
human reality and its phenomenal evidence, it is indeed as spurious to deny human 
freedom to act because the actor never remains the master of his acts as it is to maintain 
that human sovereignty is possible because of the incontestable fact of human freedom.’ 
Arendt 1958, 235. 
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constant capacity across circumstances.  Though it is constant, it is also dynamic—and 
inexhaustible—the capacity to insert oneself into the world again and again in an endless 
variety of ways.  Put another way, agency is not the capacity of a doer with a set identity 
who makes a sovereign decision to impose her will on the world; it is, rather, the capacity 
of a situated, non-sovereign, variously identified subject to appear as a unique being in 
the world.  Action may be, in Arendt’s words ‘frighteningly arbitrary’ because it sets in 
motion a multitude of other actions beyond the agent’s control, but each action springs 
from a singular agent.  Zerilli emphasises radical freedom.  She writes: ‘the ability to 
form critical judgments from within the ordinary, that is, on the reflective ability to relate 
particulars to each other in unexpected (not necessary or logical) ways by creating new 
forms for organizing our experience’.  The agent may always be engaged, then, in 
coming up with something new.  Zerilli calls action in politics—that is, action for its own 
sake and not as a means to an end—the practice of freedom.83   
Some very important correctives to feminist theories of the subject have come out 
in this close reading of Zerilli’s work on freedom.  Reconceiving freedom and agency as 
non-sovereign concepts allows us to imagine a decentred politics in which each 
individual member of a plurality has, again and again, something unique to add to 
political conversation.  This image enriches Allen’s framework of subjectivity, in which 
the subject is always contingently capable of communicating with other subjects.  The 
dangers of subjection may be amerliorated when we concern ourselves not with the ends 
of politics, but with the intersubjective give-and-take which actually constitutes 
politics—and with the newly thinkable that arises out of moments of mutual recognition 
																																																								83 Zerilli 2005, 64.  
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and reciprocity.  If we remember, at all times, that the world of politics is contingent and 
constantly renewing itself, then we can think of agency as the capacity to participate, to 
insert one’s unique perspective, into this ongoing conversation.  
 
The agency aporia in feminism remains an urgent problem.  It is still the case that 
feminist politics both needs to assert that there is a subject of feminism who can make 
claims about her experiences as a woman and to recognise that, as Zerilli rightly puts it, 
‘…it seems as if the paradox of subject-formation is installed as a vicious circle of 
agency at the heart of politics.’ And because we are caught in this vicious circle and have 
no clear concept of agency, it is ‘hard to see how politics could ever be a truly 
transformative practice that might create something new, forms of life that would be 
more freedom enabling.’84  If our goal is (and it should be) to cultivate the freedom-
enabling and transformative aspects of politics, then we must have a way to talk about the 
capacity of individual women to participate in, and to feel an essential part of, that 
politics.   Combining insights offered by feminists who have been involved in the agency 
debates of the last thirty years, however, can result in a powerful definition of agency, 
one that might even be capable of increasing the emancipatory potential feminist theory 
has long struggled to deliver. 
 I charge my concept of narrative agency with this very task of increasing 
feminism’s emancipatory potential.  The agency debate has already gone a long way 
toward clearing the ground for this concept. Out of the vicious circle of agency, stories, 
																																																								84 Ibid., 12. 
	 60 
rather than fully autonomous subjects, emerge.  They emerge because individuals—
always uniquely situated amongst, and in conversation with other individuals—tell them.  
Narrative agency is the capacity to make sense of oneself as an ‘I’ over time and 
with relation to other ‘I’s’.  The concept of narrative agency I have begun to defend in 
this chapter and develop over the course of this thesis is marked by five basic 
characteristics: (1) it is primary to narrative content; (2) it is grounded in uniqueness;  (3) 
it is non-sovereign; (4) it is essentially communicative; (5) it is (theoretically) infinitely 
generative.  I explore each of these characteristics in detail throughout the thesis, but it is 
important to make clear what I mean by each.   
First, narrative agency is the constant and irreducible capacity of an individual to 
‘make sense’.85  What ‘sense’ she makes is unpredictable and fluid.  In Chapter 2, I argue 
that an agent always has a sense of who she is when she is acting—she always has, in 
other words, a practical narrative identity.  This practical narrative identity, whatever it 
may be, first depends on the capacity to make sense of oneself as an ‘I’ at all.  
Second, that the capacity of narrative agency is grounded in uniqueness means 
that the sense that each individual within a plurality makes of his or her experience is 
unique to that individual.  No two human beings occupy the same place in the world—the 
same position in the web of stories that make up human existence.   
But, third, by the same token, each individual is constantly and inextricably 
embroiled in this web of stories and will, as a result, make sense of his or her life using 
																																																								85 It is worth keeping in mind that sense-making itself, like the idea of autonomy, has 
traditionally been the province of men.  Women have had to make sense of themselves in 
relation to men and using the language of men in order to be recognised by men.  
Communicability between women is thus an essential aspect of increasing women’s 
agency.  I explore this idea in Chapter 5. 
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the norms, language, expectations, imaginations, etc. of other people.  The capacity to 
make sense of one’s life is non-sovereign, in that individuals are constituted by and 
through relationships with others and in that sense-making does not (and cannot) involve 
an individual removing herself from the world in order to tell a story about that world.  
Fourth, within the plurality of sense-makers intersubjectively forming stories that 
make sense about the world, there must be a consensus about what ‘makes sense’.  This 
kind of mutual agreement does not occur every time an individual comes up with a 
narrative about the world, but it must take place sometimes in order for the individual to 
experience sense at all—to understand that she appears to others as a unique individual 
capable of sense-making.  More than that, the capacity to make sense of the world is 
essentially relational, in that the narrative agent assumes that he or she will be recognised 
and understood by another.  There is always, in other words, an imagined conversation 
partner in even the most rudimentary exercise of narrative agency.  Mutual recognition 
between narrative agents is what sustains the world.   
This leads us to the fifth and final characteristic of narrative agency: its infinite 
generativity.  Unique individuals within the world will always be able to make new 
stories about it.  The continued exercise of narrative agency (that is, the continued 
creation of new stories) is possible for every agent in every set of circumstances (though, 
as we shall see in Chapter 6, there might be a possible exception to this universality in the 
concentration camps).   
 I explore the implications of this concept narrative agency using a feminist 
theoretical framework which is informed by a number of diverse philosophical 
influences.  This thesis sets an ambitious methodological agenda in order to argue as 
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robustly as possible for the importance of agency.  It takes seriously postructuralism’s 
insights about the nature of power and attachment to power.  It practices the close textual 
analysis of critical theory.  It uses analytic philosophy’s method of conceptual analysis to 
isolate and define the concepts of narrative and personal identity.  And, finally, it uses the 
political philosophy of Hannah Arendt to imagine an emancipatory and empowering 
feminist politics.  The subjectivity debates of the last quarter century have given us an 
intimidatingly vast set of insights, some of which seem hopelessly to conflict with one 
another.  Rather than be overwhelmed by these different strands of theory, we can, to use 
Moira Gatens’ metaphor, immerse ourselves in the rewarding task of stitching together a 
patchwork quilt of theory.86  Each feminist theorist’s quilt will look slightly different, for 
each feminist theorist is sure to read other feminists differently.  This too is an exercise of 
narrative agency; feminist theory itself involves particular, situated, unique subjects 
making meaningful statements about what feminism is and what it should be.  It is 
concerned with making sense of the in-between: between subjection and autonomy, 
between equality and difference, between identity and freedom.    
  
																																																								86 Gatens 1991, 1. 
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Chapter Two: Narrative Identity 
 
 
The last chapter touched on the concepts of agency, subjectivity, autonomy, power, and 
freedom; notably lacking, however, was a discussion of identity.  The problem of 
identity—of what ‘identity’ is—will be the concern of this chapter. Philosophical 
approaches to identity vary so greatly that such a treatment requires that we tease apart a 
rather intimidating cluster of questions.  Philosophers of personal identity have asked: Is 
identity simply the continuity of consciousness across time?  Which attributes of identity, 
if any, remain static over time?  Which attributes shift?  Is identity something that can be 
defined from a third personal perspective, or is a first personal perspective also required?  
Feminist theory, as we saw in Chapter 1, adds other questions to these, such as: To what 
extent do relations of power constitute identity? To what extent is the reproduction of 
these relations of power necessary for life within the specific set of norms and values into 
which an individual is born?  And to what extent can an individual challenge or shift this 
web of norms and values?  In short, feminist theory asks whether identity is a prison, a 
source of empowerment, or, perhaps, alternatively one and then the other.    
Some of the concerns of this chapter have already been mentioned—such as what 
it means to define identity through identification with something (identification with the 
category of ‘woman’, for example).  I argue that, while identification with a particular 
group is part of political action, identity itself is an open-ended, relational, and complex 
social construct which can be changed through the exercise of narrative agency.  In 
Chapter 3, I will turn to questions about the extent to which agency allows us to change 
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our identities, but in the present chapter I address the difficulties inherent in defining 
personal identity in the first place.   
It may, at first glance, seem counterintuitive to include a review of the philosophy 
of personal identity literature in a thesis on feminist theory, but I want to expand the 
scope of this work to include the philosophy of personal identity for a couple of reasons.  
First, it will enhance our understanding of identity and of narrative by adding some 
insights gained through the conceptual analysis of both terms.  Second, it will provide 
grounds for exploration of more conventional philosophical theories of identity and will, 
by extension, allow us to see how these theories are compromised by their failure to take 
seriously enough the challenges to self-sovereignty put forth in this thesis. The narrative 
identity I will argue for here is inherently relational and involves the constantly shifting 
constellation of beliefs, desires, emotions, and attachments.  However, a relational-
narrative account of identity need not abandon the idea that we can have a unified sense 
of self.  Each of us is uniquely situated in the world, and each of us has a set of 
experiences that distinguishes him or her from anyone else in the world.  Having an 
identity at all, I argue, depends on a self’s recognition that she is a unique self acting in 
the world. 
 In this chapter, I give a brief overview of the literature on personal identity and 
endorse a non-reductionist, practical, narrative account of personal identity.  This account 
is non-reductionist because it maintains that the same unique self exists over the course 
of a lifetime and that this self cannot be reduced to a particular experience or set of 
experiences.  My account is practical because it posits a self that always has some idea of 
that it is a self.  And it is narrative because it posits a self that is constituted by stories 
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about who she is (these may be as simple as the basic recognition of oneself as an ‘I’ or 
as complex as overarching autobiographical accounts of one’s life).  I then point to some 
of the problems such a narrative theory poses for the feminist model of agency introduced 
in Chapter 1.  I engage with, and ultimately reject, two criticisms of this narrative model.  
The first, made by Galen Strawson, argues that a narrative model of identity attaches 
inappropriately high ethical demands to narrative identity formation (the ethical 
narrativity thesis).  The second argues that narrative imposes a harmful subjection to 
prevailing norms in identity formation.   
I argue that a narrative theory of identity need not presuppose a strong version of 
the ethical narrativity thesis—it should, rather, locate the non-reductionist aspect of 
narrative identity in uniqueness rather than in overall narrative unity or in an idea of the 
soul or of a transcendent cogito.  The self is, instead, situated within, and constituted by, 
a web of relationships.  She is not, in other words, reducible to any one aspect of her 
identity or any one mode of experience.  She is, instead, marked by a uniqueness that 
arises out of her being born into the world different from any other human being who has 
ever been born into the world or will ever be born into the world.  Narrative unity, 
understood as the subject’s strong attachment to herself as a particular person with 
particular beliefs, opinions, commitments, etc., is arguably a worthy ethical goal, but it is 
not a necessary condition for narrative identity.  I argue, further, that the narratives that 
constitute a self’s understanding are, indeed, subordinating, as we saw in Chapter 1.  
They are, however, constantly changing, constantly changeable, and can even, under 
some circumstances, be empowering.  I argue that the narrative self is inescapably 
embedded in a web of narratives that defines her but that she is able, by making sense of 
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these narratives, able to create newly meaningful narrative configurations.  She is able to 
both rearrange the narratives that define her to create a new idea of who she is and able to 
recognise this creative capacity in others. 
 
2.1 A Narrative Theory of Personal Identity 
The problem of personal identity is notoriously complex.  It does not consist of a single 
philosophical dilemma but, rather, consists of the kinds of questions posed above: 
questions of reidentification, characterisation, consciousness, and experience.  The 
articulation of these questions in the personal identity literature often begins with a 
reading of Locke’s treatment of personal identity, which is generally agreed to be the first 
philosophical account of identity as the continuity of self-consciousness87 and which was 
concerned with the problems of persistence (how do we identify a person as ‘the same’ 
even when she has undergone drastic changes?), evidence (how do we know that this 
person is the same as the person who was in her place yesterday?), and personhood (what 
is the difference between persons and non-persons?).88  All three of these categories of 
question are tied to the general concern of reidentification—how can we tell, in other 
words, that person X at time slice 1 (t1) is the same as person Y at time slice 2 (t2)? 																																																								87 There is, of course, a huge and diverse body of work devoted to reading Locke on 
personal identity.  I begin with him because he seems to be the nexus of work in the 
philosophy of personal identity (in all of its contemporary incarnations), but there is no 
need to reproduce his argument in full here.  For in-depth readings of Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, see Ayers (1991), Strawson (2011), and Uzgalis 
(2007). 88 This parsing of Locke is borrowed from Eric Olson (2007) who adds several other 
questions to this cluster, including ‘What are we?’ (What material are we made of?  What 
parts do we have?) and ‘What do our personal pronouns refer to?’ (What is the 
metaphysical status of the ‘we’?  Are human beings asking questions of personal identity 
the only kind of questioning we?).   
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There are three general categories of answers to the reidentification question: 
biological continuity theories, psychological continuity theories, and narrative theories of 
identity, which tend to shift the question of reidentification to one of characterisation—I 
will come back to this point in a moment.  Philosophical debates on the nature of 
personal identity often focus on the question of whether bodily continuity or 
psychological continuity gives us a better way to account for continuous personal identity 
over time. Theorists on the former side of the debate consider existence of the same brain 
and body (where both refer to organic matter) to be sufficient grounds for continuous 
identity89; while those arguing the latter see psychological attributes such as memory, 
recognition, beliefs, desires, opinions, and character traits as being the appropriate factors 
for determining continuous personal identity.90   
Theorists who argue that biological criteria are appropriate for positing continuity 
between X and Y often take issue with the notion that personhood is the primary marker 
of personal identity.  That is, they are sceptical of the privileging of personhood 
(generally defined by the possession of rational and moral agency) over other ways of 
materially existing: as an infant, say, or a foetus, or a body in a permanent vegetative 
state.  Since each of ‘us’ exists in some state other than personhood at some point in our 
lives, personhood cannot be our essence.  We are more properly understood to be 
biological organisms, or, as some biological continuity theorists put it, human animals.  																																																								89 Notable biological continuity accounts include Olson (1997), De Grazia (2005), and 
Wiggins (1980). 90 The psychological continuity thesis is articulated in a number of different ways by a 
diverse group of theorists, including David Lewis (1983), Sydney Shoemaker (1984), and 
Derek Parfit (1984). I do not treat each of these theories in detail here, but the important 
thing to note is that psychological continuity theorists, however they argue, believe that 
psychological attributes, rather than biological substance, account for the sameness of 
identity over time. 
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Thus, the necessary and sufficient criterion for X at t1 to be the same as Y at t2 is 
continuity of organic matter.  Often the biological criterion is, empirically, the method of 
identification that we favour: Individual Y’s DNA might be used to confirm her sameness 
with individual X, who committed the crime; the police officer who pulls a woman over 
confirms that she is, indeed, the same individual pictured in her photo ID; the body of a 
deceased loved one is identifiable as that loved one.  The positing of a biological criterion 
for reidentification has its problems, however.  Consider, for example, what has come to 
be called the transplant intuition: if my consciousness (with my memories, my opinions, 
my beliefs, etc.) is transplanted from my body into something else (another body, a 
disembodied mind, a robot), then it is very difficult to imagine that ‘I’ am not wherever 
my consciousness has ended up.     
The psychological continuity thesis goes further toward accounting for the strong 
psychological component of reidentification, which is to say that X has enough 
psychologically in common with Y to support the claim that X is the same as Y.  
Different psychological continuity theorists explain this reidentification in different 
ways.91  Often they make use of thought experiments which present some variation of the 
transplant intuition and ask after the extent to which shared memory, belief, self-interest, 
and so on can constitute a sufficient condition for declaring that X at t1 is the same as Y 																																																								91 There are many interesting considerations that go into the articulation of a 
psychological continuity theory of identity such as the question of numerical identity (can 
there only exist one person who has the identity of X at t1 and Y at t2?); the notion that 
identities exist not just over time, but also in space (sometimes called four 
dimensionalism); and the notion that personal identity is not a relevant factor for 
reidentification (there is a series of overlapping psychological factors between X and Y, 
but there is no convincing reason to say that these continuous psychological factors 
amount to an identity, understood as a ‘self’).  I will touch on a few of these differences, 
but a full articulation of them is beyond scope of this thesis.  For a helpful overview of 
the literature on the psychological continuity thesis, see Schechtman (1996). 
	 69 
at t2.92  Generally, the project of psychological continuity theorists takes reidentification 
as its goal and uses the shared content of X’s and Y’s memories, beliefs, desires as 
evidence that X and Y are the same person at different points in time.  In other words, 
psychological continuity theorists are concerned with proving that X and Y are the same 
person, rather than with a qualitative analysis of the content of an individual’s beliefs, 
desires, memories, character traits, and so on.  Put another way: psychological continuity 
theorists posit the sameness of psychological criteria as evidence for continued identity 
(indeed, they often think of identity in terms of the continuation of psychological 
attributes)93, but they do not always enquire after what seems to matter about these 
psychological attributes.94   
Traditionally, philosophers of personal identity have treated questions of 
reidentification as metaphysical questions about identity: that is, they have been 
concerned with the necessary and sufficient conditions under which person X at t1 can be 
said to be the same as person Y at t2.  Since at least the 1970s, however, there has been an 
																																																								92 Derek Parfit offers a succinct articulation of the psychological continuity thesis: 
‘The Psychological Criterion: (1) There is psychological continuity if and only if there 
are overlapping chains of strong connectedness.  X today is one and the same person as Y 
at some past time if and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this 
continuity has the right kind of cause, and (4) there does not exist a different person who 
is psychologically continuous with Y. (5) Personal identity over time just consists in the 
holding of facts like (2) to (4).’ 1984, 206. 93 Tamar Gendler (2010) argues that many of the thought experiments used by both body 
and psychological continuity theorists are (often bizarrely) out of touch with our common 
understandings about personhood and identity. These thought experiments demand that 
we suspend most of our ordinary associations with the concept of a person in order to 
identify the most ‘essential’ aspects of personhood.  For Gendler, this methodology only 
confuses the already complex concept of personhood.  How, she asks, can we be sure that 
certain criteria for judging the concept of personhood are more valid than others?  And 
what important practical aspects of personhood are lost in the standard contemporary 
reduction of personhood to a specific set of criteria? 94 This is Marya Schechtman’s argument; I will return to it in a moment. 
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increasing trend in the literature among both biological and psychological continuity 
theorists to consider questions of personal identity from a practical, rather than (or 
sometimes along with) a metaphysical, point of view.95  That is, theorists have pointed 
out that the chief concern of any theory of personal identity is (and must be) about the 
practical and ethical necessity for reidentification.  Without a way to assert that person X 
is the same as person Y we cannot ensure that person Y is responsible for person X’s 
actions: we cannot say, for example, that the person on trial is the same person who 
committed the crime.  We cannot explain, furthermore, the feeling of moral responsibility 
that person Y has when contemplating person X’s actions (or vice versa): we cannot 
understand why Y feels guilt for X’s wrongs or that X wants to take care that Y is healthy 
and happy by making good decisions in the present.  The question of personhood, 
similarly, has urgent ethical applications for the consideration of moral quandaries such 
as animal rights, euthanasia, and abortion: when can we say that X or Y is properly a 
person?  And should/does personhood make a difference as to how person X or Y should 
be treated?   
Catriona Mackenzie (2008) argues that the assumptions made by metaphysical 
accounts of personal identity cannot completely account for the nature of identity.96  
																																																								95 Notable examples of this trend include Frankfurt (1988a), Korsgaard (1989), 
Schechtman (1996) and Mackenzie (2008).  The connection between personal identity 
and personal responsibility goes back much further than this work on practical identity.  
Indeed, Locke himself thought of identity as a ‘forensic’ term (Locke 1995, 50) and 
Thomas Reid wrote that ‘Identity…is the foundation of all rights and obligations, and of 
accountableness, and the notion of it is fixed and precise’ (Reid 1785, 321).  Theorists of 
practical identity have been concerned to respond to the tendency in twentieth century 
Anglo-American philosophy of divorcing theories of personal identity from practical and 
ethical concerns. 96 There are, of course, practical theories of identity that are not narrative.  Many 
psychological continuity theorists (most notably Parfit, 1984) are concerned with the 
	 71 
Moreover, she argues that metaphysical approaches contain other problematic 
assumptions, for instance that a ‘person’ consists of a specific set of attributes and that a 
person’s identity can be assessed over time without reference to the first-personal 
perspective.  A notion of personal identity as practical and narrative helps address the 
problems with making such assumptions. 
 One way to address the problems posed by the focus on metaphysical problems 
over practical concerns in conventional approaches to personal identity is to shift the 
questions we ask about personal identity from questions of reidentification to questions of 
characterisation—to ask why certain characteristics matter, rather than only asking 
whether they are carried over across time.  Marya Schechtman (1996, 2014) advocates 
such a shift in her critique of contemporary theories of identity.  She argues that both 
bodily and psychological continuity theorists pursue a definition of quantifiable identity 
(that is, both are concerned with the question: is person X the same person as person Y?).  
These theorists are, Schechtman argues, always also concerned with qualitative questions 
of characterisation, whether they discuss this concern or not.  They are interested, in other 
words, in the following question: ‘what are the criteria by which we can judge sameness 
in a person?’97  For most theorists of personal identity, a person is judged to be either the 
same or not the same; however, neither bodily nor psychological continuity theorists can 
account for degrees of sameness, though they often make use of a discussion of such 
qualitative differences.  The logical relation between one version of a person and another 
																																																																																																																																																																					
ethical, prudential, and legal aspects of reidentification.  It is, however, fair to say that the 
bulk of the literature on personal identity in the Anglo-American tradition has been 
chiefly concerned with a metaphysical approach to reidentification.  This point is made 
by Mackenzie (2008) and West (2008), among others. 97 Schechtman 1996, 73. 
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is enough to justify the distinction of personal identity for the bodily continuity theorists; 
the psychological relation, in the case of psychological continuity theorists.  This is a 
significant problem, since the person at t2 will always be demonstrably different from the 
person at t1.  Furthermore, the important practical questions which arise out of theories of 
identity (moral responsibility, self-interested concern, survival and compensation, are the 
four categories of practical question Schechtman names) cannot be addressed within the 
mode of reidentification alone.98  
An emphasis on numerical identity within theories of bodily continuity is, in fact, 
a question about reidentification; in other words, the biological criteria which allow us to 
answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question ‘Is this the same person?’ are useful and meaningful 
determinants. The psychological continuity theorist, on the other hand, must be after a 
totally different mode of identification: she must ask how this person can be the same as 
that person and must also wonder how these two versions of the self are different.  
Another way to put this point is to note that, for the psychological continuity theorist, the 
term ‘person’ is a descriptive way of identifying continuity but not a concept that can 
refer to the whole of an individual life.  Many (if not most) prominent theories of 
personal identity assume that the psychological unity relation is one that establishes 
commonality between person X at t1 and person Y at t2, who are causally and quantifiably 
(through the articulation of psychological criteria in common) connected but who do not 
add up to a complete or unified person.  By this way of thinking, we can give a complete 
third-personal account of an individual without reference to that individual as a (whole) 
person. This way of thinking about identity as a series of connected stages is a 
																																																								98 Ibid., 2. 
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reductionist view of personal identity.  Many reductionists argue that the only alternative 
to imagining that an identity consists of discrete stages is the a priori acceptance of some 
spiritual substance, whether that substance is conceived as a Cartesian cogito or as a 
soul.99 But theorists like Mackenzie argue for a non-reductionist theory of identity, which 
shows the limits of the dichotomy between discrete person time slices on the one hand 
and an unchanging metaphysical spiritual substance on the other in favour of a practical 
understanding of the person as a whole.100  On this understanding the unifying aspect of 
selfhood is uniqueness.  The ‘I’ who has a sense of herself in action is different from any 
other ‘I’ who has every lived or will ever live, even though she will change over the 
course of her life.  This is not, then, a metaphysical non-reductionism (this uniqueness 
does not transcend consciousness) but it is practical non-reductionism (the ‘I’ is a 
constant aspect of lived experience). 
In summary: bodily continuity theorists offer a compelling account of 
reidentification (which is practically important), but they miss important intuitions about 
what psychological mechanisms unite an identity (how do memories, beliefs, and desires 
account for the sameness of identity over time?).  Psychological continuity theorists, on 
the other hand, are concerned with these memories, beliefs, and desires only as 
epistemological criteria for establishing sameness and, as a result, are often unable to 
account adequately for the basic importance of numerical identity (the person Y used to 
be is not simply like X; she is X).  Shifting the focus from questions of reidentification to 																																																								99 Parfit (1984), Shoemaker (1984).  Parfit calls the acceptance that there exists such a 
spiritual substance the ‘further fact view’. 100 I am persuaded by Catriona Mackenzie’s definition of practical non-reductionism.  
She writes, ‘Reductionist theories of personal identity that attempt to analyse the 
continuity of identity in non-personal terms…fail to account for what persons essentially 
are.’ Mackenzie 2008, 6-7.   
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characterisation allows us to ask after the everyday identity of a person.  What character 
traits go into making a particular person who she is?   What is it, in other words, that 
allows us to say a father with dementia is ‘no longer himself’ or that gives meaning to a 
teenager’s utterance that she is ‘just trying to find herself’?  
 A narrative theory of identity has the advantage of being able both to address the 
practical concerns of a theory of personal identity and to address the characterisation 
question.  Like psychological continuity theories, narrative theories of identity are 
extremely diverse.  Indeed, some narrative theories of identity101 do not address questions 
of characterisation at all; rather, they use a narrative framework as another 
epistemological tool for establishing continuity.102  Broadly speaking, however, a 
narrative view of identity seeks to explain why and how an experience, action, or 
psychological criterion is properly attributable to a certain person.103  Without thinking in 
terms of the whole person, we miss the ‘target of all the many practical questions and 
concerns that are associated with personal identity.’104  It is personal identity as a whole, 
in other words, that is the subject of ethical and practical concerns about identity.	 When 
we try someone for murder, we are concerned not only with making sure that we have 
correctly reidentified the person on trial as the person who committed the murder (though 
this is, of course, immensely important) but also with the complex psychological 																																																								101 Mink (1970), Dennett (1992). 102 Hannah Meretoja (2014) points out that those theorists who think of narrative as a 
primarily epistemological tool subscribe to hidden ontological commitments.  In other 
words, thinking of narrative as ‘just’ a cognitive function that imposes meaning or 
structure on lived experience presupposes that lived experience is essentially anti-
narrative. 103 MacIntyre (2007), Taylor (1989), Schechtman (1996), DeGrazia (2005), Mackenzie 
(2008), Davenport (2012).  I examine the work that the concept of narrativity does in/for 
Hannah Arendt in Chapter 4. 104 Schechtman 2014, 6. 
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characterisation of the murderer.  Her motives (Did she act in a jealous rage? Was the 
victim blackmailing her?), her mental stability (Does she have a history of mental illness 
or violent behaviour?), her prudential interests (Was she acting in self-defence? to protect 
a child?) all come to bear on the practical consideration of the extent to which she can be 
held accountable for her crime.  These judgments about her character are impossible to 
make without thinking seriously about who she is and (about how we can properly 
attribute certain characteristics to her as a person).105 
 Proper attribution of characteristics often involves asking after the ‘true’ or 
‘unified’ character of the person in question: it calls into question the relationship 
between the characteristics themselves and the person’s identity.106  What is it, we might 
ask, that makes this character trait or that belief properly a part of this or that person?107  
The answer to these questions requires a narrative understanding of the person in 
question.  It requires that we say that this character trait and that belief are a part of the 
larger story of his life.  More than this, it requires that we imagine that the person in 
question is himself able to understand such psychological attributes as properly a part of 
his own life or who he is.  Events do not just happen to him in a causally related stream; 
																																																								105 Wollheim (1984) gives an especially strong argument for privileging the 
characterisation question. He argues that all of the characteristics and dispositions that 
make up a self can only make sense within the context of the self as a whole.  For him, 
the person continually constitutes her own identity through the complex process of living 
in the world. 106 Benhabib poses the characterisation: ‘[quoting Virginia Woolf’s Orlando] “Yet 
through all these changes she had remained, she reflected, fundamentally the same.” 
What is the meaning of this sameness of the self?  Through what sets of characteristics or 
activities, patterns of consciousness or behavior, do we say of someone that she is “the 
same”?  In philosophical language, how is the identity of the self that remains self-same 
to be thought of?’ 1999, 343.   107 The most influential treatment of this question of proper attributability of 
characteristics and identity is probably Harry Frankfurt’s (1988). 
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rather, he is actively involved in the creation of a unified notion of who he is.108  A 
person’s self-conception is narrative in that it involves the capacity to interpret 
experience for him or herself and to endow it with meaning within the context of her or 
his own life.109 
 
2.2 Narrative as Practical and Normative 
 
Reductionist theories of identity, as we have seen, tend to frame the question of identity 
in terms of the problem of continuity.  They are interested in the logical or psychological 
connectedness between distinct stages of personhood.  Therefore, they are interested in a 
third-personal (or non-personal) definition of identity, one that has no need of first-
personal accounts.  The individual characteristics of a person within this view are only 
important because they constitute data for the determination of logical/psychological 
unity.  Attributing characteristics, thoughts, desires, etc. to a person qua person only 
muddies the waters, according to reductionists.   
  Practically speaking, however, this kind of characterisation, or attribution of 
characteristics to a particular person, happens all the time both third personally (‘That 
comment is so typical of James’) and first personally (‘I am not the type of person who 
breaks promises’).  First personal judgments of characterisation are, indeed, intrinsic to 
everyday life.  Practically speaking, the events of a life matter to an agent and are 
meaningful to an agent because they are incorporated into the already existing web of 																																																								108 MacIntyre (2007), Taylor (1989), Schechtman (1996). 109 This not mean that a person can ever give a full or complete account of him or her 
self.  Nor does it mean that the person is able to step outside of experience to give an 
account of her self. 
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narratives into which the agent is thrown (for this reason ‘practical’ and ‘narrative’ are 
often used as virtually interchangeable ways of thinking about the ethical relation 
between self and identity, or personhood).110 Thus, a practical theory of identity must 
include a first-personal perspective.  Indeed, a useful definition of personhood is self-
constitution, or the capacity to think of oneself as an ‘I’.111  
 To flesh out the notion that identity is both practical and narrative, I will follow 
the work of Christine Korsgaard (1996) and Catriona Mackenzie (2008).  Korsgaard 
defines practical identity as ‘a description under which you value yourself, a description 
under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking.’112  Mackenzie points out that this normative, everyday idea of the self 
involves both ‘discovery’, in the sense that there are features of the self that arise out of 
circumstances beyond one’s control and ‘construction’, in the sense that a self is able to 
reflect upon and shape her own identity.113  Practical identity always involves the 
interplay of these two processes, and, though it constitutes a normative force for us, it 
does not require that we have a fixed, static notion of our character.  The idea here is that 
the circumstances in which we make judgments of characterisation about ourselves are 
constantly changing and that those judgments themselves will change over time.  What is 
constant, however, is that we exercise our capacity to make such judgments.  As 
Mackenzie puts it ‘…what is not contingent is that we are governed by some conception 
of our practical identities.  Practical identity is…both a precondition for and a product of 
																																																								110 Korsgaard 1996, 102; Davenport 2012, 14; Taylor 1989, 49-50; MacIntyre 2007, 217. 111 Benhabib (1992, 1999), Ricoeur (1991), Baker (2000), Korsgaard (1996), Schechtman 
(1996), Mackenzie (2008), Atkins (2008), Wollheim (1984). 112 Korsgaard 1996a, 101. 113 Mackenzie 2008, 9. 
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agency.’114  Identity, in other words, always plays a role in action.  Whenever I do 
something, I have a basic idea of myself—the self who is carrying out the act. 
 Practical identity also necessarily involves a conception of the self in and over 
time.  We must always navigate the relationship between past, present and future versions 
of ourselves.  This relationship involves taking responsibility for past actions and acting 
in the interest of one’s future wellbeing.  It also involves the incorporation of memory 
into one’s sense of self.  Weaving together an identity out of temporally different first-
personal perspectives is thus an innately narrative process.115  Korsgaard argues that 
identity is a cumulative, lived self-understanding, the result of what she calls self-
constitution.  She argues that the reductionist model of identity is only convincing in the 
analysis of a self in the context of a specific experience or within a specific time slice.  
The picture of a self over time that arises out of this model is, therefore, a self with a 
series of discrete experiences connected by some logical unity.  But, Korsgaard argues, 
reductionist versions of identity, even when they purport to address only the question of 
reidentification, are often ‘preceded by an essentially moral assumption—the assumption 																																																								114 Mackenzie 2008, 11, emphasis added.  Another way to put this point (to which I 
return in Chapters 5 and 6) is that practical identity and narrative agency are mutually 
reinforcing.  The more we act in the world, the more we have an idea of who we are as 
agents.  I come back to this idea in Chapter 6. 115 Lynne Rudder Baker’s (2000) view of personal identity argues for the irreducibility of 
the first person perspective along these lines.  She argues that articulation of the first-
personal perspective is a precondition for personhood.  There are, she claims, both weak 
and strong first-person phenomena: the former are experiences of the self as 
consciousness’ ‘point of origin’ (all sentient creatures experience this first-personal 
phenomenon), the latter require an awareness of a point of view distinct from all others 
and the recognition of the capacity for private thought.  A related point for Baker is that 
we, as humans, are necessarily embodied but are not reducible to our bodies.  Human 
beings are more than just their biological constitution: they are clusters of ideas that 
amount to identity.  Distinct persons emerge from the human bodies in which they are 
situated.  Humans are inseparable from their bodies, only identifiable in and through their 
bodies, but not completely reducible to their bodies.   
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that life is a series of experiences, and so that a person is first and foremost a locus of 
experiences.’116  When reductionist theorists of identity talk about ‘person time slices’ in 
other words, they are still interested in the notion of ‘personhood’ as a normative concept, 
rather than just a descriptive one.  It is in these person time slices that reductionists locate 
accountability and agency, but the notions of accountability and agency do not make 
sense without a broader practical understanding of the self in the context of her world. 
 Moreover, the notion that person time slices are the location for any kind of 
identifiable psychological criteria implicitly relies on some idea that first personal 
perspectives are sources of knowledge about the self.  Mackenzie articulates this point: 
Although we can take up a theoretical standpoint from which we regard ourselves 
from the outside, as merely natural phenomena whose behaviour can be explained 
and predicted in causal terms, in order to live a life we must, as a matter of 
practical necessity, view ourselves from the inside, or from a first-personal 
perspective.  From this practical, first-personal standpoint we cannot view 
ourselves as bundles of experiences.  Rather, to live a life we must view ourselves 
as agents, capable of choice, deliberation, and practical reason.117 
 
It is essentially impractical, in other words, to conceive of a human existence not 
governed by a first-personal standpoint.  The individual self as the locus for experience is 
the touchstone for living in the world.  Whether or not the existence of this self 
																																																								116 Korsgaard 1989, 131, emphasis in original.  Assuming that the self is the subject of 
experience (rather than incidental to experience which just happens) is a moral 
assumption for Korsgaard because it posits the subject of experience as the creator of 
meaning about experience.  It locates moral agency, in other words, in the subject of 
experience (the person).  Korsgaard sees the person as fully autonomous, while I think of 
the person as both a locus for moral agency and fully constituted by relationships with 
others.  Certainly, there is much more work to be done in explaining the implications of a 
theory of relational autonomy for an account of practical identity, but it seems to me that 
it is not problematic to retain both the idea that it is the individual that makes moral 
judgments and the idea that the individual is constituted by her relationships with others.  
I come back to the idea of the moral agency in individual experience in Chapter 5.   117 Mackenzie 2008, 8. 
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transcends necessity is a separate question, and one that does not change the practical 
existence of the first personal narrative notion of a self. 
 For Korsgaard, metaphysics is irrelevant to the everyday construction of a first-
personal perspective.  A self constructs an identity as a matter of course, for basic 
practical reasons.  When I think of taking responsibility for an action, of convincing 
another of my point of view, etc., I inevitably have an idea of myself as a self.  I must 
make choices and take action in accordance with some first-personal identity, and the 
capacity to make such choices Korsgaard calls ‘authorial’ agency.  For Korsgaard, then, 
the metaphysical unity of past, present and future selves is far less important than the 
conception in the present moment of oneself as an agent.   
So, according to a practical narrative understanding of identity, a person is never 
only a series of discrete, disconnected events.118  Indeed, a life is formed through a 
person’s continuous exercise of her narrative capacities (which include, but are not 
limited to, discovery, memory, and critical interpretation).  Identity formation always 
employs narrative reasoning, and identity will always, practically speaking, be organised 
according to a narrative structure. Mackenzie describes the necessity of narrative that 
arises out of the first personal perspective this way: 
Even if what makes us persons is the capacity for a first-personal perspective, our 
temporally extended first personal experience is often of change, fragmentation, 
contingency.  Narrative self-interpretation is a response to this experience of 
change and fragmentation.  Narrative identifies and forges patterns of coherence 
and psychological intelligibility within our lives, connecting our first personal 
perspectives to our history, actions, emotions, desires, beliefs, character traits, and 
so on.119 
 
																																																								118 Mackenzie 2008, 11. 119 Ibid., 12. 
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These ‘patterns of coherence and psychological intelligibility’ are ever-changing, but 
they are always in play in the formation (however fleeting) of practical identity.  Shifts in 
circumstance and perspective, the acquisition of knowledge, undergoing trauma, changes 
in relationships to others—all of these things and many more may change one’s sense of 
one’s own identity.  Mackenzie is at pains to make the point that this change/shift in 
identity is itself narrative in nature, and so, the continued exercise of narrative self-
understanding leads, over time, to a relatively stable sense of identity.  She writes: ‘The 
self conception constituted through the process of narrative self-interpretation—in the 
form of character or a set of relatively stable and integrated traits, habits, dispositions, 
and emotional attitudes—thus has a degree of permanence and coherence.’120  Mackenzie 
is still making a practical argument here, and not a strongly normative one.  She does not 
say that the exercise of narrative agency should result in a coherent narrative identity, 
only that exercise of narrative agency cumulatively, over time, does result in a relatively 
stable narrative identity.   
This picture of narrative identity is not unproblematic.  Critics of narrative 
theories of identity do not think that an empirical-practical theory of narrative identity 
can be separated so distinctly from its ethical-normative implications.  Surely there is 
embedded in the former an ethics—namely the idea that those of us who craft more 
complete and thoughtful narratives are somehow ‘better’ people than those of us who do 
not.121  Narrative theories, furthermore, since they see the individual as self-constituting 
																																																								120 Mackenzie 2008, 12; Ricouer (1992); Schechtman (1996); Velleman (2006); and 
Benhabib (1999). 121 Crafting ‘better’ narratives and being a better person for it might be understood in 
different ways—by a Kantian like Korsgaard, as an exercise of more complete autonomy 
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may be seen to overestimate a person’s capacity for autonomous self reflection, or to be 
overly reliant on the notion that reason can make sense of, and organise, emotion.122  
Moreover, narratives can be reductive and limiting.  They artificially shape our 
understanding of experience into a conventional beginning-middle-end narrative 
structure.  They weigh us down with expectations and make us blind to alternative ways 
of being in the world. 
The problem of narrative as an ethical practice is a complex one.  The narrative 
practices of discovery, construction, interpretation, reflection, re-interpretation, and so on 
that arise out of interaction with the normative claims of personhood are constitutive of 
the narrative self.  Continued self-examination and continued articulation of how one 
understands oneself and the community of others in which one lives might be understood 
as a distinctly ethical practice, in which one attempts to be ever more oneself and ever 
closer to others through narrative practice.123  In other words, the narrative self is both a 
social construct, in that it depends upon the modes of personhood acceptable to a certain 
group of people at a certain time, and a moral construct, in that it takes as its guide the 
moral order of these modes of personhood.   
Narrative self-constitution need not be understood as an autonomous process 
(though certainly there are some theorists of narrative identity—Korsgaard, for one—
who endorse a strongly individualist notion of autonomy); on the contrary, narrative self-
construction should be understood as an innately relational process. Making narrative 
																																																																																																																																																																					
or by a virtue ethicist like Alasdair MacIntyre, as an achievement of unity of character 
(MacIntyre), etc. 122 Butler (2005). 123 Stanley Cavell’s moral perfectionism envisions ethical practice as narrative in 
precisely this way.  See especially Cities of Words, 2005. 
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sense of one’s own experience involves rearranging the web of narratives in which one is 
inextricably embedded and, indeed, by which one is constituted.  The practical narrative 
identity I have in mind when I act is not something I have invented myself—it is the 
synthesis of how I imagine other people see me, how they might see what I am doing, 
what I think someone in my position ought to do, and so on.124  Moreover, narrative is 
not simply a rational capacity; nor are we always aware of every aspect of the narratives 
we construct about ourselves.  Narrative involves ‘imagination, affect, emotions, 
memories and practical skills as well as rationality.’125  A narrative about the importance 
of one’s national identity might prevent one from having an idea of oneself as 
cosmopolitan.  A narrative about the importance of having children might be so deeply a 
part of one’s idea of oneself that one cannot imagine a life without children.  
Constructing a narrative identity does not depend on the use of a certain faculty; it is, 
rather, something that we do all the time—whether we are dispassionate or enraged, 
thinking of the past or thinking of the future, giving an account of our actions before the 
law or writing an autobiography.   
Narrative identity might refer to self reflection in all kinds of different moments, 
in ‘patterns of action, attention, or emotional response, in bodily dispositions and habits, 
in moral commitments, or in one’s personal relationships.’126  As agents in any of these 
kinds of moments, we have some sense of who we are and of who other people see when 
they look at us.  The construction of a notion of oneself in and around moments of action 
																																																								124 As I have argued, autonomy is always relational in this way. Mackenzie and Stoljar 
(2000) and Brison (2002) also argue for a relational understanding of autonomy 
alongside a narrative concept of identity. 125 Mackenzie 2008, 12. 126 Mackenzie 2008, 12. 
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is always narrative.  We may (and surely do) create narratives that extend beyond the 
moment of action, which recur again and again over the course of our lives as meaning-
makers, but what I argue here is 1) when we act we always have a sense of ourselves and 
2) that sense of self must be narrative.   
Self-constitution is not just relational—it is also political.  And, as such, 
narratives are unavoidably affected by relations of power.  We self-identify with already 
existing narratives about what it means to be a woman, or a black woman, or a poor white 
man; and these narratives shape and limit our own practical identities. However 
subordinating narratives may be, though, they always have the potential to be creatively 
reconfigured.  The construction of narratives always takes place intersubjectively, in 
conversation with other ‘I’s’.  First-personal narratives are only intelligible in the context 
of other selves, who are also involved in the process of narrative self-interpretation.  
Mackenzie writes: ‘What this means is that to be intelligible to ourselves our narrative 
self-interpretations must be capable of being made intelligible to others; they must make 
sense with reference both to the social norms of personhood and to the narratives of one’s 
life that others would tell.’127  In other words, we must make sense of who we are 
according to the agreed upon norms which guide both ourselves and those around us.  
This explains why agency and claims to personhood are diminished when the norms of 
personhood are contradicted (as in the case of the mentally ill, for instance).  But it also 
explains why agency increases where selves are part of communities that recognise them. 
This brings me to an important issue in the literature on narrative identity: what 
constitutes a ‘narrative’?  A narrative need be no more than a contextualised unit of 
																																																								127 Mackenzie 2008, 15.  See also Schechtman 1996, 114-30 and Benhabib 1992, 1-12. 
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sense.128  Narratives may be as simple as ‘I did that’ or ‘I am this way’ or ‘This is how 
things work’.  Narrative identity should not be understood to refer to a single narrative 
that gives an account of an individual’s entire life, though, of course, individuals do 
produce such narratives.  As we shall see in Chapter 4, a holistic narrative can only be 
supplied by others, and may only emerge after the subject of the narrative is no longer 
involved in action.  
Episodes of a human life are never so straightforward or neatly structured as the 
plot of a novel or a play; and therefore to use ‘narrative’ as a model for self-
awareness/self-constitution is to ascribe far more coherence and intelligibility to a human 
life than what is there.129 The self is not in the author’s position to shape the story as she 
pleases, and equating the structure of personal narratives with those of literary narrative 
leads to a dangerous over-emphasis on authorial control.  Though narrative need not 
follow a predetermined structure—narrative, as it applies to self-constitution is not the 
same thing as literary narrative—I think this criticism has some bite.   
 Narratives can be fleeting moments in which the individual makes sense of 
herself in the world (as in the utterance ‘I did that.’); they can also be, and of course often 
are, longer stories told for a purpose. Susan Brison’s work, to which I will return in 
Chapter 5, is concerned with this kind of narrative.  She talks about the importance of 
narrating traumatic events in order to move beyond them—and to (re)make sense of a self 
																																																								128 There are theorists of narrative identity who want to define narrative much more 
narrowly than this.   Carrol (2001), for instance, thinks that narratives must be stories 
about causally connected events told in chronological order; Velleman (2006) and Goldie 
(2003) view narratives as definable through the emotional resonance they have with an 
audience. 129 Butler (2005) makes this criticism, as we shall see in the next section, and so does 
McNay (2003), as we will see in the next chapter.  
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that has been undone by trauma.  Narrative identity, in this view, involves the therapeutic 
restructuring of experience into a story that makes sense.  This process of creating 
therapeutic narratives drives home the point that narratives need not be merely concerned 
with recounting facts and need not follow a pre-determined structure (beginning-middle-
end).  Indeed, Brison distinguishes between ‘living to tell’, in which the subject must 
produce a factually correct, politically communicable narrative about a traumatic event in 
order to enlist the aid of police, lawyers, juries, medical examiners, and advocacy groups, 
and ‘telling to live’, in which the subject makes sense of what happened to her in 
conversation with a caring other so as to re-affirm herself as an agent in the world.130  
The former mode of telling is, interestingly, far less connected to the subject’s sense of 
her own identity (indeed, constructing official narratives such as these can be profoundly 
alienating).  The latter mode of telling is far less concerned with facts and norms, but is 
far more empowering.  By this account, narratives are not accounts of facts—they need 
not even be objectively true.  They are ‘true’ insofar as they make sense to others.  
 
2.3 Critiques of Narrative Identity 
 
I turn now to a more extended engagement with what I see as the more concerning 
critiques of a narrative theory of identity raised above.  Narrative identity, it should by 
now be clear, is always both practical (it involves identification of an individual in the 
world for a practical purpose, such as giving an account of personal responsibility) and 
normative (in that it involves asking what kind of person would carry out this or that act).  
																																																								130 Brison 2002, 103.   
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The normative and ethical aspects of a narrative concept of identity present a problem for 
the feminist framework (which situates the subject between agency and subjection) that I 
introduced in Chapter 1 for at least two reasons.  First, a narrative theory of identity is, 
arguably, committed to a notion of the good life as a life with a strong sense of what 
Alasdair MacIntyre calls ‘narrative unity’—a sense, in other words, that one’s life is 
more ethical the better able one is to tell a coherent story about it.  Galen Strawson, who 
has published an array of articles against narrative theories of identity, argues that such 
theories subscribe to an ‘ethical narrativity thesis’, a notion that subjects somehow 
become “better” through telling coherent stories about their lives.   But how can we 
square the notion of an ever-more stable subject of narrative with the necessarily 
subordinating and essentially relational subjectivity described in Chapter 1?  It seems to 
me that, by rejecting a strong version of the ethical narrativity thesis, we can understand 
narrative identity not as the product of continuous, unified, static self-reflection but as, 
rather, an individual’s understanding of herself as a unique individual within time and 
with relation to others.131   
The second worrying problem with a narrative theory of identity is that the 
narratives that constitute our self-conception are narratives that we have inherited from 
others. We form narratives about our selves, our lives, and our relationships largely 
through repurposing the dominant normative conventions that surround us.  The stories 
we tell about ourselves, in other words, are very likely to be stories that are based on 
other people’s ideas of what is good, what is right, and what is normal.  Moreover, 																																																								131 We must accept a minimal version of the ethical narrativity thesis because the 
questions of characterization we ask about ourselves are ethical questions.  Having a 
practical sense of one’s own identity will often involve asking oneself what kind of 
person one is.  
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political and social interactions often reflect the reduction of complex individuals to 
single identity narratives.  These broad narratives limit our agency both by cutting off our 
creative capacity for telling new stories and by keeping us from seeing others as capable 
of adding unpredictable new meaning to the world because we see those others as totally 
defined by already existing narratives (the ‘welfare queen’, the ‘immigrant who is 
stealing jobs’, etc.).  If this is true, then how can we challenge these dominant narratives?  
How can we create newly meaningful ideas about who we are, and how can we recognise 
the capacity for unpredictable meaning-making in others?   
I will come back to this problem again in Chapter 3, where I argue that narrative 
agency gives us the constant potential for shifting these dominant narratives, but in this 
section, I will address both of these aspects of narrative’s normative baggage—the idea 
that narrative unity is a hallmark of ‘good character’ and the idea that narrative identity 
involves the reproduction of, and adherence to, broader socio-political norms/narratives.  
My task here is to counter some prevailing criticisms of narrative as overly or thickly 
normative.  
 
2.3.1 The Ethical Narrativity Thesis 
 
Many theorists of narrative identity consider narrative practice to be innately ethical.132  
Telling a story about oneself, about the kind of person one is, involves thinking about 
what kind of person one wants to be.  Moreover, thinking of oneself as a person who has 
existed in the past and will exist in the future requires that one be accountable for one’s 
																																																								132 Most notably Charles Taylor (1989) and Alasdair MacIntyre (2007), but see also 
Schechtman (1996, 2014) and Davenport (2012). 
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choices, beliefs, commitments, etc.  Galen Strawson provides perhaps the most extensive 
and the most well-known critique of the notion that narrative is an ethical practice.  
Reading Strawson is particularly instructive here because his critique of the ethical 
narrativity thesis sets the stage for some of the qualifications feminist theory has placed 
on the notion of autonomous self-constitution.  Strawson identifies what has already been 
flagged as a pertinent problem in the philosophy of personal identity literature: the 
assumption that one can be the author of one’s own story.  Briefly rehearsing and 
responding to his arguments against narrative should make clear that while narrative 
does, indeed, carry with it some minimal ethical commitments, a narrative theory of 
identity need not subscribe to the notion that each of us should be able to tell a consistent, 
holistic story about who she is.  Instead, as I have argued, narrative identity can be 
productively understood as the unique individual’s self-understanding in relation to 
others and over time.  This self-understanding can change from moment to moment, is 
always at least substantially determined by broader social identity narratives, but it is 
empirically narrative, in that it always consists of a first-personal understanding of the 
unique self acting in the world, and ethically narrative in that this self-understanding 
involves making moral judgments about how one is or will be perceived.133 
Strawson differentiates between the empirical claim of narrative theorists—that 
we, in fact, experience our lives as narrative—and the normative claim that a well-
developed narrative is essential to the good life, ‘to a true or full personhood’.134  It is 
																																																								133 I will return to the importance of making everyday moral judgments in Chapter 5.  
But it is important to emphasise here that making moral judgments about how one will be 
perceived is not equivalent to the pursuit of a good life or of a unified narrative about 
one’s life.  134 Strawson 2004, 428. 
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possible, he argues, to accept one of these theses without accepting the other (and that it 
is also possible to accept both or neither).  Strawson’s own position is counter to both the 
empirical and ethical theses—to insist upon narrative, he argues, is both empirically 
misguided because not everyone perceives of her life narratively and ethically harmful 
because it equates telling a story about oneself with being a good person.  
 At issue for Strawson is, primarily, the tendency to conceive of the ‘self’ as its 
own separate entity—to think of the self from a distance as an entity with different 
‘persistence conditions’ to the whole human being.135  Self-perception is, he grants, an 
inevitable part of human existence; however, he distinguishes two types of self-
experience: Diachronic and Episodic.  The former, which is the narrative outlook, he 
defines as maintaining a sense that one is the same person having different experiences 
over time, all of which ultimately add up to a narrative of one’s life. The latter is a 
position from which one does not figure oneself, considered as a self, as something that 
was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future.  In other words, 
one’s sense of one’s own identity is confined to the time and space of action. 
 So, for Strawson, these are the two ways that it is possible to experience oneself 
in time (though, he admits, there are moments when the Episodic relates to a memory or a 
Diachronic feels a non-narrative fragmentation and admits further that a person’s ‘time-
style’ may vary over the course of her life).  They are, Strawson argues, ‘temporal 
temperaments’, written into our DNA, and beyond our control.136  It seems to him that 
the Episodics are unfairly judged by the Diachronics as deficient—morally and 
emotionally, even spiritually—because they do not feel a connection with their past and 																																																								135 Ibid., 430. 136 Ibid., 431. 
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future selves.    Episodics are, however, fully imbued with the lessons of the past, 
Strawson argues, because they are products of past practice, of the lessons learned 
through a lifetime’s ethical development. 
 Strawson offers his own experience as insight into the Episodic way of life, 
saying that he has ‘absolutely no sense of [his] life as a narrative with form, or indeed as 
a narrative without form.  Absolutely none.’137  He is also, he claims, without the 
Diachronic’s ‘special’ interest in his own past or future, though he is aware that he has a 
past and a future.  He puts this claim to work on two levels: on the one hand, he says, he 
is simply not that interested in his past or future, on the other, he argues, he does not 
experience himself as the same self as the Galen Strawson of the past of future, even 
though he knows he is the same human being.  But what can he mean by this?  The 
‘inner-mental presence’ which Strawson labels ‘I*’ is the self that exists in the present.  
He has memories of himself in the past, an idea of himself in the future, but he does not 
think of these past or future events as happening to himself, that is, the ‘I*’ that is posing 
the question in the present moment. 
 First-personal memories, with all of their sensory and emotional data, are not, 
Strawson argues, events that happened to the Episodic ‘I*’: 
For me this is a plain fact of experience.  I’m well aware that my past is mine in 
so far as I am a human being, and I fully accept that there’s a sense in which it has 
special relevance to me* now, including special emotional and moral relevance.  
At the same time I have no sense that I* was there in the past, and think it is 
obvious that I* was not there, as a matter of metaphysical fact.138 
 
It seems to me, in spite of Strawson’s best efforts, that this Episodic has a distinctly 
narrative experience of the world. Strawson, by his own admission, is concerned with 																																																								137 Ibid., 433. 138 Ibid., 434. 
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events in the past and the future that have direct bearing on him*.  The Episodic ‘I’, then, 
is aware of his or her own uniqueness, and engages in the practice of ‘telling a story’ 
about herself from a unique position in the world.  The Episodic may not consider herself 
‘the same person’ as she was in the past or will be in the future (whether or not this is a 
‘metaphysical fact’ is, as I have argued, irrelevant for practical identity formation), but 
she still incorporates those versions of herself into her understanding of the moment at 
hand.  More than that, she is able to act ethically because she has ‘past practice’ of acting 
ethically in similar situations.  The Episodic, then, would appear to exercise narrative 
agency in just the way I have defined it in that she makes sense of herself in the world 
through situating herself in relation to other ‘I’s’ over time.   
 To be fair to Strawson, it is not this kind of in-the-moment meaning-making that 
bothers him—indeed, he concedes that self-perception during experience is empirically a 
part of human consciousness.139  He is, rather, particularly unsettled by the tendency to 
take one’s life as a whole and fit it into a single narrative, and, in doing so, to apply to it 
an ethical character.  Strawson argues that narrative theorists of identity, including 
MacIntyre, Schechtman, and Taylor, are convinced of the necessity of narrativity 
(defined here as the normative commitment to a narrative version of identity) because 
they can think of no other ethical paradigm.  Narrativity as the dominant paradigm is 
harmful, both psychologically and ethically, for, Strawson claims, ‘the best lives almost 
never involve this kind of self-telling.’140  Why, Strawson wants to know, should we care 
																																																								139 Even if he thinks this self-perception does not, empirically, extend beyond the time 
slice of experience. 140 Ibid., 437. 
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about what we have ‘made’ of our lives?  He is living his life, and the kind of summary 
thinking he sees as called for by narrativity has no place in this living.  
 A person can be Diachronic without being beholden to this grandiose notion of 
narrative, Strawson goes on to say, in that she can naturally experience herself as 
‘something existing as the past and future without any particular sense of [her] life as 
constituting a narrative.’141  Here again, this seems to me to refer to an essentially 
narrative point of view, one which is, indeed, very close to Seyla Benhabib’s definition of 
a narrative self who does nothing more than make sense of herself in time and with 
relation to others, which I will describe in depth in Chapter 3.  It becomes clear at this 
point that Strawson does not take issue so much with this sense of self over time and with 
relation to others as he does with the conception of this sense of self as narrative in 
nature.  As he puts it, ‘the distinctive claim of the defenders of the psychological 
Narrativity thesis is that for a life to be a narrative in the required sense it must be lived 
Narratively.’142  This version of narrativity, for Strawson, dictates that some sort of 
‘unifying of form-finding construction’ be imposed upon one’s self-understanding.143  In 
other words, Narrative goes above and beyond the simple Diachronic sensibility; it 
demands a specific construction or attitude, which he names the ‘form-finding tendency’ 
[where a tendency is different from a sensibility].   
 Strawson has to separate the Diachronic from the Narrative in order to forgive 
those people who subscribe to the former view their innate disposition when it comes to 
self-understanding (because this, in turn, allows him to rely upon his innately Episodic 
																																																								141 Ibid., 439. 142 Ibid., 440. 143 Ibid., 440. 
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self-understanding).  He insists that ‘one can be Diachronic without actively conceiving 
of one’s life…as some sort of ethico-historical-characterological developmental unity.’144  
Strawson goes on to argue that form-finding is only a minimally sufficient tendency in 
narrativity—it is more often than not, he says, accompanied by a ‘story-telling tendency’, 
which, in its more benign form ‘involves the ability to detect—not invent—
developmental coherencies in the manifold of one’s life’, but is lamentably accompanied 
much of the time by its twin tendency, revision.145  Narrativity, because of its injunction 
to ‘engage unconsciously in invention, fiction of some sort’, leads to blatant falsification 
of the details of one’s life.146  This falsification may begin honestly enough, Strawson 
argues, but it always leads to incorrect, corrupt accounts of actual events.  Revision, 
defined thus, is the province of the narrative thinker alone, according to Strawson.  He 
argues that there is a precision involved in recall unaffected by emotion.  Revision, as a 
sister-tendency to story-telling, muddies the waters of memory unnecessarily.   
He writes (and it is worth quoting him at length on this point): 
Many have proposed that we are all without exception incorrigible self-fabulists, 
‘unreliable narrators’ of our own lives, and some who hold this view claim greater 
honesty of outlook for themselves, and see pride, self-blindness, and so on in 
those who deny it.  But other research makes it pretty clear that this is not true.  
It’s not true of everyone.  We have here another deep dimension of human 
psychological difference.  Some people are fabulists all the way down.  In others, 
autobiographical memory is fundamentally non-distorting, whatever automatic 
processes of remoulding and recasting it may invariably involve.147 
 
So, for Strawson, privileging narrative is so important because it blinds us to the ‘truth’ 
of our lives, which is ever-unfolding in the present moment.  Surely he is correct in 
																																																								144 Ibid., 441. 145 Ibid., 443. 146 Ibid., 443. 147 Ibid., 444. 
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pointing out that we have a tendency to construct narratives that obscure the ‘truth’ about 
what might have happened, but to suggest that this criticism is an indictment of narrative 
itself is wrong-headed.  Indeed, his concern with accuracy reveals a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what narrative is.  The identities we construct for ourselves are 
constantly shifting.  Even the most unified, ‘authentic’ narrative involves contradiction, 
confusion, and, indubitably, revision.   Strawson is mistaken to insist that there is a single 
‘truth of [one’s] being’; such a notion of truth carries with it a far more normative view of 
action than the ethical narrativity thesis Strawson sets out to debunk.148  Strawson 
assumes that each of us should arrive at a self-understanding unmediated by memory or 
revision.  To rewrite or restructure our self-understanding over time is to introduce 
inaccuracy into that self-understanding.  He seems to suggest that we can do the work 
required for self-understanding by ourselves, rather than in communication with others.  
But this is impossible within the web of relations into which we are thrown.  We are 
taxed with the perennial task of making sense of ourselves in relation to this web of 
relations, but we do not carry out this sense-making autonomously. 
 Furthermore, the ‘revisions’ which Strawson finds objectionable constitute 
precisely the kind of action that gives us a sense of who we are.  Revisions and retellings 
and reimaginings are communicative actions.  They may help us clarify a sense of who 
we are (though this sense of self is always contingent rather than ‘true’), or they may 
obscure it.  Identity formation is extremely messy, and it involves endless conversation.  
Strawson utterly fails to grasp the extent to which we are constituted by and through one 
																																																								148 ‘The implication is plain: the more you recall, retell, narrative yourself, the further 
you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your being.’ 
Strawson 2004, 447, emphasis added. 
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another’s narratives.   It is communicability within the web of narratives into which we 
are thrown which makes our narratives meaningful.  Identity is a socially constructed 
fact, and the collective understanding of who ‘we’ are and what we know is made up of a 
matrix of such socially constructed facts.149  Surely these socially constructed facts can 
accurately be called ‘narratives’, and their ‘truth’ is a product of collaborative revision.  
 In sum, both of Strawson’s major problems with narrative miss the point that 
narrative is, as Seyla Benhabib puts it, the mode of action.150  His insistence that narrative 
pushes a strong narrative unity as the only path to the good life does not recognise the 
complex and varied possibilities for narrating oneself; indeed, all of the modes of self-
examination that Strawson diagnoses as non-narrative or less narrative are still narrative.  
Similarly, his argument that autobiographical revision makes narrative harmful to the 
‘truth’ assumes that there is some other way to arrive at the truth than through shared, 
collaborative understanding about how to articulate the truth.  And yet, Strawson’s 
critique brings into relief the essential fluidity of selfhood in a way that he does not 
intend.  Strawson’s conception of authentic selfhood is one in which the self, without the 
troublesome interference of affect, memory, or communication, emerges again and again 
in the present moment.  But the narrative self, even in its most basic form, is constituted 
by and through memories, emotions, moral judgments, expectations, power relations, and 
so on.   
However, Strawson’s critique does present us with some of worthwhile 
qualifications of a theory of narrative identity.  First, we must accept a weak version of 
																																																								149 See John Searle (1995) for an extended account of the social construction of facts. 150 This is Benhabib on Arendt’s view of narrativity in Situating the Self (1992, 127), 
which I mentioned in the Introduction and to which I will return in Chapter 4. 
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the ethical narrativity thesis.  The process of narrative identity formation is ethical in that 
it is concerned with the wellbeing of the ‘I’ over time and because it involves posing and 
answering questions about what kind of person the ‘I’ is.  Further, the narrative 
construction of practical identity does involve making sense of who we are, where 
‘making sense’ does not mean soberly considering the facts and rearranging them 
accurately, dispassionately, or completely.  These messy stories may certainly be harmful 
in such a way that our everyday, practical adoption of a narrative identity disadvantages 
us in a number of ways.151  Finally, Strawson is right that narrative identity should not be 
understood as the articulation of a static narrative that encompasses the whole of one’s 
life.  To imagine that such a narrative could exist is to miss the actual work that narrative 
does—which is to construct meaning in all possible contexts and in unpredictable ways.  
  
2.3.2 Identity Narratives and Identity Politics 
 
The narrative model of identity I have defended thus far, in which the self is constantly 
involved in the dual processes of discovery (finding oneself already embedded within 
webs of interlocution) and construction (having in mind or articulating a narrative about 
who one is), must be understood within the confines of relations of power discussed in 
Chapter 1.  Practical narrative identity is totally determined by and through relationships, 
many of these subordinating relationships of power.  Moreover, not only is narrative 
identity practical and normative; it is also political.  Identity is a public construct—we 
appear to others as possessing specific identities.  Political identities such as race, gender, 																																																								151 Indeed, even the most basic practical self-conception may be riddled with deep 
subordination by power relationships. 
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and class are inevitably a part of how other people see us and how we see ourselves.152 
These visible attributes of identity are not neutral, however; they are infused with cultural 
meaning.  To have in mind an idea of myself (a narrative identity) which includes the 
facts that I am white, middle-class, academic, female, and so on involves taking into 
account political narratives about these attributes—what white people are like, what 
academics are like, etc.  And any combination of these things gives rise, again, to more 
specific socio-cultural narratives about white female philosophers, about middle-class 
white ‘girls’, and so on.   
 Political connection—that is, solidarity in political action—often depends on 
identification with others through either taking on specific identity narratives or 
recognising the claim being made by others who share a certain narrative identity.153  In 
order to add my voice to the other voices claiming trans rights or queer rights or black 
rights or victims’ rights, I must think of myself in terms of the narrative identity in 
question or have in mind (and be sympathetic to) a narrative identity for the group in 
question.  For the purpose of political action, my identity is reducible to the collective 
narrative identity.  The problem with political identity (or identity politics, as we more 
commonly call it), then, is that it reduces complex narrative agents to identities defined 
by a single narrative (even when political narratives are intersectional they are often 
reductive in this way).   
A generally accepted narrative becomes a norm.  Indeed, the terms ‘norm’ and 
‘narrative’ are often used interchangeably.  That we are constituted by such identity 																																																								152 See Alcoff (2006). 153 I shift focus to a primarily political understanding of action in the second part of the 
thesis, but I also subscribe, throughout, to the notion that all action is political, in that it 
takes place between people and involves differentials of power.   
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narratives is unavoidable and beyond our control.  We come into the world with a variety 
of identity markers that make us intelligible to others, and, we are usually unable to 
escape these markers.  When we do escape the markers we are born with (by transitioning 
from one gender to another, say) we must trade them for other markers.  In other words, 
we can never escape identity narratives completely.  Each of us is trapped in a ‘paradox’ 
of identity—we are intelligible to others only through the embodiment of narratives that 
limit us.154   
 This narrative constitution affects not only the way other people see us but also 
the way we see ourselves.  That is to say that political narratives shape our everyday, 
practical narrative identities.  The idea of ourselves that we have in mind when we act is 
coloured by all sorts of inherited narratives—from ‘ladies don’t interrupt’ to ‘men in my 
family don’t go to college’—many of which we would probably like to disown.  But 
disowning them is difficult for a number of reasons: because, as mentioned, embodying 
them makes us intelligible to others, because we might not even realise that we are 
beholden to them, and, importantly, because disowning certain inherited narrative 
identities might compromise our ability to belong to a community. 
 Allison Weir (2013) very clearly and instructively traces the paradox of being 
subordinated by, but being unable to disown, identity narratives.  She argues that the 
resolution of this paradox lies in pursuing both some version of the ethical narrative 
identity maligned by Strawson and a relentless interrogation of the extent to which we are 																																																								154 Though, importantly, social and political narratives can also enable us.  Allison Weir 
writes: ‘My capacity to criticize dominant social constructions of myself will depend to a 
large extent on my capacity to access alternative interpretations.  Those alternative 
interpretations frame alternative identities…resistant identities.  And my capacity to 
access these alternative interpretations will depend to a large extent on my identifications 
with those alternative, resistant identities.’ Weir 2013, 27, emphasis in original. 
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subordinated by identity narratives.  Categorisation, classification, what Arendt calls 
whatness, are always part of our self-understanding; but also part of our self-
understanding is the same question of characterisation posed in the first section of this 
chapter: ‘who am I?’  The answer to this question ‘is precisely not limited by a 
category…because it focuses on questions of existential meaning.’155  Answering this 
question does not mean that we tap into a self that is authentic or complete or anything 
other than socially constituted; it means, instead, that we try to understand ourselves—
how we are constituted, how we might be able to change, and how we are unique.  The 
latter task—radical self-questioning—involves the exploration of, and the identification 
with, narratives of resistance.  I return to the potential for self and social transformation 
through the identification with narratives of resistance in my discussion of Arendt and 
identity politics in Chapter 4. 
 This tension between identifying with and questioning identity narratives arises in 
the construction of practical identity all the time, especially in times of transition.  Think, 
for instance, of a young Qatari man coming out as gay—he might still identify with 
various aspects of being Qatari but also be empowered by the identification with queer 
narratives.  Or imagine a woman who has moved to Paris from a rural town in the 
American South—she might be torn between imagining herself as a provincial 
Southerner and as a cosmopolitan city-dweller.  Similar conflicts surely arise in each of 
us innumerable times over the course of our lives.  A hallmark of narrative identity 
formation is that it changes as our lives change: as we encounter new points of view, 
form new relationships, and internalise new narratives.   
																																																								155 Weir 2013, 24. 
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The narrative self, then, appears to be caught between the temptation to cultivate 
her connection to identity narratives in order to deepen her sense of belonging and the 
urge to escape identity narratives in order to discover who she might be without them: 
and yet selves are always involved in both of these practices.  Both of these ways of 
relating to narrative play a part in the construction of practical narrative identity.  One’s 
sense of self, in action, may be closely aligned with a narrative that gives one a sense of 
belonging, or it may be derived from a fierce rejection of a certain narrative.  It is also 
possible to be both beholden to a particularly trenchant identity narrative and committed 
to challenging that narrative.  This dynamic is often at work, for example, in women who 
both want to abolish the narrative that one must be thin in order to be attractive and have 
internalised the narrative that their attractiveness depends on being thin. 
 Being caught in the paradox of narrative identity does not mean that we lack the 
agency to change our identities.  We are agents both because we are responsible for 
interrogating the norms that constitute us and because we are capable of shifting those 
norms through communication. As Judith Butler argues, even a subject that is entirely 
constituted by and subordinated to pre-existing normative relations of power is 
responsible for her actions.  ‘I am authored by what precedes and exceeds me,’ she 
writes, but this, ‘in no way exonerates me from having to give an account of myself.’156  
We must, however, be constantly critical of the accounts of ourselves that we do give.  
We must ask after things we can never fully know; such as the configuration of norms 
that existed when we came into the world, and that has defined and limited our 
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understanding all our lives.  Is a certain behaviour the legacy of an early trauma?  Is a 
certain belief or opinion the reproduction of a parental prejudice?   
 We should also add to this posture of questioning in the face of dominant 
narratives a shift in our understanding away from the oversimplification of identity 
through dominant narratives.  We should, instead, recognise that, though each of us is 
constituted by a complex intersection of political narratives, each of us is also more than 
the sum of our political narratives.  Each of us has a unique identity, articulable from a 
specific place in the world, and we are not reducible to any one slice of time or aspect of 
consciousness.  Through our own first-personal experience of the intersection of 
narratives that contributes to our self-understanding, we can recognise that each other 
experiences his or her own unique experience of intersecting narratives.  When we 
understand that everyone is uniquely situated in this way, we can open up ‘practices that 
risk the difficult work of connection through conflict, openness, and change.’157   
   
The purpose of this chapter has been to defend a non-reductionist, practical, narrative 
account of identity.  I have shown that a narrative theory is preferable to biological and 
psychological theories of personal identity because it accounts for the practical self 
conception the ‘I’ has during action and because it is concerned with the question of 
characterisation (what makes a person who she is?) as well as the question of 
reidentification (how do we know that X is the same as Y?).  Further, a narrative theory 
of identity takes into account the first-personal, practical self-conception of individual 
identity.  This practical self-conception, I have further argued, is always narrative in that 
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it involves both making sense of oneself as an ‘I’ (exercising one’s narrative agency) and 
giving a narrative account of oneself (where this narrative account will be made up 
primarily of pre-existing narratives).  The narrative account one gives of oneself will 
differ over the course of one’s lifetime: indeed, it will differ from moment to moment.  
The stories one tells about who one is are purely contingent; they depend on the 
circumstances, the audience, and the purpose of the telling.   
 Some narrative theorists of identity, such as Schechtman and Korsgaard, 
overestimate the extent to which the individual is able to autonomously construct a 
narrative about who she is.  Others, like MacIntyre and Taylor, overemphasise the 
connection between practical narrative identity (the sense of oneself as a self) and ethical 
narrative unity (the notion that one becomes a better self through the cumulative 
articulation of one’s ethical commitments.  The view of narrative identity I defend here, 
on the other hand understands the unique individual’s understanding of herself as an ‘I’ 
as innately relational—the ‘I’ itself is constituted by and through the narratives of others.  
Further, this view of narrative identity does not equate narrative practice with ethical 
enrichment.  Indeed, many (if not most) of the narratives through which we understand 
ourselves are narratives we inherit from others.  The sense of self we have in mind when 
we act, therefore, may be rigidly informed by political narratives and may prove difficult 
to change.  In the next chapter, I will explore the power of narrative agency, which is the 
capacity to make sense of ourselves as unique beings in the world, to change these 
narratives, no matter how deeply they seem to structure our narrative identities. 
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Chapter 3: The Primacy of Narrative Agency 
 
Narrative identity, as we have seen, is complex and dynamics.  To be overly sanguine 
about possibilities for changing narrative identity, however, is to fail to appreciate the 
many obstacles to agency posed by systematic marginalisation and subjugation.  On the 
other hand, as I argued in Chapter 1, there is a danger that comes from placing too much 
emphasis on the constitution of a subject by and through what I referred to in the last 
chapter as political narratives.  Conceiving of a subject as completely constituted by 
power relations does not allow us to account for the surfeit of meaning that arises out of 
human interactions.  Each individual (within a plurality of other individuals) always has 
the capacity to create new meaning.  This constant, irreducible capacity is narrative 
agency. 
 In this chapter, I develop a concept of narrative agency that does the work of 
articulating both an individual’s constant, enduring capacity for meaning making and the 
limitations to agency posed by the subject’s constitution through norms by re-reading and 
re-shaping Seyla Benhabib’s work the narrative self.  Benhabib, as we have seen, is 
interested in giving an account of a subject capable of creating new meaning—with an 
emphasis on the capacity to create rather than on the meaning created.  Attempts to create 
new meaning do not always work—in fact, they often fail—but the possibility of 
something new arising out of action remains.  This may seem, prima facie, a somewhat 
arcane distinction, but I hope to show that prioritising this capacity for meaning-making 
in a theory of feminist agency opens up all kinds of possibilities for creative action—and, 
ultimately, for progressive feminist politics. 
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It is important to differentiate between narrative agency and narrative identity.  
The first is the capacity to say ‘I’ over time and with relation to others.	 The second refers 
to the shifting constellation of narratives which make up a particular individual’s 
reflexive self-understanding (practical identity).	 Conceiving of narrative agency as 
primary to narrative identity is an important theoretical move because it allows us to 
account for the endless permutations of narrative identity—its contingency and its 
complexity—1) without having to commit ourselves to the notion that narrative identity 
is fixed, 2) without imagining that the individual can tell a complete or accurate story 
about who she is, and 3) without having to endorse the idea that the construction of 
coherent stories about ourselves makes us better people. Instead, as we have seen, the 
narrative self is engaged in embedded, contextual sense-making.  The self is always 
changing.  She is not sovereign: she cannot transcend power relationships, social context, 
or time.  Nor can she consistently exercise critical capacity in the same way over the 
course of her lifetime.  But she can change power structures from within through the 
collective interplay of narratives: we can recognise, rearrange, and reframe norms 
through action.  
In this chapter, I argue that shifting narratives in this way depends first and 
foremost on a robust notion of narrative agency.  I start by developing a clearer picture of 
what I mean by narrative agency, a concept which I will animate through Benhabib’s 
work on narrativity (1992, 1999).  Then I will engage with two critiques of Benhabib’s 
narrative model in order to illustrate some of its theoretical and practical limitations.  In 
the first, Amy Allen argues that Benhabib is able to tout the importance of narrative 
agency only by downplaying the fundamentally subordinating nature of gender norms on 
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individual identity formation.  The second is Lois McNay’s concern that Benhabib’s 
conception of narrative is predicated upon the assumption that experience is essentially 
communicable within relationships which are themselves somehow innately reflexive. 
Both McNay and Allen gesture toward a ‘rationalist residue’ in Benhabib’s theory.158 I 
will argue that the model of narrative agency I draw out from Benhabib stands up under 
the scrutiny of these two critiques.  What we are left with is a model of narrative agency 
which is irreducible, inherently relational, and essential for the generation of new 
narratives within a plurality. 
 
3.1 Narrative Agency and Narrative Identity 
 
In her early work, Benhabib outlines a concept of narrative agency within a post-
metaphysical critical theoretical framework, one in which normative criteria may be 
posited only when the validity of those normative criteria are left ever-open to 
interpretation and debate. 159  For Benhabib, this contextualised version of critical 
theory—at which she arrives through a rigorous deconstruction and reframing of 
Habermasian communicative ethics—is preferable to other epistemological methods 
because it can furnish (provisional) norms capable of influencing various disciplines, 
thereby making the most immediate difference in terms of promoting mutual recognition 																																																								158 I borrow the phrase ‘rationalist residue’ from Amy Allen . 
159 Critique, Norm, and Utopia (1986), Benhabib’s weighty examination of critical theory 
and Habermasian communicative ethics, gives a detailed account of the contextualisation 
of critique.  Benhabib extends this revised methodology to include other arenas of 
contemporary ethics and political philosophy in Situating the Self (1992).  I do not 
provide a comprehensive review of Benhabib’s methodology of critique here, but refer to 
her broader theoretical framework only insofar as it is relevant to a discussion of 
narrative agency. 
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and social justice, even as it admits that these are context-dependent goals, based on the 
concerns of a particular episteme.  A normative restructuring that seems emancipatory 
today might just as easily seem repressive or exclusionary tomorrow.  In other words, the 
theorist can only work within the intellectual parameters already set for contemporary 
critique, even as she reflects critically upon the formation of those parameters. 
Within the framework of this contextualised critique, I want to draw out three 
aspects of my concept of narrative agency.  First, narrative agency is primary: it precedes 
narrative content (narrative identity) in the sense that the former is both necessary for the 
creation and implies the continued existence of the latter.  The subject’s capacity to say ‘I 
am female’ depends on her capacity to say ‘I’; that is, a subject’s capacity to makes sense 
of herself as a unique being is a precondition for identity formation.160  Second, narrative 
agency is relational: I can only meaningfully distinguish myself as an ‘I’ in relation to 
others, and these others are a) also narrative agents who are unique sites of meaning 
creation and b) conversation partners who determine the kind of meaning I will make 
about myself.  Third, narrative agency is generative.  An agent’s uniqueness allows her to 
create meaning from a point of view that is hers and hers alone.  New norms (which are 
articulated and reproduced through narratives) arise out of the exercise of narrative 
agency by each individual member of a plurality.   These collectively constructed norms 
are immanent, changeable, and they may be harmful as often as they may be 
emancipatory. 
																																																								160 We can imagine that human beings without this basic narrative agency—such as the 
insane, the infirm, and very young infants—are unable to develop a coherent sense of 
practical identity as well.  
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The first claim, that narrative agency is primary, is perhaps the easiest to unpack.  
Each individual has the capacity to construct meaningful narratives about who she is with 
relation to others. Narrative agency, conceived as such, does not posit a static subject 
who possesses, over a lifetime, an unchanging or completely articulable identity.  On the 
contrary, the subject is not an a priori formation, wholly definable, but an irreducible site 
of meaning creation.  An individual will make sense of her own identity by exercising her 
narrative agency, but she can never give a ‘complete’ account of her self because her 
identity depends upon the changing narratives of others in and over time.  Indeed, 
narrative agency does not assume a fixed ontological subject who pre-exists discourse.  
Narrative agency does not imply any other intention or motivation than to ‘make sense’, 
so the narrative agent need not have any moral commitments or well-informed opinions. 
Narrative as capacity, the capacity to make meaningful one’s situation within a web of 
other narratives, is a precondition for the existence of any narrative content.  
Creating meaningful narratives, then, is always a relational activity, carried out 
within a group of individuals, each of whom is unique by virtue of a particular, 
unrepeatable perspective.  Each individual is ‘the same, that is, human,’ as Hannah 
Arendt writes in The Human Condition, ‘in such a way that nobody is ever the same as 
anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.’161  Benhabib’s concept of narrativity is 
built upon this Arendtian notion of plurality, in which the self is never ‘withdrawn from 
																																																								161 Arendt 1958, 8. As we shall see in the second part of this thesis, there is much to be 
said about Arendt’s influence on contemporary feminism and, especially, on the 
importance of her concepts of natality, plurality, and storytelling for Benhabib’s theory of 
narrativity.  There are also some interesting links between my own definition of narrative 
agency and Arendt’s concept of natality.  Both emphasise the unique individual’s 
potential (sometimes realised and sometimes unattained) to introduce new meaning into 
the world. 
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the world’ but is always a ‘self in the human community, an acting [and] interacting 
self.’162  Within the human community are formed protean, context-dependent 
relationships which constitute the parameters of the self in the same way that collectively 
agreed upon norms establish the parameters of critique.  Both norms and narratives are 
arrived at collectively, through social interaction; by the same token, these norms and 
narratives can only be confronted, resisted, and changed through interaction. 
Narrative agency refers to the subject’s capacity to construct a meaningful 
narrative, and not to the actual content of that narrative.  The narrative agent need not 
subscribe to a particular morality or be governed by a particular set of normative criteria.  
Benhabib makes this point against Charles Taylor’s framework for self-reflection, which 
subscribes to a strong version of the ethical narrativity thesis, as we saw in the last 
chapter.  Taylor’s self is definable by her evaluative or moral commitments.  Identity, as 
he puts it, ‘is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or 
horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, 
or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose.’163  The subject possesses a sense 
of agency, in this view, by knowing where she stands with regard to certain evaluative 
commitments.  Furthermore, for Taylor, these evaluative commitments are only 
meaningful within the context of ‘webs of interlocution.’  That is, identity depends not 
only upon what one stands for but also upon the person to whom or with whom one is 
speaking.164 
																																																								162 Benhabib 1992, 127 163 Taylor 1989, 27. 164 Ibid., 36. 
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These webs of interlocution are indeed the setting for identity formation.  At birth, 
we are thrown into a network of other people’s narratives, and we ‘become who we are 
by learning to be a conversation partner in these narratives.’165  While this process of 
collaborative individuation might entail making lasting evaluative commitments, it is 
entirely possible to have agency (in the form of the capacity to construct meaningful 
narratives or to ‘make sense’) without having a set of values or an innate moral integrity.  
Taylor’s tendency to conflate agency with moral commitment is, Benhabib argues, a 
confusion of levels of analysis.  It is important to ‘think of the continuity of the self in 
time not through a commitment to a specific set of evaluative goods but through the 
capacity to take and adopt an attitude toward those goods.’166  In other words, the 
subject’s capacity for agency must not be confused with narratives about what a self 
ought to think or do—narrative capacity must not be conflated with narrative content.  As 
Benhabib puts it: ‘it is not what the story is about that matters but, rather, one’s ability to 
keep telling a story about who one is that makes sense to oneself and others.’167  
The narrative agent, conceived as conversation partner within a web of 
interlocution, is not reducible to any one answer to the question, ‘who am I?’: she is 
changeable and context-dependent, but also irrepressible—for the narrative agent will 
always try to make sense, even out of nonsense, no matter how varied, fragmented or 
overwhelming such nonsense may be. The subject’s capacity to make sense is the 
constant which allows for a coherent sense of self to develop over time.  Moreover, if the 
process of making sense of the self over time is conceived as inherently relational, then 
																																																								165 Benhabib 1999, 344. 166 Ibid., 364, emphasis added. 167 Ibid., 347. 
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the subject is never solely responsible for her own story.  Indeed, she must always fit her 
story in with and alongside the stories of others.  ‘Narratives,’ Benhabib writes, ‘cannot 
have closure precisely because they are always aspects of the narratives of others; the 
sense that I create for myself is always immersed in a fragile “web of stories” that I as 
well as others spin.’168 ‘Making sense’ paves the way for mutual recognition: I include 
you in my story as you include me in yours.  Parts of your story resonate with me, as 
parts of my story resonate with you.   
It is precisely this intersubjective give-and-take which lends narrative agency its 
heuristic strength, for ‘[f]urthering one’s capacity for autonomous agency is only possible 
within a solidaristic community that sustains one’s identity through listening to one, and 
allowing one to listen to others, with respect.’169  For Benhabib, narrative agency and 
communicability are ‘two sides of the same coin.’170  Stories are produced culturally, as 
well as individually, and individual stories have no meaning unless they are shared: 
Only if somebody else is able to understand the meaning of our words as well as 
the whatness of our deeds can the identity of the self be said to be revealed.  
Action and speech, therefore, are essentially interaction.  They take place between 
humans.  Narrativity, or the immersion of action in a web of human relationships, 
is the mode through which the self is individuated and acts are identified.171  
 
Narrative agency thus fosters an appropriate model of narrative identity whether it applies 
to individual or collective identity.  The impetus toward making sense of oneself in 
relation to the world and over time drives identity formation for both the individual and 
the group.   
																																																								168 Ibid., 347. 169 Ibid., 350. 170 Benhabib 2007, 15. 171 Benhabib 1992, 127. 
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Conceptualising the creation of meaning through communicative action represents 
an important point of tension between Benhabib’s narrative model of agency and other 
prominent feminist definitions of agency, especially those inspired by Judith Butler’s 
performative model.172  For Butler, speech is an action that reiterates a norm or set of 
norms.  Reiteration and subsequent resignification, in this model, constitute a linguistic 
transformation, a speech act.  The result of this transformation is a new linguistic 
configuration, one which may subversively rearrange the terms of discourse in such a 
way that the subject is able to express her agency.  Benhabib argues that this 
conceptualisation of language in action does not go far enough because it cannot account 
for the ‘surfeit of meaning, creativity, and spontaneity’ that arises out of communicative 
interaction.173  As she puts it, these ‘speech acts are not only iterations but also 
innovations and reinterpretations.’174  In other words, resignification and reinterpretation 
create some new meaning apart from the norms or sets of norms that they reproduce.175 
This ‘something more’ language arises out of the mutual recognition (between 
unique and unrepeatable individual perspectives) involved in the sharing of narratives. 
Breaking apart and reconfiguring norms of discourse, as the performative model does, 
cannot fully explain the experience of participating in or appreciating these performances 
																																																								172 I introduce this model in Chapter 1. 173 Benhabib 1999, 341. 174 Benhabib 1999, 339. 
175 Allison Weir offers a concise summary of the performative model’s inability to 
account for the surfeit of meaning in language: ‘What’s lost here [in the performative 
model of agency] is any recognition of the perspectives of the participants in these 
performances, and hence, any meaningful differentiation among unreflective, deliberate, 
dogmatic, defensive, anxious, ironic, playful, and parodic performances of gender, and 
any understanding of the ways in which these interact and conflict in specific 
performances and particular subjects.  What’s lost then, is any meaningful concept of 
agency, and any meaningful concept of subversion.’ Weir 1996, 127. 
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which create moments of humour, irony, pathos, etc.  This creation of shared meaning 
cannot be explained by performance alone.  ‘The narrative model,’ as Benhabib puts it 
‘has the virtue of accounting for that “surfeit of meaning, creativity and spontaneity” that 
is said to accompany iteration in the performativity model as well but whose mechanisms 
cannot actually be explained by performativity.’176   The meaning generated by the 
sharing of narratives, in other words, amounts to more than the sum of its parts.  An 
individual, by this account of narrative agency, is always able to tell some kind of story 
about how she is situated in the world into which she is thrown.177 Even if the content of 
that story is rife with contradiction or belies a commitment to subordinating attachments, 
the capacity to tell a story about oneself remains and, with it, the capacity to change that 
story as circumstances, beliefs, and normative commitments change.  
 
3.2 The Gender Objection 
 
As mentioned, some feminist theorists are concerned that a narrative model remains 
overly indebted to a rationalist conception of autonomy, one which presupposes the 
possibility of critical self-awareness from a place beyond the confines of power 
relations.178  Amy Allen offers one such critique.  She argues that Benhabib’s conception 
of narrativity retains an implicit reliance upon a subject with robust autonomy in the form 																																																								176 Benhabib 1999, 341. 177 Almost always.  In the third section of this chapter, and again in Chapter 6, I will 
discuss the challenges posed to this basic capacity for narrative by trauma, mental illness, 
and other physical and psychological impairments. 178 The idea of such an autonomous ‘authentic’ core self has been explicitly rejected by 
many feminist theorists, including (but certainly not limited to) Benhabib (1995), Butler 
(1997b), Benjamin (1998), Brown (1995), Zerilli (2005), Heyes (2007), Allen (2008), 
and Krause (2013), Weir (1996). 
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of critical reflexivity.  According to Allen, Benhabib posits the existence of an 
‘ungendered core self’ capable of ‘making sense’ of subordinating gender relationships 
before becoming gendered.  To choose how to relate a narrative about gender, a self must 
first have the autobiographical capacity necessary to ‘make sense’ at all, but an individual 
does not gain such a capacity, Allen reasons, until that individual is already gendered.  
Recall, however, that narrative agency, conceived as an individual’s capacity to make 
sense out of nonsense, does not need to posit the extent to which an individual can gain 
reflective distance from her situatedness within society.  An individual will make sense of 
the gender norms into which she is thrown, but the way she will make sense of those 
norms can be neither predicted nor guaranteed. As we have seen, the individual’s 
capacity to form a narrative in the first place constitutes her agency, regardless of the 
content of that narrative.  
Allen’s broader goal (discussed at length in Chapter 1) is to find a framework for 
feminist subjectivity which allows for the possibilities of agency and mutual recognition 
in the face of power ‘in all its depth and complexity.’179 Thus, her aim in looking at the 
narrative model of agency is to determine whether it falls victim to an unsupportable 
rationalism in the face of ubiquitous power relationships.  She finds that the narrative 
model does not take sufficiently into account the severity of the influence of 
subordinating gender norms on the process of individuation.  
Allen argues that the ‘I’ who ‘chooses’ her narratives is always already gendered.  
But even the gendered ‘I’ has the capacity to make choices, and the content of those 
choices is secondary to this capacity.  As we undergo the process of socialisation, we are 
																																																								179 Allen 2008, 2. 
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introduced to the claims of culture, many of which are uncomfortably subordinating and 
marked by unequal distributions of power.  These claims constitute narrative identity, 
but, in themselves, they do not account for every aspect of narrative identity.  The 
capacity to form and reform attachments to these claims first depends on the role of the 
individual as narrative agent. 
It is this differentiation between the capacity to say ‘I’ and the content of the 
choices that ‘I’ make, however, of which Allen is sceptical.  In her view, the capacity to 
say ‘I’ is preceded and thus at least partially determined by gender identification.  As she 
puts it: ‘If the roots of gender identity lie deeper than those of the narrative ability that 
Benhabib views as the source of spontaneity, creativity, and agency, then interrelated 
assumptions about gender difference and gender dominance are so basic to our sense of 
ourselves that they are likely to be extremely resistant to critique and to change.’180  For 
Allen, Benhabib posits a universal narrative agency at the expense of recognising the 
gendered constructs which shape even the child’s first exercise of this narrative agency.  
But does the reality of gender subordination, even at the earliest stages of individuation, 
compromise our definition of narrative agency as the irrepressible capacity to make sense 
over time and in relation to others?  And does this concept of narrative agency really 
carry with it a harmfully rationalist endorsement of autonomy vis-à-vis gender norms? 
In the model of narrative identity detailed above, gender identification, like all 
other narrative content, depends upon the capacity to say ‘I’.  Narrative agency (capacity) 
and narrative identity (content) are inextricably bound together.  To conceive of narrative 
agency as primary is not to suggest that the self exists in some fixed state apart from the 
																																																								180 Ibid., 170. 
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narrative formation of life-stories.  The narrative self is the site of making sense and, as 
such, is fragile and always in flux.  Benhabib does not argue for a static individual who 
may step outside of her position in the world and ask: How ought ‘I’ to confront this or 
that norm?  Narrative agency, as we have seen, is the capacity to make sense of one’s 
position within a web of narratives and not the capacity to get outside of this web in order 
to choose whether or not to accept its terms.  Furthermore, the narrative agent is not the 
master of her own narratives.  Her access to meaning-making is always mediated not only 
by external norms and other stories but also by the very early unconscious internalisation 
of these norms.  
Allen refers to several studies which suggest that gender identity forms before a 
child develops either autobiographical memory or the narrative capacity through which to 
share information about herself.  By age two, it seems, children have ‘mastered the 
concept of gender difference’, but they do not begin to develop the capacity for 
autobiographical memory until the age of three or four.  Autobiographical memory is 
different from episodic memory in that it gives the subject a sense of self over time, 
rather than just an ability to recall past events.  Because research suggests that 
autobiographical memory is developed ‘through social interactions with adult caregivers’ 
and because those adult caregivers tend to ‘interact with infants and young children in 
ways that correspond to gender stereotypes’, Allen concludes that ‘autobiography is 
deeply gendered as well’.181  To support this claim, she cites a study which concluded 
that little boys’ and little girls’ narratives ‘tend to be different in both their content and, 
																																																								181 Ibid., 167. 
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perhaps more significantly, their structure’.182  Researchers found that little boys tended 
to relate memories that were shorter and more self-involved, whereas little girls tended to 
give more elaborate and relational accounts of past experiences. 
Based on this empirical evidence, Allen claims that individuation, as well as 
socialisation, is a fundamentally gendered process.  She argues that ‘gender structures not 
only the substantive content of our very narratives but also our very narrative capacities, 
thus, our narrative selves as well.’183  According to Allen, Benhabib does not take 
seriously enough the extent to which gender dominance is at work on this foundational 
level and thus gives ‘an overly optimistic account of what is required in order to exercise 
autonomy with respect to gender narratives’.184  But this criticism misses the mark for a 
few important reasons.  
First, Allen gives dubious privilege to the systematic dominance of gender 
relations over the systematic dominance of other systematic relations of power, such as 
race, class and level of education.  Autobiographical understanding is formed chiefly 
through social interaction (what Benhabib calls learning to become a conversation 
partner) with caretakers, but there is nothing to suggest that gender stereotypes are more 
influential in forming this understanding than these other important factors.185 Many of 
																																																								182 Ibid., 167. 183 Ibid., 168. 184 Ibid., 164.  Allen also writes ‘the very language that we use to articulate our critique 
of gender subordination is relentlessly structured by the same’ (171).  The extent to 
which language is itself gendered would certainly be an interesting matter for discussion, 
though it seems to me that a concept of language as gendered shapes narrative identity 
but does not compromise narrative agency. 185 In her recent book Delusions of Gender (2010), Cordelia Fine offers some remarkably 
compelling evidence that gender is a salient feature in identity development from day 
one.  Her project is to reveal various fallacies in neurological accounts of sex difference, 
but we need not engage on the level of her (extremely well-made) argument against 
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the experiments to which Allen refers examine the autobiographical narratives of white, 
middle-class American children.186  Surely, the development of autobiographical 
capacity is different in children of other cultures or other classes; thus Allen’s singling 
out of gender over other developmental factors seems to give us only part of the story.  
The confrontation with norms, whatever these norms may be, is an integral feature of the 
process of identity formation: the capacity to confront these norms remains constant. 
And so, it does not matter all that much whether the ‘I’ who creates narrative 
meaning is already gendered—what matters is the capacity to make sense of oneself as a 
unique ‘I’ at all.  From birth, the narrative agent interacts with the (often contradictory) 
claims made by gender norms over the course of a lifetime.  These gender norms 
themselves are fluid and multi-layered, not homogenous.  They mean different things to 
different people at different times and in different cultural contexts.  Thus, a subject 
might very easily be ‘gendered’ in that she is constituted by and embedded in the web of 
gender norms into which she has been born, but this does not mean that she cannot 
																																																																																																																																																																					
neurosexism in order to draw on her empirical accounts of a culture obsessed with 
inscribing and re-inscribing gendered norms.   Fine summarises study after study into the 
imposition of normative gender identity on children from infancy, on children’s 
surprisingly early mastery of their own gender identities, and their tendency to self-
socialise along gender lines.  However, there are (at least) two problems with drawing 
from this empirical evidence the conclusion that gender is always a salient component of 
the exercise of narrative agency, both of them implicit in Fine’s work.  The first, an issue 
not discussed by Allen, is the demonstrably contingent importance of gender norms in 
various activities studied by social scientists, neurologists, and psychologists.   Many of 
the studies Fine cites in the earlier part of her book suggest that the salience of gender in 
a given task (like taking a math test) is contingent upon whether or not the subject is 
‘primed’ with gender salience.  A large part of her argument depends on the claim that 
we can change both our minds and our brains through our behaviour.  The second is the 
lack of intersectional concern in most of the investigations of gender salience Fine 
canvasses; almost all of the studies she cites are, like the studies Allen cites, comprised of 
white, middle-class, well-educated subjects. 186 Buckner and Fivush 1998, 407. 
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challenge and transform, with varying degrees of success, the norms with which she is 
confronted.  Knowing that an individual is gendered, even down to her most basic 
conception of herself, does not lessen the individual’s capacity for narrative agency.  
Benhabib writes: 
We always have options in telling a life story that makes sense to us.  These 
options are not ahistorical; they are culturally and historically specific and 
inflected by the master narrative of the family structure and gender roles into 
which each individual is thrown.  Nonetheless, just as the grammatical rules of 
language, once acquired, do not exhaust our capacity to build an infinite number 
of well-formed sentences in a language, so socialisation and accumulation 
processes do not determine the life story of any unique individual or his or her 
capacity to initiate new actions and new sentences in conversation.187  
 
Presumably Allen would not deny that there exists this kind of wiggle room when it 
comes to the ways in which we confront gender norms; but she insists that the salience of 
gender norms from early infancy limits the options the narrative agent has.188  What she 
misses is the grounding of narrative agency in uniqueness.  The unique individual makes 
sense of who she is, and of how she is gendered, from a perspective enormously 
influenced by the world into which she is thrown; and yet, a perspective that is wholly 
her own and, therefore, new. 
And lastly, against Allen, we can say that a notion of gender subordination, even 
one that is deeply entrenched at the psychic level, does not compromise our concept of 
narrative agency. Narrative agency does not mean that a self can always identify or 
isolate, and then choose whether and how to take up as narrative, subordinating gender 
norms.  On the contrary, Benhabib concedes, after Freud, that the ego is not the master in 
its own house. She takes seriously psychoanalytic insights into the phenomenon of 																																																								187 Benhabib 1999, 345. 188 As Moira Gatens puts it: ‘Allen…seems to flirt with…the existence of a gendered 
core self.’ Gatens 2014, 43. 
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subjection.  As she puts it: ‘Every story we tell of ourselves will also contain another of 
which we may not even be aware; and, in ways that are usually very obscure to us, we are 
determined by these subtexts and memories in our unconscious.’189  This unavoidable 
subjection does not preclude narrative agency.  The individual tries to form a coherent 
identity for herself by relating to others, but she may never fully know what psychic 
forces at work within herself influence the course of this interaction.190 
The deeply ingrained system of subordinating gender norms into which all 
humans are born will limit the individual’s capacity for autonomy vis-à-vis these norms; 
it will not, however, compromise the individual’s narrative agency.  The agent will make 
sense of herself within society whether she accepts or rejects the claims of stereotypical 
gender norms, when she is able to recognise them at all. The narrative agent is, indeed, 
constituted by a host of subordinating relationships; and yet, she is not totally determined 
by them.  While these relationships of power, many of them gendered or gender-based 
relationships, often limit a subject’s ability to recognise power at work in and on herself, 
they do not completely determine the stories a subject will tell about herself. Narrative 
agency, therefore, is, very simply, the capacity of a constituted subject to make sense.  
This narrative model does not propose a core self that transcends the subordinating 
																																																								189 Benhabib 1999, 349. 
190 But how does the subject know whether or not she has recognised the extent to which 
gender norms are at work in determining her narrative identity at any given time?  And 
how can we cultivate a desire for self-transformation if an attachment to subordination 
structures our psyche at the most intimate level? Benhabib allows for the possibility that 
subordinating relationships of power are at work even at an unconscious level, but she 
cannot explain why or how we become attached to this intimate psychic subjection.  It is 
at this point that we might want to use the theoretical framework from Chapter 1: to 
mediate Benhabib’s model with Butler’s theory of attachment to subordination (1997b) in 
order to enrich our understanding of the limitations imposed upon the subject.    
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claims made by systems of gender dominance, and so there is nothing in it that prevents a 
gendered subject from exercising narrative agency. ‘Gendered’ identity, as it plays out in 
the open field of choice and circumstance, is as complex and varied as identity itself. 
 
3.3 The Communicability Objection 
 
I argue above that narrative agency is essentially relational in that it arises out of 
conversations within webs of interlocution.  Within a radically contextualised critique, 
there exist no static or quasi-transcendental rules which govern conversation in action; 
however, if we take seriously Benhabib’s notion of the creation of shared meaning 
through shared narratives within a plurality, then we might reasonably conceive of 
narrativity as a sort of engine for social change.  Together, we are able to make and re-
make meaningful statements about who we are.  The problem then becomes how to 
identify whether or not such change is for the better: how to identify, in other words, 
moments of ‘positive’ mutual recognition and to distinguish those moments from harmful 
patterns of systematic subordination, miscommunication, and misrecognition.  
The second major criticism of the narrative model of agency within feminist 
theory is the concern that privileging the notions of narrative and recognition may lead us 
to ignore the problematics of subordination in favour of a satisfying, but imagined, 
narrative coherence. Lois McNay (2003, 2008) makes this argument directly against 
Benhabib.  McNay does admit that a narrative model of agency is more conducive to 
theorising intersubjectivity and creativity than other models put forth by feminist 
theorists.  She sees much heuristic potential in the narrative model of agency—a subject 
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with the constant capacity for sense-making seems to her pragmatically preferable to the 
disconnected, serialised, and fractured subject of postmodernity because it emphasises 
‘the temporal and intersubjective aspects of subjectivity and agency.’191  However, 
McNay is sceptical of Benhabib’s work on narrativity for a few reasons.  First, she thinks 
it insupportably relies on the inherent communicability of narratives. Second, she 
suggests that much of Benhabib’s theory of narrativity is still haunted by the untenably 
rationalist assumptions of the Habermasian communicative ethics that Benhabib has 
worked so meticulously to contextualise.  And third, she points out that narrative, focused 
as it is upon relationships between individuals, struggles to address systematic 
domination on a broader social scale.  
McNay argues, then, that narratives are not inherently communicable and, further, 
that the assumption that ‘making sense’ is an essential human capacity keeps us from 
appreciating ‘the blocks, both psychic and social, to the formation of a coherent sense of 
self’.192  She equates the notion that narratives are inherently communicable to 
Habermas’ reliance on the context transcendence of certain kinds of communication.  
Benhabib, according to McNay, tends to disassociate narrative from the factors which 
might prevent the construction of narratives in the same way that Habermas tends to 
disassociate communication from inherently subordinating forms of power.  In both 
cases, there is an overly ambitious attempt to theorise identity in terms of 
unproblematically equal and ‘authentic’ communication.  However, where Habermasian 
communicative ethics depends on the use of rhetorical rather than poetic language—in 
other words, the acceptance of another person’s point of view on predetermined terms—																																																								191 McNay 2003, 7. 192 Ibid., 7. 
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the process of sharing narratives is anything but rhetorical.  The Habermasian project of 
communicative ethics and the Benhabibian notion of narrativity are thus fundamentally 
incompatible, according to McNay.  Benhabib, by both copying Habermas’ assumption 
of universal communicability and simultaneously throwing out Habermas’ criteria for 
validity when it comes to sharing meaning, wants to have her cake and eat it too. 
McNay argues that intersubjectivity and interpersonal interaction, within 
Benhabib’s schema of narrative identity formation, can never function according to 
universal rules of engagement because the commitments, identifications, and perceived 
truths of the narrative agent are ever-shifting.  Thus, relationships between the individual 
and the other, the individual and her self, the individual and certain social norms, may 
never be definitively judged subordinating or mutually recognitive; and, as a result, 
identifying situations in which mutual recognition or positive re-signification are certain 
to occur becomes nearly impossible.  Moreover, the process of telling stories is not 
always helpful; McNay argues that it can also be disruptive, mythologising, or reifying.  
According to McNay, Benhabib is blind to this problem of systematic inequality because 
she implicitly relies on ‘Habermas’s model of a communicatively symmetrical 
intersubjectivity’, a reliance which ‘results in the deployment of a syncretic and over-
generalized idea of narrative identity’.193 
For McNay, one result of this implicit methodological reliance is Benhabib’s 
assumption that all experience can lend itself to narrative.  Such an assumption grants a 
disproportionate authority to stories about the self and promotes an insupportable 
primacy of the said, a linguistic monism that does not sufficiently take into account the 
																																																								193 Ibid., 2. 
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myriad aspects of selfhood that are difficult, if not impossible, to put into narrative form.  
In other words, McNay thinks that Benhabib copies the Habermasian ‘assumption of the 
unproblematic transmissibility of inner nature.’194  She argues that Benhabib is overly 
ambitious in her judgment that the self is always capable of constructing a narrative 
identity.   
Indeed, McNay claims that Benhabib posits an irreconcilable difference between 
the fragmented self and the coherent self and in doing so ‘avoids addressing important 
issues, such as the nature of the boundary between the sayable and the unsayable, or of 
the passage of experience from a pre-discursive to a discursive level.’195  The problem 
here is not that Benhabib posits a core self; rather, it is that she presupposes an essential 
relationship between the experiences that constitute a self and the process of making 
sense of those experiences.  Experience, according to McNay, is not so universally 
translatable.  Many experiences, such as the everyday episodic experiences of eating 
lunch or riding the bus are so mundane that they ‘resist incorporation into a meaningful 
account of the self.’196  Conversely, experiences of rape or abuse are often so traumatic 
that an individual will disassociate from them completely and have no way of rendering 
them meaningful at all. 
Benhabib, by this account, also privileges narrative accounts of lived experience 
to the extent that she sees them as unquestionably authentic.  McNay sees this privileging 
as a kind of fetishizing of meaning—she refers to Benhabib’s problematic preoccupation 
																																																								194 Ibid., 10. 195 Ibid., 9. 196 Ibid., 9. 
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with narrative’s ‘normative redemptive force’.197  Privileging the stories we tell about 
ourselves is harmful because the ‘[N]arration of identity may involve the reification as 
much as a clarification of the self’.198  When we rely on someone else’s memory or 
someone else’s perception, we often tell ourselves stories about who we are in order to fit 
in with the agreed upon notion of who we ought to be.  The telling and retelling of such 
codified narratives can ‘create crevasses, ruptures, emptiness and deep wells of non-
being’.199  An individual trying to make sense of a traumatic event, for example, might 
tell a story in which she identifies herself as victim, where the telling of that story results 
in a reified, alienating narrative identity of victimhood.   
Finally, McNay is concerned with the now-familiar tendency in critical theory to 
reduce systematically subordinating power relationships to identity politics.  Gender 
issues, especially, are far too often conceived of in terms of identity or recognition rather 
than as systematically maintained forms of oppression.  McNay argues that the narrative 
model suffers from this oversight because of its emphasis on immediate interpersonal 
interaction instead of trends of subordination on a broader scale.  A narrative subject 
might be able to identify or confront the subordinating norms with which she comes into 
direct contact, but, at the same time, be unable to theorise a ‘public’ or ‘impersonal’ 
undercurrent of oppression.  In the context of gender, for example, an individual might, 
because her personal experience of, say, excelling as a woman in a male-dominated field, 
incorporate into her life story a narrative of widespread and growing gender equality 
while failing to recognise the ways in which gender is still responsible for various 
																																																								197 Ibid., 2. 198 Ibid., 11. 199 Ibid., 10. 
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(quasi)permanent asymmetries of power within society as a whole.  McNay is concerned 
that the ‘understanding of gender in terms of narrative identity and mutual recognition 
obscures the systemic levels at which gender inequalities are perpetuated and thereby 
renders them invisible’.200  Emphasising the importance of these overarching objective 
asymmetries of gender subordination is clearly an indispensable task of feminist theory. 
McNay’s critique requires that we elaborate upon the relational and generative 
aspects of narrative agency.  First, McNay’s charge that a narrative theory is overly 
optimistic about the communicability of experience demands a review of what ‘narrative’ 
is and what it is not.201  Recall that narrative need not follow a predetermined structure: 
narrative, when it applies to self-constitution, is not the same thing as literary narrative.   
It does not need to follow the arc of beginning-middle-end, does not need to be coherent, 
and is not completely under the agent’s control.  Narrative identity, furthermore, might 
take any number of forms: ‘patterns of action, attention, or emotional response, in bodily 
dispositions and habits, in moral commitments, or in one’s personal relationships’.202  
The narratives that emerge in narrative identity formation, as we have seen, are 
contingent and unpredictable.  Their existence does not (and cannot) depend upon a fixed 
system of communication.  A narrative theory allows that experiences which resist 
conventional narrative structure, such as ‘fragmentation and collage, the senselessness of 
being next-to-each-other in space in time’ are just as authentic as more straightforward 
life-stories because they express a ‘material and lived reality’—these experiences are still 																																																								200 Ibid., 14. 201 Defining narrative is currently a major preoccupation in a variety of disciplines.  I 
gave an overview of the literature on narrative identity and the meaning of narrative 
within the philosophy of personal identity in Chapter 2.  For an excellent overview of the 
broader ‘narrative turn’ in contemporary philosophical methodology, see Meretoja 2014. 202 Mackenzie 2008, 1. 
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classifiable as narratives in that they involve exercising the capacity of narrative agency, 
or ‘making sense’.203  The construction of narrative content is an open-ended process of 
remembering and retelling within a web of other narratives.   
Furthermore, the conversations which constitute this web almost always take 
place on unequal ground.  Certain aspects of selfhood, especially the effects of trauma 
and abuse, may elude narrative awareness.  But we can extend Freud’s metaphor of the 
ego who is not the master of his own house even further: the self may be imagined as a 
crowded household in which all of the petty bickering of a ‘family brawl’ is apt to be 
acted out.204  No relationship, whether intrasubjective or intersubjective, is free from 
confusion, contrast, or argument; and, of course, there is no possibility of extricating 
oneself from the web of relationships into which one is born.  Some conversations are 
mutually beneficial, but conversations often fail.  Importantly, individuals and 
collectivities continue to weave identities for themselves out of the web of interlocution 
into which they are thrown, regardless of how repressive or subordinating relationships 
within the web may be.  McNay reads Benhabib’s insistence on the resilience of narrative 
agency as a reliance on the inherent communicability of ‘narratives’, but we should, 
instead, understand the resilience of narrative agency as the certainty that some narratives 
will be communicable, some of the time.  
Within a theory of narrativity there is room for the idea that narrative is repressive 
and exclusionary, but there is also, simultaneously, room for the idea that narratives can 
be productively communicable. The process of creating narratives is indeterminate, 
marked not by the construction of any specific narrative, but by the uniqueness of each 																																																								203 Benhabib 1999, 345. 204 Ibid., 349. 
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narrative agent.  Inherent in the formation of each narrative is the potential generation of 
a new meaning, unique by virtue of its unrepeatable perspective.  McNay gestures toward 
a problematic privileging of ‘meaning’ in this formulation of narrative construction, but a 
theory of narrativity does not have any intractable attachments to what constitutes 
‘sense’.  Rather than read a theory of narrative agency as emphasising meaning itself, it is 
more profitable to read such a theory as interested primarily in the capacity to formulate 
and reformulate meaning.  It is precisely this open-endedness, this unpredictability, which 
is foundational for the formation of narratives within a plurality.205  The individual 
child’s construction of narrative content—of what it means to be a little girl instead of a 
little boy, for instance—is essentially relational.  Her idea of what ‘makes sense’, though 
unique, is informed by, and limited to, collectively decided upon, and ever-shifting, ideas 
of ‘sense’. 
Embedded in this landscape of relational identity and collectively decided upon 
norms, is the individual’s capacity to confront and change these norms through the 
articulation of new narratives.  Recall Benhabib argues that ‘[F]urthering one’s capacity 
for autonomous agency is only possible within a solidaristic community that sustains 
one’s identity through listening to one, and allowing one to listen to others, with 
respect.’206  An individual’s speech and action have no meaning unless that speech and 
action are recognised by others (and it is in this sense that all action is interaction).  The 
meaning they do have once recognised is fragile and dependent upon a specific 
																																																								205 Benhabib writes: ‘we have to explain how every human infant can become the 
initiator of a unique life-story, of a meaningful tale—which certainly is only meaningful 
if we know the cultural codes under which it is constructed—but which we cannot predict 
even if we know these cultural codes’ 1992, 218. 206 Benhabib 1999, 350. 
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constellation of collectively constructed narratives and norms.  As circumstances change, 
so too does the construction of narrative and normative meaning.  These changes can 
occur for the better, under the aegis of respectful mutual recognition.  
The reification of certain narratives alluded to by McNay can thus be challenged 
and changed under the correct conditions.  The rape victim who feels she cannot escape 
the narrative of victimhood always has the potential to confront and reconfigure this 
narrative within a solidaristic community, however small.  The generation of new 
meaning through such a supportive and mutually respectful conversation (or, more likely, 
series of conversations) will be extraordinarily difficult.  The point, however, is that the 
potential for transformative mutual recognition is always there, no matter how unlikely.  
Because narrative agency is a constant capacity, narrative identity never refers to a static 
subject who is the same over time.  It always refers to an open and unfinished process full 
of potential but, as of yet, unrealised meaning.   
Feminist politics, to be truly powerful, must recognise the importance of 
belonging to and being recognised within, such a community.  The collective capacity to 
identify and resist oppression first depends on the capacity of discrete, individual agents 
to communicate meaning to one another.  The narrative identities of nations, cultures, and 
other groups are also ‘woven out of tales and fragments belonging both to oneself and to 
others’.207   Collectivities, at their best, may derive a coherent sense of who they are 
																																																								207 Ibid., 351.  But do these ‘tales and fragments’ consist of language alone?  It seems 
that the communicative action Benhabib writes about is, for the most part, based in 
language.  She does address the problem of privileging language over other forms of 
communication in Situating the Self: ‘If communication is not understood narrowly and 
exclusively as language but if body gestures, behavior, facial expressions, mimics and 
sounds are also viewed as non-linguistic but linguistically articulable modes of 
communication, then the “ideal communication community” extends well beyond the 
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through this dynamic of generative mutual recognition.  By these lights, we can pursue a 
politics that does not define itself according to static or pre-existing identity narratives; in 
other words, we can endorse a communicative politics that is concerned with the interests 
(contingently) held in common by complex narrative selves.  Such a politics does not 
insist on permanent categories of oppression, but is defined by, as Marieke Borren puts it, 
‘spontaneous emergence, associative action, revolutionary pathos…the very urgent sense 
that something new and empowering is happening, and…a short-lived existence’.208  
Many different feminist politics seem to share these characteristics.  This is not to say 
that there is no common thread connecting one feminist politics to the next; rather, 
feminist politics spring up differently for different collectives, depending on which issues 
or problems are pressing for those collectives.  Each politics is feminist because it 
addresses a ‘particular worldly issue that affects women differently from men’, but each 
collective deals with or acts out this issue on its own terms and is, importantly, made up 
of a plurality of unique individuals concerned with the issue in question but whose 
identities are not fully defined by this issue.209 
Similarly, the collective identity of the Occupy movement, to take a particularly 
relevant example, has not been definable in terms of its mission statement or its 
demographics; rather, it is a historically situated and contingent confluence of many 
narratives.  Its transformative potential depends upon the collaborative construction of its 
own identity by discrete, individual actors.  Diverse individuals within the movement 
have confronted and resisted deeply entrenched systematic oppression through a series of 																																																																																																																																																																					
adult person capable of full speech and accountable action.’  See Benhabib 1992, 58-
59fn. 208 Borren 2013, 207. 209 Ibid., 207. 
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actual conversations.  The collective agency of the Occupy movement depends on these 
‘dynamic and open-ended conversations’ rather than on ‘collective identity as a 
product’.210  A plurality of real, unique, individual agents with diverse points of view is 
the source of the capacity of the movement itself to create new narratives, which may or 
may not be sufficient to effect lasting political change.  Overturning systematic 
oppression over a specific period of time, and according to a set of static normative 
commitments, applicable to everyone everywhere, has not been the point.  Indeed, the 
possibility of general consensus among the social movement and everyone else (the state, 
the banks, those inherently unsympathetic to the movement for any number of reasons) is 
an unnecessary, and often harmful, illusion.  ‘[I]t is less significant,’ Benhabib writes, 
‘that “we” discover “the” general interest, but more significant that collective decisions 
be reached through procedures which are radically open and fair to all.’211  This view of 
solidarity—as the mutually recognitive collective pursuit of an interest held in 
common—seems to me a very productive way of framing confrontations with what 
McNay refers to as systematically maintained forms of oppression.  
A more challenging example to consider here might be the Black Lives Matter 
movement in America, since its participants are more weighed down by the systematic 
oppression with which McNay is concerned.  Part of what activists in the movement are 
trying to do is to point out that ‘blackness’ is an inescapable identity marker, one that 
puts black people in danger.  And, indeed, insisting that unjust treatment in the hands of 
the police is a problem which affects black people specifically is especially important in 
the face of the rejoinder that ‘all lives matter’.  The discrete individuals who make up the 																																																								210 Kavada 2015, 875. 211 Benhabib 1992, 9. 
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Black Lives Matter movement, then, are organised around revealing the systematic 
subordination and discrimination faced by black people in America.  In the second part of 
the thesis, I employ Hannah Arendt’s thoughts on identity and politics, which both 
recognise the need to respond to an attack on a specific aspect of one’s identity by 
claiming that identity.  I also describe a model of politics that is concerned with making 
communicable specific harms and injustices through collective action.  In this model of 
politics, interests held in common lead to associations which bolster individual members’ 
political agency—which give them the confidence, in other words, to make claims and 
voice judgments based on their experience. 
 
Thinking of agency in the way I have described it here, as the irreducible capacity at the 
heart of identity formation, allows us to posit an idea of a self who is always capable of 
change.  An agent might incorporate the claims of subordinating gender norms into even 
her most basic idea of herself, and yet she remains capable, through the creation of new 
meaning from a unique point of view, of shifting those norms in surprising ways.   An 
agent might harbour the seemingly inarticulate harm caused by deep trauma, and yet she 
remains capable, through continual attempts at conversation with people who respect her, 
of changing the extent to which that trauma defines her.  Recognising this capacity to 
make sense of oneself through time and in relation to others as primary does not mean 
that we should expect people to tell coherent, authoritative stories about who they are; it 
means, rather, that we should be prepared for unexpected stories to emerge from each 
individual, no matter who he or she is and no matter what we may think we know about 
him or her.   
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Feminist theorists can, as Allen suggests, encourage positive self and social 
transformation by ‘acknowledging recognition as an ethical ideal and understanding it as 
a permanent—though temporally fleeting—possibility of human relationships.’212 There 
is no way to transcend completely the subordinating power structures we, as feminists, 
seek to change, but ubiquitous subordination does not compromise narrative agency.  On 
the contrary, it is only by positing narrative agency as a constant that we are able to argue 
that the possibilities of mutual recognition and autonomy are permanent.  Further, the 
identification of this irreducible capacity as a constant does not mean that we should 
endorse an individualistic feminist politics; on the contrary, the notion that agency is the 
unique individual’s capacity to make meaning is inescapably relational.  The 
transformative and generative potential of identity (whether collective or individual) first 
depends upon the capacity of each human being to make sense of herself as an ‘I’ within 
a web of other ‘I’s’.  
Mutual recognition and reflexivity are plausible normative aims of an admittedly 
contextualised feminist critical theory.  These aims are inherent in narrative practice—by 
virtue of narrative agency I understand myself in time and in relation to others; and 
through this understanding of myself I come to recognise the same narrative agency in 
others.  Equally inherent in narrative identity, however, are the problems of subjection 
and misrecognition—some narratives will always be reductive, harmful, alienating, and 
misrepresentative. Tracing possible pathways for positive social transformation thus 
involves attending to moments, however transitory, when new meaning is created within 
a plurality of unique selves.  In the second half of this thesis, I turn to the work Hannah 
																																																								212 Allen 2008, 95. 
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Arendt to help articulate a feminist political theory grounded in cultivating and enhancing 
these pathways. 
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Chapter Four: Feminist Resources in Hannah Arendt 
 
Up to now, this thesis has been concerned with questions about subjectivity, agency, 
autonomy, and identity.  My chief focus of inquiry, in other words has been the 
individual (unique) self.  I have given an account of a non-sovereign, narrative, and 
relational understanding of the self through a discussion of feminist theories of agency 
and subjection (Chapter 1), an examination of work in the philosophy of personal identity 
on the nature of narrative identity (Chapter 2), and an endorsement of a narrative model 
of agency (Chapter 3).  In the second part of this thesis, I turn to the field of action—the 
political.  I explore a political theory of feminist politics built on a narrative model of 
agency.  The political theory of Hannah Arendt forms the scaffolding for this feminist 
politics.  There are, in Arendt, profound resources for understanding how a politics based 
on narrative agency can and should work.  Arendt gives us excellent conceptual tools for 
explaining the significance of many of the aspects of narrative agency I have highlighted 
so far: uniqueness, non-sovereignty, communication and communicability, and, of 
course, action and agency.  
Arendt’s concept of the political, with its emphasis on action, gives us an 
opportunity to pursue the emancipatory goals of feminism without getting our boots stuck 
in the persistent quagmire of identity politics.  This quagmire often arises out of 
conceiving of identities in terms of what they are—thinking of them, in other words, as 
combinations of political narratives.  In Arendt’s work, by contrast, ‘identity’ might be 
defined as a complex disclosure of a unique individual in a public space.  Arendt’s 
conceptual framework, in other words, allows us to shift the focus of politics from what 
we are to what we are doing.  This politics of action is only possible if certain conditions 
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are met.  There must be a plurality of actors, each of which is able to repeatedly offer 
unique meaning through natality, the individual’s continued appearance in the common 
world.  What’s more, the meaning that arises out of action, and that allows us to articulate 
shared concerns, interests, and judgments, is experienced through narrativity.  These 
three aspects of action (plurality, natality, and narrativity) are conditions for the 
individual agent to understand herself as an ‘I’ in time and with relation to other unique 
‘I’s’.  In this chapter, I take from Arendt 1) a definition of political identity that does not 
reduce agents to a single set of narratives, 2) an account of plurality, natality, and 
narrativity as conditions for agency, and 3) a sketch of a feminist politics of association 
based on a narrative agency. 
 
4.1 Arendt and Identity Politics 
 
Many feminist theorists have been drawn to Arendt in recent years because she offers an 
unusually expansive set of options in the face of the problematic identity questions with 
which I have been concerned in this thesis.213  On the one hand, feminists must discuss 
collective identities in order to make claims on behalf of this or that group of people; and 
yet, on the other hand, these identity designations are always exclusionary and reductive. 
We can read Arendt as giving us a way beyond the terms of this debate by insisting on the 
constant tension, in her work, between identity and non-identity.214  Moving beyond the 
terms of the identity/non-identity debate involves finding a way to come up with ‘non-																																																								213 Allen (1999), Cavarero (2000, 2015), Benhabib (1992, 1993), Zerilli (2005, 2009), 
Borren (2013), Honig (1995, Dietz (2002), and others.  214 Amy Allen (1999) proposes the ‘identity/non-identity’ reading of Arendt for feminist 
politics. 
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repressive, non-exclusionary conceptions of group identity’.215  Conceptions of group 
identity, as we have seen, usually rest upon political narratives of gender, race, sexuality 
and so on.  These pre-assigned collective narrative identities are necessarily exclusionary 
because they refer to fixed categories, which in turn lend themselves to limited 
definitions.  The category of woman, for example, forces those of us who make use of it 
to fit the bill of what we think of when we think of woman.  To identify as woman both 
forces women to downplay their differences (sharing the identity ‘woman’ does not 
guarantee that those identifying as women have anything else in common) and excludes 
women who may not fit the generally agreed upon criteria for womanhood (trans women, 
for instance, who do not have female identity but who identify as women, would be left 
out of the category ‘woman’ if having a specific anatomy were a part of the generally 
accepted narrative of what a woman is).   
On the other hand, a conception of identity as entirely performative—as ‘acting 
out’ identity narratives without affirming them—makes it very difficult to explain why 
we might be so invested in political narratives or how identifying with political narratives 
can provide us with a deep sense of solidarity or with feelings of empowerment.  When a 
trans woman identifies with the category ‘woman’, for instance, she is declaring that part 
of her identity important or salient.  Sharing that identity with others might give her a 
feeling of belonging with those others and being able to apply the political narrative 
about what a woman is becomes a positive resource for her narrative self-conception.  
She is able to affirm an identity in common with other women.  This is an affirmation of 
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solidarity understood as the shared sense of identification with a certain political narrative 
that arises during action.  
 This definition of solidarity emphasises the similarities that arise out of uniting for 
a common cause, rather than the similarities that move people to act in the service of a 
common cause.  The trans woman feels that she shares her womanhood in common with 
other women.216  She is not reducible to the category of woman (there are many other 
narratives that make up her narrative self-understanding), nor do the political narratives 
about what women are pre-determine how she will act, but she claims the identity of 
woman in order to make communicable political concerns pertaining to her 
womanhood—whether she can legally use a women’s restroom, for example.  The 
resolution of this political concern is made possible by general recognition of the 
legitimacy of the transwoman’s identification with the category of woman.  The general 
consensus about the political narrative of womanhood shifts as more and more people 
recognise similar claims.  This model of action differs from conventional politics based 
around identity narratives because it does not insist on the pre-political content of an 
identity narrative.  It does not, in other words, ‘police’ the boundaries of the category of 
woman, but, rather, involves an organic alignment of interests held in common in order to 
																																																								216 This is a complicated, but trenchant, example because the identity of the transwoman 
as a woman is contested. The struggle to be able to claim an identity—imagine a woman 
struggling to claim the identity of CEO or a man trying to claim the identity of primary 
caretaker—is an important political struggle.  Arendt herself, it is important to remember 
(and I will return to this in a moment) would not consider these struggles to make public 
what is private as legitimate political action.  Aspects of private life (under which 
heading Arendt would put gender identity), are not matters for public discourse, and, 
consequently, cannot be subjects of action.  Throughout this thesis, however, I follow 
Seyla Benhabib’s lead in ‘reading Arendt against Arendt’ on this point.  Social justice, 
especially feminist social justice, is committed to bringing any systematic injustice into 
public discourse, no matter how ‘personal’ this injustice may seem at first glance.  
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shift the public understanding.  Identity is relevant to this picture—the claim to the shared 
identity narrative of womanhood is essential for understanding the injustice of being 
excluded from this narrative.  But it is also fluid—the category of ‘woman’ is not 
essential or static or able to be defined prior to political action. 
 In addition to the shifting of, and consensus about, political narratives as a result 
of action (recognition through solidarity), the model of feminist politics I want to fashion 
from Arendtian political theory requires an investment in the interpersonal recognition of 
specific claims made by unique individuals (recognition through agency).  This is not to 
say that we need to know personally, or intimately, every other who shares our concerns 
(with whom we act in concert); it is to say, rather, that we understand those others as 
unique configurations of a number of intersecting narratives.  We recognise, in other 
words, that human beings inhabit a condition of plurality, wherein there are as many 
discrete points of view as there are discrete persons.  
Arendt’s insistence on plurality is very helpful for understanding the universally 
radical difference between subjects.  Political action would not be possible in a human 
community defined by sameness.  Action in concert brings about a solidarity that is 
defined by the recognition of uniqueness, rather than by the resolution of various 
perspectives into a single narrative.  Arendt writes: ‘the unitedness of many into one is 
basically antipolitical; it is the very opposite of the togetherness prevailing in 
political…communities.’217  If we shared an essential sameness then we should not need 
politics at all because we could understand and anticipate one another’s needs without 
discussing them.  The kind of sameness we do share, according to Arendt, is just the 
																																																								217 Arendt 1958, 214-215. 
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sameness that comes with being human.218  The essential similarity between humans is 
uniqueness.  This condition of distinct uniqueness lends itself to collective action because 
interaction lends itself to commonality, to the formulation of shared goals and the 
articulation of shared needs.  There is in Arendt’s politics a constant back-and-forth 
between distinction (shared uniqueness) and equality (sharing the space in which to voice 
concerns).  
Amy Allen endorses such a reading of Arendt for feminist politics.  She illustrates 
the Arendtian paradigm of (non-)identity politics with an example: Arendt’s own political 
engagement with questions of Jewish identity.  When Arendt was awarded the Lessing 
Prize in Hamburg in 1968, she gave an address in which she remarked that when one is 
attacked as a Jew, one must respond as a Jew: 
…the basically simple principle in question here is one that is particularly hard to 
understand in times of defamation and persecution: the principle that one can 
resist only in terms of the identity that is under attack.  Those who reject such 
identifications on the part of a hostile world may feel wonderfully superior to the 
world, but their superiority is then truly no longer of this world; it is the 
superiority of a more or less well-equipped cloud-cuckoo-land.219 
 
For Arendt, the only way to respond to an attack on one’s identity was to affirm that 
identity.  To respond to attacks on one’s Jewishness with an appeal to universal humanity 
(as in, ‘we are all humans—Jewishness is irrelevant’) is to ignore the political reality that 
Jews are subject to systematic discrimination and oppression.  Identifying as Jew under 
these circumstances does not imply static or essential sameness with others who identify 
as Jews; rather, it is a statement of a political fact.  The category of Jewishness becomes 
																																																								218 We are the same ‘in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever 
lived, lives or will live.’ Ibid., 8. 219 Arendt 1968, 18.   
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the most important aspect of one’s personal identity if one is attacked as a Jew220; but in 
other circumstances, the category of Jewishness is unstable, with no fixed meaning.  
Identification with a collective identity, therefore, facilitates resistance to systems of 
discrimination, oppression or domination.  Solidarity arises out of sustained identification 
with political narratives, even though such narratives can be reductive.   
 To say that Jewishness is an unstable category and a political fact, however, is not 
to say that Jewishness is nothing more than a momentary posture.  Jewishness, like 
womanhood, is unstable because it might mean something radically different to one 
person than it does to another; indeed, it will mean something radically different to the 
same person at different times over the course of her or his life.  It is political because it 
involves a public disclosure of Jewishness—an appearance to others as Jewish.  But it is 
also a consistently meaningful category which may contribute to identity formation in a 
number of ways over time.  To answer as Jew is not merely an iteration of some arbitrary 
fact; rather, it is to speak from the point of view of one aspect of an enormously complex 
personal identity.  And, recall, that each of us is unique—the facts that add up to our 
distinct identities, which, again, Arendt refers to as our whoness, are so varied as to be 
infinite and therefore unlistable.  We can stack up fact upon fact about what a person is 
without ever arriving at a complete description of who she is. 
 
4.2 Conditions for Narrative Agency 
 
																																																								220 ‘Rather, I was only acknowledging a political fact through which my being a member 
of this group outweighed all other questions of personal identity or rather had decided 
them in favor of anonymity, of namelessness.’ Arendt 1968, 18. 
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The space of action is not guaranteed to us.  A key theme in Arendt’s work is that the 
constant exchange of ideas, opinions, and judgments between humans sustains the public 
sphere, where we appear to one another as unique individuals.  Narrative agency (the 
capacity of an individual to ‘make sense’ of herself as an ‘I’), therefore, depends on the 
existence of the world in which the ‘I’ is sure to appear.  In the following, I argue that 
action is predicated on the conditions of plurality, natality, and narrativity; the practical 
narrative understanding of oneself as an ‘I’ depends on these things, in other words.  By 
the same token, these three aspects of action in Arendt reveal the extent to which the ‘I’ is 
constituted relationally; Arendt’s account of action confirms the relational personal 
ontology proposed in the first half of this thesis.  
 
4.2.1 Plurality 
 
The paradox of plurality—the sameness-in-difference Arendt insists is a basic condition 
of human action—enables us to make claims based on collective identity without being 
reduced to or oppressed by static accounts of collective identity.  In this section, I will 
expand upon Arendt’s account of action and on Arendt’s account of plurality as a 
condition of action as she lays it out in The Human Condition.  There is no guarantee, for 
Arendt, that humans will preserve the conditions for action.  As we shall see in Chapter 6, 
which examines possible conditions for the eradication of agency, human life descended 
in the concentration camps into something less-than-human; there was no world in the 
camps: no meaning and no action.  The danger of such world-poverty is, as Arendt is 
writing The Human Condition, still very much in her mind.  The crisis of World War II 
	 143 
has passed, but the dangers of technology run amok, made luridly manifest in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, are looming larger than ever as the world settled into its Cold War.  There 
was, moreover, the intractable international dilemma of protecting and enforcing human 
rights, a problem which Arendt gives an in-depth treatment in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism.  And, finally, Arendt laments the rise of ‘the social’, which she defined 
as the infiltration of the public sphere and which she associated with the undifferentiated 
and thoughtless sentiment of the masses. 
Arendt is thus concerned about the loss of politics, a loss she sees as having 
already begun.  The stakes are, for her, very high.  Between individuals in Nazi Germany, 
the conditions for politics disappear completely.  Individuals are not able to recognise 
concerns they hold in common, are not able to articulate their differences productively, 
and are not able to come to meaningful agreement about what matters to them.  
Furthermore, in the advancement of science, Arendt sees tendencies in public discourse 
away from meaning and into abstraction—as in the invention of a mathematical language 
which cannot be translated into human speech or the preoccupation with making new 
things (bombs, spaceships) without pausing to reflect upon, and converse about, their 
meaning.  The world, which we construct through our shared understanding, cannot exist 
without this reflection and conversation.  Truths (be they mathematical, philosophical, or 
religious) may exist beyond the realm of the articulable, Arendt tells us, but it is only in 
speaking to one another and collaboratively creating meaning between themselves that 
humans can have a world.  As Arendt puts it, ‘whatever men do or know or experience 
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can make sense only to the extent that it can be spoken about.’221  Making sense between 
ourselves is the product of action.222   
Action, along with labour and work, are the three activities of human life; and all 
three of these are necessary to sustain the public sphere, where action takes place.  
Labour arises out of necessity.  It involves the endless repetition of the tasks necessary 
for survival.  The cycle of labour doesn’t produce anything that lasts; the effort of labour 
expends itself in labouring and must begin anew as soon as the task at hand is finished.  
Arendt extends these tasks beyond common conceptions of labour—planting and sowing 
fields, scouring pots and pans, caring for children and the elderly—to the modern 
drudgery of cubicle life, which, she insists is lived even by ‘presidents, kings…prime 
ministers… [and] intellectuals’ who think of what they do not as work but as ‘making a 
																																																								221 Arendt 1958, 4. 222 I am chiefly concerned in this chapter with the conditions for agency and thus with 
Arendt’s discussion of the human condition of action.  It is also important to introduce 
the conditions of labour and work as well because all three aspects of the human 
condition are necessary to sustain the world.  Arendt says that humans have always, since 
the beginning of time, sought freedom from the necessity of labour.  This has caused 
some to label her an elitist (Kelz 2016) since an overwhelming number of human beings 
in the Global South and among the poor of every country have very little time that could 
be properly identified as free from necessity.  I think such a critique is important to keep 
in mind, but it seems to me that it may also be elitist to suggest that those human beings 
whose lives are spent mostly in labour do not engage in meaningful political action 
through various forms of community organisation.  Better to endorse the normative claim 
that people should have time to engage in politics—that is, they should be able to spend 
time discussing between themselves the things that matter to them.  Another interesting 
(though unrelated) question about the relationship between labour, work, and action is 
where to fit anti-political directions in political theory. Might mankind now be seeking 
freedom from action?  Could we conceptualise political philosophy that emphasises 
withdrawal from the public sphere (Hardt and Negri, 2005) or anarchic mysticism 
(Critchley, 2009) or decreation of the self (Kearney, 2011) as a search for freedom from 
action?  
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living’.223  People in these exalted positions, who are liberated by modern convenience 
from the back-breaking labour of days gone by, do not make use of this freedom from 
necessity because they view their offices in terms of necessity and not as contexts for 
creating the material world (which is built through work) or creating new meaning about 
the world (which happens during action).  Arendt’s primary injunction is that we all must 
‘think what we are doing’ in order to preserve the freedom that arises out of meaningful 
political interaction.224   
The condition for labour is simply being alive (each of us must labour to stay 
alive), but work involves the creation of something tangible and enduring.  Work is the 
human activity that creates a world of non-natural (artificial) things, things which often 
outlive the humans who make them.  Work liberates labour from its futility by creating 
this stable and durable world full of tools and artefacts.  Artists, craftspeople, 
intellectuals—anyone who produces a concrete object—performs the activity of work.  
These concrete objects amount to more than just their uses; they are imbued with 
meaning as things.  This meaning, which arises out of a thing having a place in the world 																																																								223 Arendt 1958, 5.  If intellectuals and artists (who ought to be involved in the activity of 
work) and politicians (who ought to be involved in action) can be said, in fact, to be 
trapped in necessity, carrying out the drudgery of fruitless labour, can we not perhaps say 
that there are those who practice activities previously seen as the province of labour in 
such a way as to turn them into action?   Might we, for example, re-imagine carers, 
farmers, and waste managers as ethics of care feminists, slow food advocates, and 
environmental activists?  In other words, as champions of action? 224 Arendt 1958, 5.  Arendt broadly distinguishes between human action (the vita activa) 
and human thought (the vita contemplativa). The nature of thinking, and the distinction 
between thinking and acting, are important leitmotifs throughout Arendt’s work (a major 
preoccupation, of course in her latter work The Life of the Mind, but see also her lecture 
series at Notre Dame “The Problem of Action and Thought after the French Revolution”, 
especially “Philosophy and Politics”). Thinking is, in many ways, the very highest human 
activity.  It occurs prior to speech and action, and so it is a pre-political activity but an 
incredibly important one because the meaning we create in action arises out of the care 
taken when we think. 
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rather than just being a means to a further end, gives the thing a kind of dignity.	225  The 
world that work creates is the context for action. 
Action is the activity that goes on directly between human beings, unmediated by 
the natural world or by artificial things.  If life itself is the condition for labour, and 
worldliness is the condition for work, then plurality is the basic condition for action.  
Because there exist multiple, discrete human beings, there is necessarily interaction 
between them.  This point is at once obvious and profound.  Of course, plurality is the 
foundation of all things political, for what is politics if not the activity of creating 
meaning between people?  But in drawing our attention also to the distinction inherent in 
plurality, Arendt shows us that politics is contingent on its having unique practitioners.  
Action, as we have seen, would be unnecessary if it weren’t for the irreproducible 
difference between each individual.  If we were many, but a homogenous many, then we 
would have no need for the creation of meaning through speech and action.  We would 
understand one another intuitively because we would have the same thoughts, dreams, 
and desires.  It is only because we are, each of us, unique, that we are able to act. All 
action (and because only action is properly political, all politics) arises out of shared 
uniqueness. 
																																																								225 Arendt herself points out that all three human activities are ‘somehow related to 
politics’ 1958, 7.  There is much to say on the importance of work for/in action and also 
the importance of thought in work.  Particularly interesting to our discussion on Arendt 
and agency is the relationship between thought and the creation of works of art: ‘Thought 
is related to feeling and transforms its mute and inarticulate despondency, as exchange 
transforms the naked greed of desire and usage transforms the desperate longing of 
needs—until they all are fit to enter the world and to be transformed into things, to 
become reified.  In each instance, a human capacity which by its very nature is world-
open and communicative transcends and releases into the world a passionate intensity 
from its imprisonment within the self.’ 1959, 168. 
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Since action always concerns what goes on directly between human beings (the 
shared being or inter esse of human beings), unmediated by the natural world or material 
things, action is always, in a very important sense, interaction.  Plurality is, therefore, 
constitutive of the political or public sphere.  Existence in spheres other than the public—
in the private sphere, for example, and in what Arendt calls the social—need not be 
defined in terms of plurality.  Plurality is not guaranteed by human existence, even 
though it is a natural condition of human existence.  Plurality can be collapsed into 
sameness when the arena for action disappears.  It is only in the public sphere that we are 
able to act in such a way that we appear to others in our uniqueness.  
So, for Arendt, action cannot take place outside of the public sphere.  
Contemplation, childbirth, art-making, field-plowing, shop-keeping: none of these things 
necessarily involves action.  They are human activities with no intrinsically political 
content.  However, the moment we act by inserting ourselves into the political sphere 
(and such an insertion is, Arendt will argue, ultimately unavoidable), we confirm the 
distinction-cum-equality of plurality.  To act in the world is to embody one’s distinction 
from others and to have this distinction perceived by others.  In other words, plurality is 
the immediate context for action.  Action requires both participation and recognition.  
Appearing in public in this way also demands that we be seen by those others in the 
public sphere.  
 As a resource for feminist theory, plurality shows us that participation and 
recognition in the public sphere can provide both solidarity and empowerment.  Action in 
plurality may involve the alliance of one’s own interests with the interests of others.  
These interests can be brought forth from the realms of the private or the social into the 
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space of public appearance; in other words, they can become political.  Participation with 
other members of a plurality and recognition by those other members as unique in the 
public sphere add up to an elusive goal, however.  Often, misrecognition or lack of 
recognition get in the way of an agent’s successfully appearing in a public space; get in 
the way, in other words, of that agent participating in politics.  Take the example of 
Jewishness introduced above.  A person perceived only as Jew has no choice but to 
respond as Jew; lack of recognition artificially reduces the person to one aspect of her 
identity.  This reduction in identity obscures the person’s unique whoness, and it reduces 
the person’s agency.  She is still able to participate in the public sphere, but she is limited 
in this action because her uniqueness is not fully recognised.   
 A free public space emerges when action in concert gives rise to both 
participation and appearance in all participants of a particular plurality.  Such public 
spaces cannot be predetermined or expected—indeed, the power of plurality is that it can 
create public spaces whenever and wherever its constituents act in concert.  Recall that 
plurality is a condition of action because human beings would not need to speak or act if 
each did not represent a unique perspective.226  Seyla Benhabib describes the process this 
way: 
It is not a space in any topographical or institutional sense: a town hall or a city 
square where people do not ‘act in concert’ is not a public space in this Arendtian 
sense.  But a private dining room in which people gather to hear a Samizdat or in 
which dissidents meet with foreigners become public spaces; just as a field or a 
forest can also become public space if they are the object and the location of an   
																																																								226 ‘Thus it is also true that man’s capacity to act, and especially to act in concert, is 
extremely useful for purposes of self-defense of pursuit of interests; but if nothing more 
were at stake here than to use action as a means to an end, it is obvious that the same end 
could be much more easily attained in violence…’ Arendt, 1958, 179. 
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‘action in concert,’ of a demonstration to stop the construction of a highway or a 
military airbase, for example.227  
 
Recognition through speech and action gives agents the confidence to risk further 
political participation.  It is empowering to feel one’s point of view coalesce with that of 
distinct others through acting together.  I feel, as my voice joins the voice of others in 
demonstrating against the construction of a highway, the power of so many aligned but 
distinct perspectives.  Acting in concert is empowering because it gives one the sense that 
one’s speech and actions are recognised and accepted by others.  The more one’s 
community listens to and supports one, the greater her sense of agency.  
 There is, in this picture of plurality, a great deal of spontaneity.  It is impossible to 
arrange beforehand the public space necessary for political action.  It arises organically, 
out of the negotiation of differences, and coalesces into a contingently shared interest, 
which plays out through action in concert.  Any issue can become public (and thus 
political) if it is subject to the interests of members of a plurality.  Matters that Arendt 
herself did not see as political—the claims and concerns she relegated to social or private 
life, which often, to our eyes, seem obviously political, such as the issue of desegregation 
in the American South in the 1960s—we can rewrite as political because the struggle to 
include an issue on the public agenda is itself a political struggle.  Problems that seem at 
first glance innately private—such a woman’s access to birth control—or innately 
social—such as an artist like Beyoncé’s identification as a feminist—can become matters 
of public concern and can be treated by action in concert in a plurality.  As Benhabib puts 
it: ‘What is important here is not so much what public discourse is about as the way in 
which this discourse takes place…[A]t stake is the reflexive questioning of issues by all 																																																								227 Benhabib 1992, 93. 
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those affected by their foreseeable consequences and the recognition of their right to do 
so.’228  We can take from Arendt the process of politically discussing interests held in 
common in a plurality without being overly concerned with the boundaries Arendt herself 
placed on ‘the political’. 
 
 
4.2.2 Natality  
  
 
The second condition for narrative agency I take from Arendt’s work on action is 
natality, which may be summed up as ‘beginning’.  The model of public space facilitated 
by plurality arises out of conversation and connection between distinct individual agents.  
Disclosure of an individual’s identity in the public sphere, in turn, is a result of that 
individual’s uniqueness, or whoness.  Whoness, as we have seen, is not just difference or 
otherness; it is the distinction of each human being from every other human being who is, 
was, or ever will be.229  This distinction is revealed when humans speak or act.  In other 
words, through speech and action, an agent appears to others as a distinct individual.230  
Such appearance, though it ‘rests on initiative’ is irrepressible: ‘it is an initiative from 
which no human being can refrain and still be human.’231  To cease speaking and acting 
in the world of other humans is to cease to be human at all (this kind of withdrawal is 
extremely rare—indeed, it is nearly impossible).  It is true that we are often 
misunderstood by others when we speak or act and that speech and action do not always 																																																								228 Benhabib 1992, 95. 229 Arendt 1958, 176. 230 Recall that the necessary context of this appearance is the world.  I will have more to 
say on the mutual interdependence of whoness and the world in my discussion of 
loneliness in Chapter 6. 231 Arendt 1958, 176. 
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guarantee us full participation in or recognition by public life; and yet, we cannot help but 
insert ourselves into public life through speech and action.   
Natality, then, may be understood as the irrepressible initiative to appear in the 
world. As Arendt puts it: 
This insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labour, and it is not 
prompted by utility, like work.  It may be stimulated by the presence of others 
whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its 
impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we were 
born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own 
initiative.232 
 
Peg Birmingham (2006) refers to natality as an ‘ontological event’—it happens again and 
again as a matter of course.  Birmingham points out that this event contains within it two 
basic principles: the principle of givenness and the principle of publicness.  On the one 
hand, natality is the innate capacity of each individual to begin in the world, given by 
birth.  On the other hand, natality is the animating principle of action in the public sphere.  
It is the irresistible tendency toward judgment, law-making, debate, and all of the other 
accoutrements of political world-building.233  This analysis is germane to my 
identification of natality as a condition for narrative agency because it reinforces the 
notion that narrative agency is both an irreducible capacity (it is given) and a constant 
political capacity (it introduces the sense made by the ‘I’ into the space shared by a 
plurality of ‘I’s’).  In Chapter 6, I argue that narrative agency works on two registers: the 
ontological and the political.  Narrative agency involves, in other words, both the mere 
fact of existing in the world and the insertion of oneself into the world through speech 
and action.   
																																																								232 Arendt 1958, 177. 233 Birmingham 2006, 12-17. 
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Being born into the world, having a beginning ourselves, is what, for Arendt 
makes us able to begin again and again.  Each insertion on our own initiative of ourselves 
into the public space is like a second birth, and our capacity to assert this initiative is, 
importantly, a corollary of us being born into the human world in the first place.  Human 
beings all possess the capacity to begin something new.  Further, human beings will 
exercise capacity—they will, as I argued in Chapter 3, makes sense of themselves in the 
world, no matter how confusing the world may be and even when the political discourse 
of that world is impoverished.  Even without mutual recognition, in other words, the 
initiative to appear in the world is given in each of us.  We tend toward sense-making, no 
matter how difficult it is to make sense.  The capacity to begin again, therefore, is given 
by birth, but so the unique whoness that is disclosed through action.  Because each of us 
is born distinct from every other human being, we possess an individual whoness.  It 
appears to others and is recognised by others, but it is not articulable by or perceptible to 
the agent herself; nor is it ever fully determined.  Whoness is disclosed again and again 
through action; who one is becomes clear through what one does.  Who someone is 
changes over the course of her life, but the possession of a disclosable whoness is given 
and constant. 
The ‘who’ here is different from the practical self-conception one has in action 
and from the political narratives that might describe aspects of one’s identity.  It refers, 
rather, to the appearance of the unique individual before others.  Natality carries with it ‘a 
startling unexpectedness’.234   Action is not to be confused with making, which is the 
																																																								234 Ibid., 178. 
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pursuit of a means to an end.  Political life cannot be planned: it cannot be the subject of 
making.  Rather, political life arises spontaneously out of the continuous introduction of 
(unpredictable) new speech and new action into the public sphere.  Political life is always 
marked by unpredictability and uncertainty, by action multiplying from more action.  The 
unpredictability of natality endows us with an unwieldy freedom: the freedom ‘of being 
able to begin something new and of not being able to control or even foretell its 
consequences’.235  We are free to begin, but we are never free from the consequences of 
what we begin. 
Action inevitably produces both consequences and further action.  What we 
introduce into the world through speech and action remains in the world.  We cannot 
reverse our actions (though, Arendt tells us, we do have two ways to mediate the 
consequences of those actions: forgiveness and promising). Natality lends to action what 
Arendt calls its ‘process character’—human beings continuously introduce into the world 
new speech and new action.  Arendt sees this as perhaps the most salient characteristic of 
all human life; for, without it, we would tend inevitably toward death: 
The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything 
human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and 
beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-
present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but 
in order to begin.236 
 
The power to act is ontologically rooted in the faculty of natality, which Arendt calls ‘the 
miracle that saves the world’.237  The constant introduction of newness into the world by 
human agents ensures infinite possibility.  No speech or action is the final speech or 
																																																								235 Arendt 1958, 235. 236 Arendt 1958, 246, emphasis added. 237 Arendt 1958, 247. 
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action; each human being possesses the ineradicable capacity to introduce speech and 
action into the world. 
The initiative to appear again and again in public, to articulate one’s concerns to 
others, to discuss what goes on between us, is an irreducible human capacity.  We know 
each human being possesses this capacity because action in the form of self-disclosure is 
a necessary part of human life.  Narrative agency, then, is guaranteed in natality. 
Natality’s unpredictability, furthermore, endows the agent with a radical freedom.  She is 
always, in every situation (even, as we shall see, in situations where her agency is 
severely compromised by lack of a community to sustain her), capable of introducing 
new meaning into the world through speech and action.	238  The new meaning introduced 
into the world through natality aligns itself with the speech and action of others in a 
plurality and, out of these aligned but distinct interests arises action in concert. 
  
4.2.3 Narrativity  
 
 
The third condition for narrative agency I take from Arendt is narrativity.  Understanding 
narrativity requires that we zoom ut from the mechanics of action and ask: how do we 
give an account of politics?  The picture of action that has emerged of agency as arising 
out of natality at work within a plurality is not complete.  The sustained exercise of 
narrative agency results in a narrative, which makes sense of what has happened in 
action.  As I have mentioned, ‘narrativity’ is not a word that Arendt herself uses.  
																																																								238 ‘A life without speech and without action, on the other hand—and this is the only way 
of life that has in earnest has renounced all appearance and all vanity in the biblical sense 
of the word—is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is 
no longer lived among men.’ Arendt 1958, 176. 
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Benhabib uses the term to refer to Arendt’s narrative understanding of how we preserve 
meaning that arises in action (Arendt herself calls this ‘story-telling’).239   Narrativity, 
according to Benhabib, is ‘the immersion of action in a web of human relationships.’	240  
It refers to the mode of understanding action; it describes, in other words, the complex 
relationship between an agent and the meaning that she takes away from action.  It may 
refer to either (1) a story about action (this can be the practical notion of narrative identity 
discussed in Chapter 2 or a more general account of what has happened in action) (2) a 
story that emerges about the agent.  This second aspect of narrativity is present both in 
the disclosure of who the agent is in discrete, unique actions and as the coalescence of a 
lifetime of actions into a person’s life story.   The self is never the author or producer of 
her own story, and the elements of who she is amass over a lifetime of action.241  
Narrativity is therefore not simply an aspect of action; rather, it is the register in which 
our understanding of action takes place.   
Though she does not name it, Arendt gives a very interesting account of 
narrativity in a section of The Human Condition entitled “The Web of Relationships and 
the Enacted Stories”.  Whoness, she reminds us, is an intangible quality.  As soon as we 
try to say who someone is, we begin instead to say what she is.  We name her character 																																																								239 Arendt 1958, 175. 240 Benhabib 1992, 127. 241 Whoness is not a life story for the self to tell: it is a story about the self that emerges 
from the total of that self’s experience in the world. Other people can get closer to 
narrating the whoness of a self, but to narrate another’s whoness is also difficult, due to 
our tendency to reduce an individual’s unique whoness to aspects of her identity, or her 
whatness).  Arendt writes: ‘Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into 
the human world through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own 
life story.  In other words, the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, 
but this agent is not the author or producer.  Somebody began it and is its subject in the 
twofold sense of the word, namely, its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author.’ 
Arendt 1958, 184. 
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traits, facts about her appearance, her age, her race, her religion, etc.  The agent’s 
uniqueness is proven by the mechanics of action; that is to say, by plurality (her 
distinctness from any other human being) and natality (her ineradicable capacity to create 
something new through speech and deed).  Not being able to describe fully the agent’s 
whoness presents us with a problem, namely: politics (inter-human affairs) are comprised 
of speech and action, but the essence of that speech and action can never be fully 
understood, articulated or explained.  There is a ‘notorious uncertainty’, Arendt writes, 
‘of all affairs that go on between men directly, without the intermediary, stabilizing and 
solidifying influence of things’.242  Unlike work, which produces a concrete and tangible 
world of things, action results in narrative, which we might describe as the fleeting 
coalescence of new meaning between agents.   
This new meaning is always connected to the agent who creates it, such that 
action and speech ‘retain their agent-revealing capacity’ even when they are about 
matters other than the agents themselves.243  New meaning about problems or issues or 
other interests is always also ‘a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent’.244  Action 
always involves human beings speaking directly to one another; it does not leave an 
objective material world in its wake.  It takes place in between people—it arises 
spontaneously and fades away between people.  The space in between people where 
action takes place is, Arendt insists, every bit as much a world as the tangible world 
created by craftsmen, builders, artists, and so on.  She calls it the ‘web of human 
relationships’ and points out that every disclosure of whoness occurs against the 
																																																								242 Arendt 1958, 182. 243 Ibid., 182. 244 Ibid., 181. 
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backdrop of such an already existing web of human relationships, which absorb much of 
disclosure’s uniqueness.  This web of relationships consists of already held perceptions of 
the agent and norms that govern the agent’s behaviour, beliefs, and emotions.   
Whenever an agent discloses herself through speech or action in the public 
sphere, she reveals her whoness.  That whoness, however, is not something that springs 
into existence ex nihilo in the moment of action.  It is, instead, an expression of the 
agent’s already existing and complex self.245  This self is comprised of a lifetime of 
actions, which is a kind of story.  The story of this action is not, however, the agent’s to 
tell.  She is the protagonist, but she is not the author.  Recall that the disclosure of ‘who’ 
one is imperceptible to the agent herself.  An agent’s whoness appears to others when she 
acts. This backdrop of human relationships is often oblivious to the newness of action 
because the people within it are preoccupied with various desires, emotions, unthinking 
reactions and expectations.  Hence, a second problem arises out of the disclosure of 
whoness: action, the purpose of which is to create new meaning, does not always achieve 
this goal.  Agents cannot resist the initiative to act, to insert themselves in the world 
through speech and action, but the world is very rarely open to the kind of politics that 
occurs when, say, a conversation between people who identify as women allows us to 
shift the meaning of the category of woman, to hearken back to the earlier example of the 
trans woman who seeks solidarity with other women.   
																																																								245 Contrast this appearance of the unique self to others in action with the practical self-
conception the agent has when she acts.  Both are ways of thinking about narrative 
identity.  In the first, others perceive, and construct narratives about, the identity of the 
individual in question. In the second, the individual has in mind a practical narrative 
identity (an idea of herself as a self). 
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Most of the time, agents do not enter a public space that fosters universal 
participation and recognition.  People in a web of relationships misunderstand one 
another, fail to listen, conform to already determined political narratives, are concerned 
with other things.  This is an important point for two reasons.  First, because it suggests 
that there are better and worse ways to interact with one another, where, say, being 
receptive to the capacity of another to articulate new meaning is a better way and relying 
on pre-learned mores and habits without giving new ideas their due is a worse way.  And, 
second, because it gives us a way to talk about the irrepressibility of action, regardless of 
its political outcome.  No human being can resist the initiative to act in the world, and 
each human being is unique and has the potential to say something utterly new.   
Benhabib’s assertion that narrativity is the mode of action makes more sense once 
we understand action as an enacted story within a web of relationships.  The web of 
stories is always already there, and the appearance of the agent within that web is always 
the enacting of a story.  The situatedness of the self within the web is narrativity.  This 
mode is the same, no matter the scale of the story.  It is the task of the theorist, then, to 
piece together a coherent account of action even as she recognises that the real stories 
disclosed in action are untranscribable.  Not only does narrativity describe the lifelong 
process of identity formation through action; it also refers to the way in which we try to 
make sense of this process (whether as individual selves or as theorists). As Benhabib 
puts it: 
The narrative structure of action and of human identity means that the continuing 
retelling of the past, its continued reintegration into the story of the present, its 
reevaluation, reassessment, and reconfiguration are ontological conditions of the 
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kinds of beings we are…narrative is the modality through which time is 
experienced.246 
 
Both the agent and the theorist—or the spectator, which is the name Arendt gives to the 
thinker who tries to makes sense of action through judgment—are engaged in 
constructing narratives all the time.247  Arendt explicitly compared her job as theorist to 
the task of the storyteller.  This task, which she likened to diving for pearls, includes 
mining the past, and everything one knows of the past, for meaning.248  
 Even though we cannot ever fully articulate who an individual is, and even 
though, most of the time, an individual’s appearance in the world will not result in the 
kind of coalescence of interests that precedes action in concert, the end result of a lifetime 
of speech and action ‘will always be a story with enough coherence to be told, no matter 
how accidental or haphazard the single events and their causation may appear to be’.249  
Action cannot help but produce stories about individuals, groups, even history itself.  Just 
as there exists no fully articulable ‘who’ in the story of a life, there exists no fully 
articulable subject in the study of history or of political theory.  Indeed, Arendt argues 
that the subject of political philosophy—‘humankind’—is as much an abstraction as the 
indefinable whoness that animates each of us.  History presents to us a mirage very 
																																																								246 Benhabib 1990, 187-188. 247 I discuss the relationship between agent and spectator at length in Chapter 5. 248 Arendt 1968, 193.  Benhabib describes Arendt’s understanding of political philosophy 
as story-telling:  ‘The key here is Arendt’s odd methodology which conceives of political 
thought as “storytelling.”  Viewed in this light, her “story” of the transformation of public 
space is an “exercise” of thought.  Such thought exercises dig under the rubble of history 
in order to recover those “pearls” of past experience, with their sedimented and hidden 
layers of meaning, such as to cull from them a story that can orient the mind in the future.  
The vocation of the theorist as “story teller” is the unifying thread of Arendt’s political 
and philosophical analyses from the origins of totalitarianism to her reflections on the 
French and American revolutions to her theory of public space…’ Benhabib, 1992, 91.   249 Arendt 1958, 97. 
	 160 
similar to the one that arises out of trying to describe whoness: as soon as we try to tell as 
story about who the hero of this or that historical event, we give a partial and/or reductive 
account of that hero.  There exists a coherent story about mankind, perhaps, but because 
we are embedded in that story, we do not have the authority to tell it.  The theorist is 
always involved, therefore, in articulating narratives in the form of contingent political 
judgments about experience in such a way that they are communicable to others.  
Thinking of feminist theory as an exercise in narrativity is just as exciting a 
prospect now as it was when Benhabib first proposed it in the early 1990s.  By this 
account, theory is and extension of our narrative agency; that is, it is something we 
always already do when we try and make sense of our place in the world.  Narrativity is 
the process of sense making that connects the initiative of natality to collective 
understanding of speech and action that arises within a plurality.  It is also the sense-
making that accompanies the construction of an agent’s idea of herself and the sense-
making that accompanies the theorist’s construction of a model of politics.  The whole 
story, whether about a self or about some aspect of political philosophy, is never 
completely articulable or communicable, since it only rises up during action and then 
fades away.  The story that arises through narrativity, on the other hand, is capable of 
bringing up the ‘pearls’ of meaning that action leaves behind. 
 
4.3 Toward a Model of Feminist Politics 
 
Let us now return to the relevance of Arendt as a resource for a post-identity feminist 
politics, in light of our reading of Arendt on action.  Recall that Arendt enables us to 
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think about politics in a way that neither essentialises identity (that is, treats identity as a 
category determined prior to politics) nor imagines that the identity narratives shared in 
common with others are escapable (identification with certain political narratives is an 
important aspect of solidarity).  The agent who, through natality, possesses the capacity 
to introduce repeatedly radically new ways of understanding the world, negotiates this 
identity/non-identity politics within a plurality of other agents.  She participates in 
feminist politics through the public articulation of particular narratives about the 
experience of being a woman.  Where these narratives resonate with others, their subject 
becomes an interest held in common by others.  These others organise around the 
political importance of these relevant claims and pursue social change called for by these 
claims. 
Marieke Borren (2013) offers a detailed account of an action-based Arendtian 
feminist politics.  Such a politics is more appropriately conceived of as a set of civic 
practices, rather than as a field of social movements.  Organisation according to shared 
interests leads to action in concert.  If political power arises out of action in concert, then 
units of power within a plurality take the form of voluntary associations or councils.  
These groups are identifiable by their aligned interests rather than by institutional 
organisation or by holding in common some static, essential identity or set of identities.  
Associations spring up spontaneously out of aligned interests and then vanish.  Borren 
gives several examples, from the revolutionary councils of the French Revolution, to the 
civil rights activists of the early 1960s, to the Riot Grrrl movement of the 1990s.  Citizens 
within these councils enjoy participation and recognition: they enjoy public freedom 
within the bounds of a particular association.   
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Inside the framework of the council is the coalescence of distinct individual 
interests into the making of mutual promises and purposeful organisation. The 
importance of individual action within the plurality is secondary to the communicative 
action that arises out of aligned individual interests.  Importantly, this means that politics 
grows up around aligned interests, rather than trying to force a consensus out of its 
constituents or attempting to motivate action based on shared identities or ideologies.  As 
Borren puts it, ‘…unlike identity politics, council politics is not based on substantive 
collective identities or ideological commitments, but concerns the practical, ad-hoc 
organisations of citizens pursuing “actual” and “short-term” goals, and disappears as soon 
as these goals have been achieved’.250  Council politics, or action in concert, is always 
short-lived (it matters as long as the interest in question presents a specific problem or 
issue), but that does not mean it is ineffective or easily exhausted.  Indeed, for Arendt, it 
is the insistence upon conceiving of politics in terms of social justice (in terms of 
identity) that has led to the impoverishment of the public sphere.  Council politics arises 
spontaneously around a certain problem or set of needs and will continue to do so ad 
infinitum because we have an infinitely shifting set of interests in common.  As long as 
there is public space, there will be action in concert.251 
 Each wave of feminism has involved active engagement through interests held in 
common.  Feminist solidarity has been the ground up coalescence of claims made by 
women.  The formation of council politics, Borren posits, has the following 
characteristics: ‘spontaneous emergence, associative action, revolutionary pathos…the 
																																																								250 Borren 2013, 206. 251 In Chapter 6, I discuss in more detail the necessary conditions for public space and 
argue that communication between agents and the world are mutually sustaining. 
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very urgent sense that something new and empowering is happening, and…a short-lived 
existence’.252  This is not to say that there is no common thread connecting one feminist 
politics with the next; rather, feminist politics springs up differently in different publics, 
depending on which issues or problems are pressing for those publics.  Each politics is 
feminist because it addresses a ‘particular worldly issue that affects women differently 
from men’, but each politics deals with or acts out this issue on its own terms.253 
  A major problem with this politics immediately comes to mind.  First—and this 
is a problem pertinent to both solidarity and agency—is the concern that an agent must 
have access to a public sphere in order to participate.  Arendt might frame this as a 
problem of freedom, which she sees as both participation in public and recognition by 
other members of the public.  Unencumbered speech and unencumbered action 
performed in a vacuum are not meaningfully free.  Speech and action performed without 
access to a community that recognises and sustains one are not free either.  Marginalised 
agents, therefore, will have a harder time communicating their interests, and will be less 
likely to find others who share those interests.  Borren suggests that we reconceive what 
are usually thought to be social problems of misrecognition and injustice along these 
lines such that they become problems of lacking political freedom to participate in a 
public sphere.  Reconceiving systematic problems of discrimination, oppression, and 
exclusion as political problems—as problems of freedom—shifts the goal of feminism 
from the recognition of collective identities to universal political participation.   
The problem remains that this model of feminist politics does not go far enough 
toward accounting for the difficulties many women face in claiming their freedom to 																																																								252 Borren 2013, 207. 253 Ibid., 207, emphasis in original. 
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participate in public action.  They may be prevented by any number of asymmetries of 
power from finding meaningful counterpublics in which to voice their claims, but they 
may also suffer a lack of confidence that they will appear to others as unique individuals 
in the first place (as is often the case with severely traumatised subjects).  Individuals 
who are kept out of the public sphere due to group marginalisation are not included or 
recognised simply by identifying their group as marginalised.  Addressing social justice 
is an important aspect of encouraging political participation, but it is not enough to ensure 
that marginalised or traumatised subjects will embrace the freedom to participate in 
politics.  The struggle to create publics through ensuring participation and recognition is 
foundational for associational politics.   
Resources for addressing this problem may be found within Arendt’s work.  The 
politics of action in concert does not assume that a lasting freedom is attained through 
access to the public.  Rather, the struggle for freedom is constant and shifting and 
depends on risking one’s opinion in public again and again.  That this opinion will be 
communicable to others can never be guaranteed by membership to a group.  Instead, it is 
involves a perpetual risk that one will not be recognised or understood by others.  What 
sets Arendt apart from feminist political theorists  ‘is that she focuses on what happens 
after social justice and recognition have been attained, whereas most feminist 
philosophers tend to stop there, pretending that the job is done.’254  This is an alluring 
aspect of Arendtian politics, but a tricky one, since problems of marginalisation are 
conventionally perceived as problems of identity recognition rather than problems of 
participation.  A shift from thinking in terms of identity to thinking in terms of freedom 
																																																								254 Borren 2013, 209, emphasis added. 
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requires a demanding level of civic engagement, but it also enhances the potential for 
individual agency and meaningful collective action. 
 
I have tried to do a few related things in this chapter.  First of all, I have endorsed the 
point of view of those feminists who look to Arendtian political theory as a productive 
counter approach to identity politics.   Arendt’s politics allow us to avoid the pitfalls of 
identity politics, which include essentialising identity, projecting sameness when there is 
none, and privileging claims based on collective identity at the expense of meaningful 
interactions between individuals.  Identity politics is further problematic, I have argued, 
because it fails to provide agents with a way to express the complex and unique identity 
each of us has by virtue of our birth.  Who a person is, by Arendt’s model, is both a real 
and perceivable entity and also an intangible and contingent.  This fluctuation between 
identity and non-identity makes room for a more nuanced account of politics because 
individual agents are able to align themselves (and re-align themselves) according to 
shared interests that arise between them rather than according to pre-determined things 
held in common. 
The negotiation of interests held in common involves the sustained exercise of 
narrative agency, which is made possible by three fundamental aspects of Arendt’s theory 
of action—plurality, natality, and narrativity.  Plurality is the field of uniqueness which 
forms the context for action.  Agents within a plurality are able to act in concert to create 
new meaning in the public sphere.  Natality is the inescapable intiative to appear within 
this public sphere as a unique agent.  A model of politics that privileges plurality and 
natality is marked by the potential for increased association and more effective and 
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meaningful collective action.  The agent within such a politics is, through her freedom to 
participate in this association, is empowered by the recognition of her uniqueness by 
others.  The mode through which this action-based politics is expressed is narrativity.  
I have gestured toward the possibility of understanding narrativity—which is the 
mode through which all action, and not just effective action, is expressed—as progressive 
feminist methodology.  Arendt’s conception of herself as a storyteller, and Benhabib’s 
account of critique as narrative are intriguing foundations of a feminist methodology that 
privileges agency, power, and freedom. Within this framework, we can theorise 
productive political action and give an account of the shared interests that coalesce into 
meaningful politics.  Narrative agency, as I have defended it over the course of this 
thesis—as the individual’s capacity to make sense of herself as an ‘I’ over time and in 
relation to other ‘I’s’—depends on all three aspects of Arendtian action.  The narrative 
agent is situated within a plurality, is able to create meaning through natality, and 
understands herself as an ‘I’ in time through narrativity. 
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Chapter 5: A New Feminist Theory of Judgment 
 
In the last chapter, I raised some concerns with a model of feminist politics based on 
action in concert: the problem of access to a public sphere in which to act (the problem of 
making narratives political) and the problem of having the confidence to enter into a 
public sphere at all (the problem of making narratives communicable).  I address both of 
these problems in this chapter through a discussion of judgment.  Judgment is the public 
articulation of a coherent, considered opinion.  Making a judgment is a narrative exercise: 
it involces extracting meaning from action.  Voicing a political judgment, then, means 
becoming what Arendt calls a ‘spectator’, someone who reflects on action in a prolonged 
way, rather than merely participating in it as an agent. 
The meaning created through action is distilled through critical consideration of 
other perspectives and conversation into judgment.  Feminist politics requires that we 
make feminist judgments.  Think of the ‘why we need feminism’ social media hashtag, 
for example, which users attach to news items, opinions, or anecdotes that reveal 
perceived harms against women.  It’s a question about what feminism does, can, and 
should do for women.  What harms can it diagnose and alleviate?  What connections can 
it reveal?  It seems to me that feminist judgment makes communicable something that has 
been previously incommunicable.  That is, a feminist judgment involves the public 
articulation of something newly understandable about women and their experience.  
Consider, for example, Susan Brownmiller’s account of the coining of the term ‘sexual 
harassment’.  As long as women have been in the workplace, they have experienced 
unwanted advances, inappropriate flirting from colleagues, being humiliated or demeaned 
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because of their gender; and yet, it wasn’t until 1975 that a group of feminist activists at 
Cornell University came up with a single phrase that encompassed a widespread and 
systematic series of wrongs.  When an individual judges a particular behaviour to be 
sexual harassment, she is able to communicate the nature of this wrong to others because 
feminist conversation has made sexual harassment a commonly understandable kind of 
harm.255   
But how can we evaluate the validity of this process, given the normative 
contingency that underpins our theory of agency?  Can we say that the narrative agent 
makes ‘legitimate’ political and moral judgments, considering the impossibility of nailing 
down universal criteria for legitimacy? Gendered norms and practices, such as the 
privileging of little girls’ prettiness over their intellectual prowess, must be judged as 
harmful, unfair, and deleterious to feminism’s goals of equal respect and empowerment 
for women, for instance.  But how can we make and validate these judgments?  Linda 
Zerilli frames the question this way: ‘What am I doing, really, when I declare something 
“bad for women”?  What gives me so much as the idea that my judgment could be, or 
ought to be, accepted as valid by others, especially by people who do not share my 
particular cultural heritage or social location?’256  How, in other words, can we possibly 
assert that something is harmful for women, when feminism, as we have seen, 
encompasses a plurality of normative commitments (from the liberal to the postcolonial) 
and has long been ambivalent about the determinacy of the category ‘woman’?  How, 
further, can a subject who is riddled with subordinating attachments to harmful gender 																																																								255 Miranda Fricker offers a thorough and instructive treatment of this collective 
definition of the harm of sexual harassment, 2007, 150-152. 256 Zerilli, 2009: 298.  The wording of her question is an allusion to Susan Moller Okin’s 
much discussed 1999 article, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?”. 
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norms—think, for example, of a young female executive who has come to rely on sexual 
advances from a male boss as validation of her self worth—trust the validity of her own 
judgments about what is bad for other women and for herself? Finally, how we can we 
stand by our judgments about what is harmful for women when what is commonly 
understandable as harmful today may not be what is commonly understandable as 
harmful in the future?  Arendt’s late-in-life work on judgment has been taken up by 
several feminists as a model for conceptualising a contextualised, intersubjective way to 
make judgments.257  Arendt is helpful in addressing these tricky questions of validity 
because, as we shall see, she gives us a way to think of judgments as intersubjectively 
valid; valid, in other words for a culturally and historically contextual community of 
subjects. 
 But what enables a subject to articulate a judgment in public in the first place?  
Who makes judgments about what is harmful to women?   About what is beneficial to 
women?  The theorist?  The activist?  The concerned citizen? For Arendt, it is the 
spectator who comes up with a coherently articulable judgment about the world.  The 
spectator is the uniquely situated subject who, through a process which Arendt calls 
enlarged thinking, considers and consults the perspectives of other subjects.  Arendt sees 
the spectator as distinct from the agent, who appears through speech and action to a 
plurality of other agents. The spectator, on the one hand, exercises his or her faculty of 
political judgment to come to conclusions about the world—and to articulate those 
conclusions publicly.  The agent, on the other hand, acts in the present moment—she or 
he creates, through speech and action, the raw data that is considered by the spectator in 																																																								257 Benhabib (1992); Disch (1994); Nedelsky (2001, 2011); Zerilli (2005, 2009); Fulfer 
(2014). 
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his or her judgment-making.  However, it is essential that we remember that the spectator 
is always also an agent.  She is always embedded in a web of narratives in which she 
constantly appears to others, and she can never escape this web (with all of its normative 
baggage) when she makes a judgment.  Further, as an agent or actor she always exercises 
her faculty of moral judgment both to come to conclusions about the ‘right’ course of 
action for herself in the present moment and to recognise this basic moral faculty in 
others.  Moral judgment is, as Seyla Benhabib puts it, what we ‘always already’ exercise 
as agents in the world.  This means, I will argue that we cannot have a theory of feminist 
political judgment without giving an account of moral judgment.  We cannot, in other 
words, fully separate the spectator’s political capacity for judgment-making from the 
agent’s ethical concern with moral recognition.  The communicability of political 
judgment depends first on mutual recognition among moral agents.   
In this chapter, I offer a brief overview of Arendt’s ideas about the importance of 
a theory of judgment to a post-metaphysical political theory.  I then consider Linda 
Zerilli’s appropriation of this part of Arendt’s work for a feminist theory of judgment.  I 
argue that this feminist theory of judgment falls short for two reasons: first, it relies on 
too strong an endorsement of our capacity to judge beyond our prejudices; second, it 
cannot explain what gives us the courage to risk articulating our judgments publicly.  
When we consider the moral judgment that co-exists with political judgment, a 
consideration that requires us once again to use Benhabib’s method of ‘reading Arendt 
against Arendt’, we are able to arrive at a more satisfactory model of feminist judgment, 
one which sees in each spectator a unique moral agent capable of appearing in the 
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common world.	258  I argue that this model of judgment gives us a better way to think 
about the necessarily relational and communicative aspects of judgment-making.  Finally, 
I illustrate the relationship between political and moral judgment—and affirm the 
importance of the latter—by tracing Susan Brison’s documentation of her recovery after a 
violent sexual assault.  Her ability to articulate political judgments—judgments about 
harm of rape, about the nature of identity, and so on—depended on having a sustained 
avenue for communication and recognition. 
 
5.1 Enlarged Thinking: Arendt on Kant 
 
Scholars in various fields have offered interpretations of Arendt’s unfinished work on 
judgment, which would have comprised the final volume of her last book, The Life of the 
Mind.  Rather than offering a meticulous reading of this somewhat scattered work, I will 
bring out the most useful aspects of Arendtian judgment for a theory of narrative agency. 
First, Arendt’s thoughts on judgment give us another way to talk about the tension in her 
work between uniqueness and plurality, a tension which, I argued in Chapter 4, lends 
narrative agency its force.  A subject must be both uniquely situated to produce new 
meaning and belong to a world in which that meaning can be understood in order to 
																																																								258 Arendt herself was at best ambivalent about including moral considerations in the 
process of political reflection.  She seems to want to think of judgment both as the 
political faculty we use to articulate what is meaningful about past action and a moral 
faculty that tells us how to act.  Arendt’s thoughts on judgment ‘vacillate between 
judgment as a moral faculty, guiding action, versus judgment as a retrospective faculty, 
guiding the spectator or storyteller’, as Benhabib puts it (1988, 31).  This is a keys 
conceptual tension of this chapter; I explore it in detail in section 3.  
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exercise narrative agency.259 Second, Arendt’s notion, borrowed from Kant, of ‘enlarged 
thinking’, the dispassionate consideration of other perspectives, provides us with a useful 
tool for further theorising a fair feminist politics.  And, finally, the emphasis on 
communicability and conversation in Arendt’s account of judging gives us some insight 
into the importance of mutual understanding for a theory of narrative agency. 
In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt gives an account of the 
two different kinds of judgment in Kant’s Third Critique: determinant judgment and 
reflective judgment.260  The first entails subsuming a particular under a universal law 
(whether that universal law be moral or physical).  The second, however, involves an 
appeal to an unstated or absent universal rule or law, when confronted with a particular.  
It involves, in other words, giving an account of the particular in order to arrive at a 
universal. As Kant describes the difference: ‘Judgment in general is the ability to think 
the particular as contained under the universal.  If the universal (the rule, principle, law) 
is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinative…But if 
only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power 
is merely reflective.’261 For Kant, this means that the reflective judgments at which we 
arrive through the exercise of our shared faculties and then hone through discussion with 
others.  The ultimate result of a reflective judgment, in other words, is objective validity.  																																																								259 Narrative agency disappears when the world disappears.  There is no narrative agency 
in the camps; natality remains—the potential to introduce new meaning remains—but the 
world in which that new meaning may be understood (the capacity to share it) disappears.  
In Chapter 6, I return to the claim that uniqueness and the recognition are both necessary 
to sustain narrative agency. 260 Throughout this chapter, though I occasionally quote Kant for the sake of clarifying 
his concepts, I am chiefly interested in Arendt’s (often less than thorough) reading of 
Kant, and not in whether Arendt has gotten Kant ‘right’.  For a discussion some of the 
inconsistencies in her reading, see Beiner (1997).	261 Kant 1987, 18-19. 
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In Arendt’s reading, however, reflective judgments are neither objective nor wholly 
subjective.  When I make a judgment, I likely think that others should make the same 
judgment under the same circumstances.  However, I do not convince them of the 
objective truth of my judgment by giving them a proof (as of the universal law) but by 
persuading them to see things from my point of view.   
The question that Arendt wants to pose, then, is how a judgment that is not 
objectively true can still be valid.  How can a judgment about a particular set of 
circumstances be true without recourse to an established universal law?  Importantly, the 
lack of universal objectivity does not render a judgment arbitrary; the judgment does not 
apply only for the person whose judgment it is.  In other words, a reflective judgment 
does make a claim to validity.  The exemplary reflective judgment in Kant’s Third 
Critique is, of course, aesthetic judgment—the capacity to judge that something is 
beautiful.  To say that a rose is beautiful is to do more than just assert a preference, as I 
do when I say that a rose is my favourite flower or that I prefer swimming in the sea to 
swimming in a pool or, to use Kant’s cheerful example, that I like canary wine.  To say 
that the rose is my favourite flower does not require wondering whether I am justified in 
my preference.  To say a rose is beautiful, on the other hand, is to make a claim that 
requires agreement about the rose, rather than about my personal disposition toward it.  
Such a claim derives its validity from intersubjective agreement, and this consensus has 
what Jennifer Nedelsky calls a ‘quasiobjective quality’ (and what Kant calls ‘subjective 
universality’).262  Making a judgment, as opposed to stating a preference, involves 
appealing to this imagined consensus and concluding that one’s own opinion will make 
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sense to others.  
There can be no objective criteria for reflective judgment for Arendt, but there are 
communicable reasons for it.  Making a judgment is inherently relational—it depends on 
an imagined conversation with others.  Giving an account of that judgment is also 
inherently relational—it involves recounting that imagined conversation to others, and 
persuading others that one’s judgment embodies the general consensus.  The imagined 
consensus gives rise to the judgment, and it also informs the way in which the judger will 
be able to persuade others of the validity of her judgment.  Arendt believes that Kant is 
very clear about how one consults the imagined consensus.  He says that the mind must 
‘enlarge its point of view from a microscopic to a general outlook that it adopts in turn 
every conceivable standpoint, verifying the observations of each by means of the 
others.’263  Arendt dubs this practice of taking oneself out of one’s own individual 
interests, thoughts, emotions, commitments, etc. and considering a particular problem or 
object from the standpoint of others (as many others as possible, indeed ‘every 
conceivable standpoint’) ‘enlarged thinking’.   
The more one considers a judgment in light of the possible thoughts and opinions 
of others, the closer the judgment will come to embodying a ‘quasiobjective’ consensus, 
the more valid it will be.  Another way of saying this is that impartiality, rather than 
objectivity, lends a judgment its validity.  When we make a judgment, we ‘go travelling’ 
into the minds of others, imagining how they might perceive the same set of particulars, 
and imagining how we might explain to them what it is that we see: ‘[W]e…overcome 
																																																								263 Arendt 1989, 42.  Arendt is quoting from one of Kant’s letters here. 
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our special subjective conditions for the sake of others.’264  It is not by rising above the 
particular circumstances and appealing to an objective truth that we overcome our bias; 
rather, it is through the methodical consideration of every imaginable standpoint and of 
the uniqueness of the particular.  As Arendt puts it, ‘impartiality is obtained by taking the 
viewpoint of others into account; impartiality is not the result of some higher standpoint 
that would then settle the dispute by being altogether above the melée.’265  So, enlarged 
thinking is neither a thoughtless acceptance of consensus, nor a conceit that the truth of 
one’s judgment transcends consensus.  We arrive at impartial judgment through the 
creative, intersubjective, critical, and immanent process of enlarged thinking. 
Enlarged thinking is not, however, the same thing as empathy, which, Arendt 
argues, compromises critical thinking by making us overly aligned with one perspective 
or another, by reinstilling a kind of bias.266  It is not for us to imagine what actually goes 
on in the minds of others—what thoughts, feelings, emotions and so forth a person might 
be experiencing—but, rather, enlarged thinking involves imagining what might go on in 
the minds of others when they are confronted with a specific situation and imagining how 
we might ‘woo their consent’ in order that they will share our judgment of that 
situation.267  
The consensus concerning aesthetic judgment, which Kant calls taste, is thus 
																																																								264 Arendt 1989, 67. 265 Ibid., 42-43, original emphasis. 266 Arendt 2006c, 221. 267 Benhabib 1992, 137.  This metaphor of wooing is somewhat questionable considering 
its patriarchal connotations (to ‘woo’ someone implies condescension or persuasion from 
a position of power).   
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comprised of already existing common beliefs and opinions.268  The sum of these 
opinions, Kant calls the sensus communis, the common sense.  It is this sense in common, 
this trying to think of what is imagined and understood by others, that forms the 
boundaries of our own judgments.  We can only persuade others that our judgment is 
valid, when the content of our judgment is in line with the common content of similar 
judgments, the sensus communis.  The validity of our judgments, in other words, is 
increased by their communicability. 
Reflective judgment depends, therefore, on communicability, which ‘obviously 
implies a community of men who can be addressed and who are listening and can be 
listened to.’269  A judgment is only valid if it can be explained, discussed, and agreed 
upon.  As Arendt puts it: ‘To the question, why are there men rather than man?  Kant 
would have answered: In order that they may talk to one another.’270  Were there only 
judgments determinant judgments about the universal law, there would be no need for us 
to communicate with one another at all; we would all arrive at the same conclusions 
through rational consideration of the same criteria.  Communication, as opposed to the 
exercise of collective reason, is not merely the expression of a series of agreed upon or 
objective truths but a negotiation of agreed upon criteria that will make up the common 
sense. Communicability of the criteria for judgment is immensely important for Kant—
indeed, he calls it the ‘very least to be expected from anyone claiming the name of 
																																																								268 For Kant, the sensus communis is arrived at through the exercise of the shared 
faculties of understanding and imagination.  For Arendt, through the articulation of 
reasons for judgment.	269 Arendt 1989, 40. 270 Ibid., 40. 
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man’271 and the measure of sanity.272 Arendt emphasises this preoccupation of Kant’s in 
order to draw conclusions of her own about making political judgments in a post-
metaphysical world.  For Kant, the imagined conversations we have with others in the 
process of making judgments are headed for an eventual across-the-board (universal) 
agreement.  The faculties by which we arrive at the sensus communis (imagination and 
understanding) are shared faculties, and our minds, through the use of these shared 
faculties, will come up with the same criteria for judgment.  Kant’s sensus communis, in 
other words, is universal.273  For Arendt, by contrast, a theory of judgment is useful when 
it allows us to negotiate the ever-shifting criteria for common sense and to recognise that 
there exists a distinct common sense for each distinct community. 
Communicability may start to seem more isolating than community-building in 
this light—it would appear that, in the absence of universal common sense, the sensus 
communis would need already to be in place before the reasons for a judgment’s validity 
could be communicable.  But Arendt’s point is that, in training our imaginations to ‘go 
travelling’, we interrogate the limits of what is communicable about what we think.  
Individuals will share the common sense of a number of these distinct communities at the 
																																																								271 Kant 1987, 160. 272 ‘The only universal characteristic of madness is the loss of common sense (sensus 
communis) and its replacement with logical private sense (sensus privatus); for example, 
a human being in broad daylight sees a light burning on his table which, however, 
another person standing nearby does not see, or hears a voice that no one else hears.  For 
it is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, 
and consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain our 
understanding by the understanding of others, instead of isolating ourselves with our own 
understanding and judging publicly with our private representations, so to speak.’  Kant 
2006, 113. 273 Nedelsky 2001, 109.  Another way to put this distinction is that for Kant common 
sense is empirical; but, for Arendt, common sense is a collective hermeneutical 
endeavour. 
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same time.  The way to woo consent within and between overlapping communities is to 
give an account of one’s own particular judgment.  Being in conversation with the sensus 
communis is not the self-satisfied ratification of one’s thoughts and opinions through 
consideration of others’ thoughts and opinions already in line with one’s own.274  
Conforming one’s own judgment to the general opinion is lazy thinking, the likes of 
which Arendt diagnosed in Eichmann.275  Coming into conversation (real and imagined) 
with others about the appropriate criteria for judgment is, on the other hand, an essential 
activity of living together as human beings.276   
The bounds of communicability dictate the bounds of the world, which comes 
into existence through plural perspectives.  Each individual will subject her particular 
experience to the possible experiences of as many others as she can imagine, and try to 
give an account of her particular experience in a way that will be understood by the 
common sense.  Arendt writes: ‘The it-pleases-or-displeases me, which as a feeling 
seems so utterly private and noncommunicative, is actually rooted in this community 
sense and is therefore open to communication once it has been transformed by 
reflections, which takes all others and their feelings into account.’277 The faculty of 
judgment, by this account, depends on the presence of others.  Without the ability to 
																																																								274 Some work in political science (see, for example, Hemilboim et.al., 2014) suggests 
that internet culture has contributed to a rise in confirmation bias of this kind—people 
tend to talk to people who they anticipate will agree with them, read news sources that 
are generally aligned with their opinions and beliefs, and so on. 275 Arendt writes of Eichmann, ‘He was not stupid.  It was sheer thoughtlessness—
something by no means identical with stupidity—that predisposed him to become one of 
the greatest criminals of that period.’  2006a, 285. 276 Arendt claims that taste is grounded in a ‘principle of belonging’.  ‘Taste,’ she writes, 
‘is the political capacity that truly humanizes the beautiful and creates a culture.’ 2006c, 
224. 277 Arendt 1989, 72. 
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communicate our private thoughts, to have them truly make sense to others whose own 
private thoughts make sense to us, each of us would be a prisoner of her individual point 
of view without a sense of the reality of the world with its plurality of viewpoints.278  
 
5.2 A Feminist Theory of Judgment? 
 
It is often incumbent upon feminists to give an account of a particular without recourse to 
the universal, to make judgments that draw on ways of thinking that have not been 
codified or institutionalised—ways of thinking that, on the contrary, are inspired by the 
need to shift the sensus communis so that it better reflects women’s experiences.  
Agreeing upon the content of judgments about what is best for women has been 
notoriously difficult across cultural, racial, and class lines.  Multicultural and postcolonial 
feminists have long lamented this apparent normative incommensurability.279 The 
question of what we feminists can make of the problem of relativism in our ranks is still a 
pressing one.  How can we proscribe what is ‘harmful’ for women when women occupy 
such disparate positions in the world?  How can we even begin to imagine giving an 
account of the universal grounding of such judgments?  How can we ‘woo the consent’ of 
those with whom we have nothing in common?  How can we make our beliefs, needs, 
and attachments communicable across cultural and class divides?  And how can we avoid 
																																																								278 Again, this atomisation is not as impossible as it may seem at first glance.  Indeed, the 
kind of imprisonment in one’s own private point of view that Arendt is worried about is 
readily apparent in ‘comments’ sections across the Internet.  Also important to remember 
is that an ‘individual’ viewpoint can imprison more than one person—indeed, as in the 
case of Nazi Germany, it can imprison a whole mass movement, as I will argue in 
Chapter 6. 279 hooks 1984; Narayan 1997; Mohanty 2003. 
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privileging out own points of view when we are out to consider the circumstances of all 
women, everywhere?  Linda Zerilli applies Arendt’s insights on judgment in order to 
address such seemingly intractable quandaries.280  A theory of judgment which is 
concerned with giving and defending an account of a subjective judgment rather than 
defending an objective truth is very useful for pointing out the hidden bias of claims to 
objectivity that haunt various theoretical frameworks in law, in philosophy, and in 
feminist theory itself.  Zerilli’s analysis and affirmation of Arendt provide a compelling 
picture of a cross-cultural feminist theory of judgment, though Zerilli is overly ambitious 
in her expectation that we can judge above our prejudices and problematically dismissive 
of the importance of mutually recognitive communication for enlarged thinking, as we 
shall see. 
 The lack of universal criteria for making feminist judgments does not, for Zerilli, 
represent a crisis of relativism or a hopeless aporia of identity politics.  It is not a 
lamentable state of affairs at all; it is, rather, the perfect condition in which to exercise 
political freedom.281  We should not think of the problem of judgment as a matter of 
establishing some shared universal criteria for feminism, for ‘it is the very idea that 
criteria must be given as universal rules governing from above the application of 
concepts to the particulars of political life that has…led partly to the breakdown of the 
capacity to judge critically in the first place.’282  We should, instead, think of judgment as 
																																																								280 Zerilli is due to publish a monograph on Arendt’s theory of judgment in October of 
2016, two months after the submission of this thesis.  Because it is not yet publically 
available, I engage with her earlier work on this topic, especially her 2009 article 
“Toward a Feminist Theory of Judgment”. 281 I offer a detailed overview of Zerilli’s understanding of political freedom as 
unpredictability in action in Chapter 1. 282 Zerilli 2009, 308. 
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the free exercise of critical thinking in a plurality, the interrogation of a particular.  
Forging new meaning through judgment in this way allows critical judgment to ‘come 
into its own’ by refusing to reproduce the narratives of others and instead forging new 
meaning by subjecting those narratives to never-ending conversation.  Critical judgment 
should never be comfortable, in other words.  It should require constant reassessment, 
constantly enlarged thinking.   
 How can we put this idea of judgment as a practice of freedom to use in the 
mediation of contemporary feminist debates about the problems of ethnocentrism in 
contemporary feminism?  ‘How,’ as Zerilli puts it ‘might [a Western] feminist mobilize 
the inescapability of her own embeddedness in a given cultural horizon to advance a 
perspective that is less myopic and self-congratulatory about Western values such as 
political rights without being any less critical toward the gendered cultural and political 
practices of non-Western, nonliberal cultures?’283  Many feminists, she argues, are unable 
to grasp the importance of unyoking the faculty of judgment from a universal set of 
criteria for judging.  The assumption that, through the exercise of reason, all participants 
in a discussion will reach the same conclusion, is a difficult one to dismiss.284  We 
automatically assume the objective validity of our beliefs and opinions—indeed such 
conviction often seems necessary for making compelling arguments or initiating social 
change—and in the process lose sight of the importance of proclaiming the contingency 
of those beliefs and opinions.  We imagine we are trying to convince other people of the 
objective truth, rather than to persuade them to take seriously, and adjust their thinking as 
a result of, whatever it is we have to say.   Because feminists often remain beholden to an 																																																								283 Zerilli 2009, 297. 284 Ibid., 299. 
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untenable, anachronistic universalism that insists on the normative rightness of their 
points of view (Martha Nussbaum and Seyla Benhabib are the two feminists Zerilli paints 
with this universalist brush), they posit a counterproductive impasse between theoretical 
frameworks that may otherwise have a lot to say to one another (such as poststructuralism 
and critical theory or postcolonialism and liberalism).  Often the construction of such an 
impasse exhibits an anxiety about cultural and moral relativism; objectivism and rational 
universalism look preferable to the tendency to abstain from judgment on the grounds 
that other cultures’ norms are not our own, however potentially harmful to women they 
may be, because in positing some universal (liberal) normative criteria at least we can get 
things done.285   
Zerilli argues that the liberal/multicultural impasse is, however, a false antithesis, 
and one that is doomed to reinscribe a harmful misrecognition between feminists from 
different cultures, races, or classes by failing to appreciate fully the agency of women 
who live in cultures other than their own, either by imposing on them liberal western 
norms or by imagining that they are so different from us that we cannot give to one 
another a coherent account of our respective norms.  Instead of feeling caught between 
the rock of rationalism and the hard place of relativism, Zerilli argues, we should not be 
afraid to consider the particular qua particular, and we should feel free to form opinions 
about particulars outside of a set of philosophical or epistemological rules.  Often, we 
supply our preconceived notions and opinions as universal rules even though we think we 
are being impartial.  We hold particulars outside of our own culture up to our already 
																																																								285 Like enacting liberal policies which ban practices which are harmful to women, such 
as female genital mutilation.  The liberal/multicultural debate in feminism is famously 
canvassed by Susan Moller Okin (1999).  See also Gatens (2004). 
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determined normative standards (those of Western liberal democracy) instead of taking 
into account their uniqueness.  Our capacity for critical judgment is, in a way, hobbled by 
rules, which Zerilli says ‘are like a banister to which we hold fast for fear of losing our 
footing and not being able to judge at all.’  She continues, ‘[t]he problem with this top-
down understanding of judgment is that it leaves whatever rules we employ more or less 
unexamined; their normativity becomes the take-for-granted basis for every claim to 
validity.’286  All too often we supply our opinions as universal norms by which to judge, 
rather than consulting the imagined opinions of others so that we may give an account of 
our opinions that make sense to them (as Arendt bids us do). 
The threat of relativism derives from its insight that we cannot apply our criteria 
for judgment regardless of context without risking ethnocentricism—thus it often seems 
we cannot judge unless we have first-hand experience of what we judge, that we lack 
criteria for trans-contextual judgment.  We are caught between making judgments that do 
not sufficiently take into account other standpoints and taking on other standpoints so 
completely that they become our standard for judging (‘going native’, as it were).  Zerilli 
argues that the necessary condition for putting into practice the Arendtian process of 
enlarged thinking is that of being an ‘outsider’.   She insists that Arendt’s practice of 
enlarged thinking allows us to judge effectively across cultural contexts without simply 
reproducing our own already held beliefs and opinions or inhabiting another way of 
thinking so much that it makes us forget our own particular context.   
The starting point for such enlarged thinking is the recognition of one’s own 
particularity, one’s own uniqueness—what Zerilli refers to, after Cornelius Castoriadis, 
																																																								286 Zerilli 2009, 309. 
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as rootedness—and to admit that one cannot transcend it, cannot make judgments from 
outside of it.287  But it is as important to remember that it is one’s own particularity that 
gives her the necessary perspective to understand the particularity of what she is judging.  
As Zerilli puts it: “…[outsideness] is a way of expressing the specificity of one’s own 
rootedness elsewhere as a condition of understanding and judging what is foreign.”288  
Each judging subject is uniquely situated, rooted in her own particular context; so each 
subject is capable of imagining the point of view of other subjects, also uniquely situated.  
Better judgments involve, as we have seen, taking into account more standpoints, 
imagining the conclusion from more points of view.289   
Zerilli argues that this practice of thinking from the point of view of others must 
not be confused with empathic over-identification with the other because the ultimate 
result of enlarged thinking is still judgment.290  That is, we cultivate the ability to be 
impartial by considering the opinion of others in order that we may criticise or question 
with confidence some set of particular circumstances.  The understanding of other 
standpoints is essential for achieving this goal, but such understanding cannot be thought 
of as an end in itself.  ‘We should not,’ Zerilli writes, ‘confuse an ethical stance (other-
regard) with a political practice (representative thinking).’291  I have more to go on, as it 
																																																								287 Zerilli 2009, 310-311. 288 Ibid., 311. 289 Many other feminist theorists, including Yuval-Davis (2011) and Weir (2013) also 
emphasise the importance of acknowledging rootedness in feminist politics. 290 The definition of ‘empathy’ is, of course, stipulative.  Zerilli’s (and Arendt’s) 
understanding of empathy as the over-identification with another such that one’s 
judgment is clouded is not the only way to think about empathy.  We might also define it 
as the situated sympathetic imagination we must cultivate in enlarged thinking.  For an 
excellent account of empathy as cultivated sympathetic imagination, see Churcher 
(2016). 291 Zerilli 2009, 313. 
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were, the more I am able to consider other standpoints.  And, at the same time, my own 
position is open to interrogation by others.  It is the outsideness, the position of spectator, 
that makes judgment possible—from my unique position in the world, I see the opinions 
and beliefs of others in all of their distinctness, without trying to subsume them under my 
own already held opinions and beliefs. By the same token, I see my own actions in all of 
their distinctness, considering them, as I do, from the position of spectator.  Zerilli argues 
that we can avoid reproducing the prejudices of our cultural context by articulating things 
as they appear to us.  She suggests that we think of this practice of judgment as 
‘anticipatory’, as carving out unique and newly communicable political meaning rather 
than as establishing a new set of rules that will remain valid for future judgments.  There 
is no guarantee that the judgment that results from enlarged thinking will be 
communicable, but, Zerilli argues, articulating unique judgments, even when they may 
not resonate with the sensus communis, is preferable to reproducing old prejudices.   
Not only does this theory of judgment allow us to make judgments across 
concepts, it also allows us to ground feminist solidarity in the alignment of such 
judgments.  Feminist theories, which in the past have been problematically grounded in 
identity or experience, can instead be grounded in shared judgment of the world, on 
whatever it is that women have in common.  Communities are formed by the discovery of 
beliefs and opinions held in common.292  She quotes Arendt, ‘We all know very well how 
quickly people recognise each other, and how unequivocally they can feel that they 
belong to each other, when they discover a kinship in questions of what pleases and 
																																																								292 See my discussion of Borren (2013) in Chapter 4 for an account of how collective 
action arises out of interests in common. 
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displeases.’293  The idea here is that, once a person gives an account (in public) of his or 
her judgment, others who have reached the same conclusion, or who would give similar 
accounts, have a sense of solidarity through the shared validity of their judgments.   
This model of feminist judgment is extremely useful—arriving at a shared 
agreement about what makes judgments valid should be the formula for feminist 
judgment.  But Zerilli is overly sanguine about the individual’s capacity to carve out new 
meaning in the public sphere through the articulation of political judgments even in the 
absence of recognition by sympathetic others.294  She insists that the mechanism of 
enlarged thinking depends not on ‘mutual understanding of one another as individual 
persons’, but, instead, on the capacity to see the same world from different 
standpoints.295  In other words, impartial judgment involves understanding the world, the 
reality of the sensus communis, and not on understanding each individual person in the 
world.  And yet, she also insists that ‘the practice of political judgment is a way of 
constructing or discovering community through the articulation of individuality rather 
than its suppression, for this articulation will always involve taking the perspectives of 
others into account.’296 Her example par excellence of community building through 
judgment is the work of the Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective, the group of radical 
Italian feminists who set out to theorise sexual difference without drawing on pre-existing 
narratives about women’s relations, female freedom, or empowerment.297  Through the 
collective articulation of individual thoughts and experiences arose a shared sense of 																																																								293 Zerilli 2005, 159. 294 Lois McNay gives a similar criticism of Zerilli’s insistence on the subject’s capacity 
to feel her freedom even in the absence of recognition.  2014, 113-118. 295 Zerilli 2005, 150. 296 Ibid., 159. 297 Ibid., 125-127.   
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community, which was not held together by membership but by conversation and 
consensus.  Asserting one’s subjectivity in this way might be seen as a confirmation of 
our agency—our open-ended and irreducible capacity to create something new. But each 
member of community who exercises such agency engages in a hermeneutical wager—
there is no guarantee that her account will be communicable.  The stakes of judgment, 
considered in this way, are high.  We risk total alienation and isolation when we give an 
account of our judgments.  What gives us the confidence to take such a risk?  It seems to 
me that there must be some kind of community already in existence for the subject to 
come into conversation with the sensus communis, to make sense in the world.298  
Zerilli seems not to appreciate the necessary (meta)stability of such a world or the 
extent to which the artefacts of judgment (i.e. narratives) are intractable.  The risky 
judgments that the spectator is able to make, in Zerilli’s estimation, appear relatively 
unencumbered by the inevitable prejudices dictated by the spectator’s rootedness.  
Indeed, Zerilli is sceptical of feminists who fall back on these prejudices rather than 
practicing enlarged thinking as she understands it.  Zerilli takes Seyla Benhabib as her 
primary foil here because she seems to see in Benhabib’s work both a problematic 
antiessentialism (in her assertion of the polyvocality of cultures) and a recalcitrant 
ethnocentrism (in her positing of universal norms for conversation).  The first criticism 
grows out of Zerilli’s worry that, by insisting that cultures are not homogenous, Benhabib 
undermines the feminist capacity to make judgments about harmful cultural practices.  
The second, out of Zerilli’s conviction that (any form of) universalism is beholden to an 
obsolete rationalism.   																																																								298 Arendt writes: ‘Kant does tell one how to take others into account, he does not tell one 
how to combine with them in order to act.’ 1989, 44. 
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Zerilli, however, fails fully to appreciate the grounding of Benhabib’s interactive 
universalism in precisely the same Arendtian framework of plurality and uniqueness in 
which she grounds her own theory of judgment.  In focusing on Benhabib’s work on 
universalism, Zerilli misses two crucial aspects of Benhabib’s reading of Arendtian 
judgment, which would greatly enhance her own theory of feminist judgment.299  First, 
Benhabib draws out the inherent moral content in political judgment making, which helps 
ground the idea of the practice of enlarged thinking in the already existing set of 
judgments in which each of us is situated.  Second, she focuses on the essential 
importance of mutually respectful conversation to giving an account of one’s opinions.  
These two insights shift the focus of an account of Arendtian judgment from the 
articulation of individual judgment within a community to the conversation between 
individuals that enables such articulation in the first place.  As Benhabib writes, 
‘[f]urthering one’s capacity for autonomous agency is only possible within a solidaristic 
community that sustains one’s identity through listening to one, and allowing one to 
listen to others, with respect.’300 
The deeply inscribed web of narratives that constitutes our worldly reality is 
constantly changing as a result of spontaneous action; and yet, this web rarely changes 
radically, all at once.  The introduction of new meaning into a plurality is gradual.  As we 
saw in Chapter 4, most action springs up and fades away without leaving a trace.  
Narratives change, instead, a little bit at a time, as the new meaning which emerges out of 
action becomes communicable.  The kinds of consultations that occur in the formulation 																																																								299 For some reason, Zerilli engages with Benhabib’s work on cosmopolitanism rather 
than Benhabib’s work on Arendt, though Benhabib has written extensively on Arendt’s 
thoughts on judgment. 300 Benhabib 1999, 350. 
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of Arendtian judgment require that we redeem meaning from action by remembering 
events, looking at them through the lens of other perspectives, embellishing them, and 
otherwise converting them into narrative form.  Zerilli makes much of this injunction 
toward narrativity in Arendt’s work on judgment, where Arendt distinguishes between 
the agent, who participates in the life of the world directly, and the spectator, who 
formulates judgments about action.  But her portrayal of the Arendtian spectator requires 
that we commit to an impossibly constant outsideness.  It exhibits a lack of understanding 
of the narrative embeddedness of the spectator, who will unavoidably bring to bear her 
prejudice, her preconceived notions, and her short-sighted normative commitments, on 
her exercise of the practice of enlarged thinking.   
  
5.3 Practices of Freedom vs. Communicative Freedom 
 
To tease out the tensions between Zerilli’s reading of Arendt and Benhabib’s, it is 
necessary to get a clearer picture of Benhabib’s take on judgment.  Benhabib’s reading of 
Arendt differs from Zerilli’s largely because she emphasises the importance of the moral 
content of Arendt’s concept of judgment.   Benhabib identifies an essential tension 
between the moral and the historical articulations of Arendtian judgment.  Arendt’s 
preoccupation with judgment, Benhabib insists, derives, in part, from the problem of 
thinking as an ethical activity that Arendt hits upon in her diagnosis of Eichmann:  not a 
man monstrous beyond all understanding, but a thoughtless one, incapable of judging 
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right from wrong because he was unable to think for himself.301  However, this equation 
of judgment with the capacity for moral thought does not tell the whole story.  We must 
also consider, as Zerilli has already bidden us to do, Arendt’s focus on judgment as a 
narrative capacity to consider, and cull meaning from, events in context (whether these 
take the form of stories about the past, articles in the newspaper, or the contents of a 
community debate).  Thus, Benhabib believes, though Arendt herself does not say this, 
that the arrival at a judgment through the exercise of enlarged thinking involves both the 
first person agent making a moral judgment and the third person spectator making an 
historical-political judgment about what is meaningful or important about a certain event.  
To complicate matters further, Benhabib identifies another ‘philosophical perplexity’ in 
Arendt’s reflections on judgment: her apparent conflation of the Aristotelian notion of 
judgment as a political virtue to be exercised in particular political discussions 
(phronesis) and the Kantian idea of moral judgment as the exercise of the universal moral 
faculty.  These two tensions—between a moral and an historical/political understanding 
of judgment and between an Aristotelian and a Kantian understanding of how judgment 
works in the public sphere—form Benhabib’s framework for parsing Arendt. 
However, no matter what we make of these twin tensions, there is no doubt that 
every political or historical judgment contains within it (or happens alongside) moral 
judgment.  Benhabib writes:  
Moral judgment differs from these other domains [legal, aesthetic, political, 
medical, etc.] in one crucial respect: the exercise of moral judgment is pervasive 
and unavoidable; in fact, this exercise is coextensive with relations of social 
interaction in the lifeworld in general.  Moral judgment is what we ‘always 																																																								301 Arendt explicitly states that the exercise of reflective judgment requires that we 
consider questions of right and wrong on more than one occasion.  See, for example, 
1978, 5, 8, and 69; 1971: 418, and others. 
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already’ exercise in virtue of being immersed in a network of human relationships 
that constitute our life together.302 
 
So, the formulation of a moral judgment inevitably arises out of the everyday unfolding 
of action in a plurality.  Because each of us is uniquely situated, and constantly inserting 
herself into the world through action, each of us is constantly formulating moral 
judgments from wherever we are—our ‘rootedness’, in other words, compels us to make 
moral judgments which, unlike the measured, political judgments of enlarged thinking, 
arise in the course of political action.  The subject, then, makes judgments both as agent 
and as spectator.  And, unlike the impartial judgments we are able to make through 
imagining a particular situation from the standpoint of others, the judgments we make as 
agents are off-the-cuff and spontaneous.  This does not mean, however, that they are 
thoughtless.  On the contrary, what we decide to do in action we decide to do because of 
our already held opinions, desires, beliefs—in other words, because of our practical 
narrative identity.303  This is not to say that moral judgment precedes political judgment.  
The individual subject occupies both the position of agent and spectator; she exercises 
moral and political judgments at the same time.   
 Benhabib offers what she calls a ‘phenomenology of moral judgment’ to support 
her claim that moral judgment is immanent to everyday interaction.  A subject confronted 
with everyday interactions will inevitably assess the moral content of those interactions.  
She will ask herself whether she is compelled to act one way or another, whether she has 
																																																								302 Benhabib 1992, 125, original emphasis. 303 As we saw in Chapter 2, we may think a lot about our own identity or we may not 
think about it very much at all.  Either way, we will have a sense of who we are that is 
made up of a variety of narratives—some unquestioningly inherited from the web of 
interlocution within which we are embedded, some created through challenging and 
shifting dominant narratives. 
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fulfilled her moral duties in her relationships to others, and how her actions might be 
judge-able—that is, what narratives a spectator might tell about her actions.304  An agent 
must determine the specific moral content of each particular set of circumstances—
Imagine the example of an agent who considers whether or not she has a duty to travel 
some distance to care for her sick mother.  Making the moral judgment about whether or 
not she ought to attend to her familial duty cannot be a matter of subsuming the particular 
situation under the universal law, and so it must be a question of going through a nuanced 
interior interpretation of the particular circumstances.  The agent considers the particular 
moral claims on her in the particular situation based on the status of her relationship with 
her mother, whether other people would think less of her for not going, what career or 
personal commitments are potentially more important, and so on.  As Benhabib puts it, 
‘[T]he capacity to formulate goals of action is not prior to the capacity to be able to 
justify such goals with reasons to others.  Reasons for actions are not only grounds which 
motivate me; they are also accounts of my actions as I project myself as a “doer” unto a 
social world which I share with others, and through which others recognise me as a 
person capable of, and responsible for, certain courses of action.’305 Carrying out this 
interpretation involves imagining possible narratives about one’s action and imagining 
how those narratives might be communicable to, and understood by, others.306   
																																																								304 Benhabib 1992, 127. 305 Benhabib 2007, 15. 306 These moral calculations are, as I have argued, not carried out by an autonomous 
subject who is transparent to herself—constantly making moral judgments in no way 
guarantees that we will become better people.  Lots of times the moral judgments we 
make are influenced by the kinds of oppressive political narratives discussed in the first 
half of this thesis.  Sometimes they are influenced by willed ignorance and the desire to 
remain in a position of privilege—think, for example, of a white man insisting that ‘all 
lives matter’ when confronted with claims made by the Black Lives Matter movement.  
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This sounds a lot like the political judgment endorsed by Zerilli, but the key 
difference here is that the deliberation of the agent’s moral imagination does not allow 
the agent to remove herself from the action in order to consider it from the point of view 
of spectator.307  The spectator creates the world of political action by her judgment, and 
yet the spectator is always also an agent.  Arendt writes that ‘The judgment of the 
spectator creates the space without which no such objects [of judgment] could appear at 
all.  The public realm is constituted by the critics and the spectators, not by the actors and 
the makers.308  And this critic and spectator sits in every actor.’309 An agent involved in a 
calculation of the moral content of a particular situation is also involved in that situation, 
is also a ‘sufferer’, and a part of any narrative that might be constructed about the 
situation in question. What’s more, the action that is the result of moral deliberation 
represents a unique outcome, which discloses the agent as unique being.  This action does 
not arise ex nihilo, or as the result of totally impartial deliberation, but out of the web of 
narratives that constitute who an agent imagines herself to be (as a whole, coherent 
person) and who she imagines she is seen to be by others. It is in this way, Benhabib 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Sometimes, they are a result of the unquestioned acceptance of subordinating 
narratives—imagine the daughter taking for granted that it is up to her, rather than her 
brother, to care for the ailing mother, in the above example.  In short, moral judgment is 
what we “always already” exercise no matter what our ethical commitments are.		 307 Moral judgment is inconvenient for Zerilli.  It means that the spectator is never free of 
the kind of everyday moral calculations that accompany rootedness.  But moral judgment 
is also what provides us with the world in the first place.  Political judgment makes sense 
of action, but action itself depends on the existence of a space between humans in which 
agents can appear and be recognised.   308 So it is with Susan Brison, as we shall see in the next section.  She is always a moral 
agent in that she is always asking questions about who she is and about how people will 
see her, but she is also a spectator, aligning herself with different communities’ common 
sense as she gives an account of why her particular rape was wrong and harmful. 309 Arendt 1989, 63. 
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argues, we can say that all moral action is communicative interaction.310 
So, it is imperative that we extend Arendt’s theory of judgment to the realm of 
moral action—even if this requires that we use some of Arendt’s insights in ways she did 
not intend or foresee.  When we decide what to do in the face of certain morally charged 
particulars, we engage in a species of enlarged thinking.  This argument gives rise to two 
further (closely related) claims about the contextual nature of moral judgment.  First, that 
moral judgment is contextual—it involves interpreting the particular without subsuming 
it under a universal.  Second, that moral judgment is relational—it involves ‘the 
understanding of the narrative history of the self and of others.’311  We consider what we 
know about ourselves, what we know about everyone else directly involved in the 
situation at hand, what we want others to think of us, and so forth.  We imagine other 
points of view, and yet we fall back on our own prejudices, our own preconceived 
narratives, our own already held convictions about right and wrong.  
As we saw in the first section, Arendt’s chief concern was to account for the 
intersubjective validity of reflective judgments (be they aesthetic or political).  Kant, of 
course, maintained that the validity of moral judgment was to be found in the moral law, 
and that his theory of reflective judgment was relevant only to matters of taste.  It is 
Benhabib’s contention that Arendt had an essentially Aristotelian conception of 
morality—in her view morality was more a matter of individual strength or weakness of 
character than of the negotiation of intersubjective criteria for valid moral judgments.   
However, though she did not give an account of moral judgment as it arises in 
spontaneous action, Arendt clearly considered the practice of enlarged thinking, in which 																																																								310 Benhabib 1992, 129. 311 Ibid.., 132. 
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the impartial spectator distinguished right from wrong, to have a moral dimension.  
Benhabib sees in Arendt’s theory of judgment an implicit moral universalism.  That is, 
reflective political judgments about what is right and wrong are undergirded by 
contextualised, relational interpretations of the moral content of the situation at hand.   
For Arendt, the validity of moral judgment depends on being at home with 
oneself; but Benhabib insists that we must read Arendt against Arendt here—that we 
must take her insights on the political realm to be founded in her moral intuitions.  
Enlarged thought may also be said to have an undeniable moral dimension because it 
enjoins us to consider the standpoints of as many others as possible when we consider a 
set of particulars.  It is incumbent upon us to imagine that every human being has a 
unique perspective, and, contra Zerilli, that each is a moral agent.  Moral universalism is 
thus for Benhabib the recognition that every agent is a potential conversation partner, 
rather than the assumption that all agents share similar moral principles or similar 
approaches to moral judgment-making.  As Benhabib puts it:  
If we reject Kantian a priorism, and his assumption that as moral selves we are all 
somehow identical; if, in other words, we distinguish a universal morality of 
principles from Kant’s doctrine of a priori rationality, then I want to suggest we 
must think of such enlarged thought as a condition of actual or simulated 
dialogue.  To ‘think from the perspective of everyone else’ is to know ‘how to 
listen’ to what the other is saying, or when the voices of others are absent, to 
imagine to oneself a conversation with the other as my dialogue partner.312 
 
So the practice of enlarged thinking does not resemble a decontextualised thought 
experiment, but instead is made possible by the kind of fellow feeling that arises out of 
actual conversation.  I take it Benhabib’s point here is that though we will not always 
reach the same conclusions through moral conversation each of us is a moral agent 
																																																								312 Benhabib 2001, 198. 
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capable of conversation.313  
In Arendt’s view, this universal moral agency is salient in public life, which is 
defined by the condition of plurality, but it is not as relevant a concern when it comes to 
individual moral judgment—which is, in her view, a question of the individual soul being 
in harmony with itself (moral judgment, in other words, was for Arendt a matter of being 
‘true’ to oneself).  But Arendt cannot have it both ways; she cannot insist upon universal 
equality in the public sphere without assuming the moral equality of individuals and the 
potential validity of each individual’s moral judgment.  If we think of moral judgment as 
a matter of checking in with oneself and no one else, then it becomes difficult to level the 
appropriate charges against Eichmann, whose evil arose precisely from his refusal to 
exercise his capacity for enlarged moral thinking, to consider the moral standpoint of 
others, and who was perfectly at home with himself.314  Indeed, Benhabib argues, the 
collapse of such moral thinking is the most stunning aspect of an impoverished public 
sphere, as we shall see in the next chapter.  Failure to engage in everyday moral 
interaction makes it impossible to formulate reflective political judgments.  Where moral 
universalism does not underpin the political, ‘the moral obligation to think of the other as 
one whose perspective I must weigh equally alongside my own disappears from the 
																																																								313 ‘This vision states that when divested of all our social, cultural, and religious 
accouterments, ranks and distinction, we are all humans like each other.  There is no 
greater proof of our common humanity besides the fact that we can communicate with 
and understand each other.’ Benhabib 1995, 98. 314 Arendt writes ‘What [Eichmann] failed to point out in court was that in this “period of 
crimes legalised by the state,” as he himself now called it, he had not simply dismissed 
the Kantian formula as no longer applicable, he had distorted it to read: Act as if the 
principle of your actions were the same as that of the legislator or of the law of the land—
or, in Hans Frank’s formulation of “the categorical imperative in the Third Reich,” which 
Eichmann might have known: “Act in such a way that the Führer, if he knew of your 
action, would approve it.”’ 2006a, 136. 
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conscience of individuals.’315  Enlarged thinking is possible because moral conversation 
is possible. 
Benhabib’s attention to the tension between the two moral frameworks within 
Arendt’s thought is productive because it gives us a way to talk about the relevance of 
moral conversation in the political domain.  Though there may be no direct overlap 
between the moral conversations we have as agents in everyday action and the creation of 
policies, institutions, practices, and norms that is a result of the consensus we reach as 
spectators through reflective judgment, there are certainly moral dispositions that better 
enable us to perform the practice of enlarged thinking—dispositions such as civic 
friendship, solidarity, receptivity, and respect for vulnerability.  ‘These moral attitudes,’ 
Benhabib writes, ‘involve the extension of the sympathy and affection we naturally feel 
toward those closest to us unto larger human groups and thus personalize justice.’316  
Indeed, the attitudes of civic friendship and solidarity make it possible for individuals to 
articulate their points of view in the public sphere in the first place—they empower 
individuals to risk voicing those points of view.  
Benhabib’s reading of Arendt on judgment gives us a great deal of insight into the 
importance of both narrativity and communication to a feminist theory of judgment.  The 
articulation of the moral content of action, making sense of action, constitutes an exercise 
of narrative agency.  Crucially, this exercise of narrative agency is only possible when the 
agent has access to a community that is able to understand her articulation.  As Benhabib 
writes,  ‘agency and communication are two sides of the same coin: I only know myself 
as an agent because I can anticipate being part of a social space in which others recognise 																																																								315 Benhabib 1992, 138-139. 316 Ibid., 140.
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me as the initiator of certain deeds and the speaker of certain words.’317  The kind of 
political judgment Arendt and Zerilli endorse cannot truly take into account the 
standpoint of others without this communicative freedom as its moral foundation. 
Serious consideration of the roles narrative and communication play in judgment-
formation calls into question Zerilli’s claim that the political practice of enlarged thinking 
should not involve an ethical stance.  Benhabib, in drawing our attention to the moral 
content of action, does not posit an ethical framework based on a universal normative 
criteria for what is right; instead, she shows us that we cannot have a theory of political 
judgment, wherein we think from the standpoint of others, without the conviction that 
these others are moral agents.  Any feminist theory of judgment must take into account 
this moral universalism in order to consider fully the (theoretically infinite) plurality of 
perspectives that make up any given political space.   
Such moral universalism is neither a reiteration of objectivism or rationalism nor 
a form of cultural relativism.  Thinking from the standpoint of another within a plurality, 
rather than in a Kantian kingdom of moral homogeneity in which each agent is purely 
rational, self-legislating, and operates according to the universal moral law, is the only 
way we can make sense of the kind of post-rational, discursive judgment formation for 
which Zerilli herself advocates.  A feminist theory of judgment requires the cultivation of 
meaningful conversations about what feminism is, and about how feminists ought best to 
confront shifting norms, beliefs and judgments.   
Zerilli fails to attend to the norms, beliefs, and judgments, which are already in 
place in any given community, and that set the parameters for those conversations.  To 
																																																								317 Benhabib 2007, 15, emphasis added. 
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articulate one’s own point of view in the public sphere is more likely to result in 
alienation than solidarity if there is no community whom can be addressed, who is 
listening, and whom can be listened to.   The stronger such a community is, the stronger 
the bonds of civic friendship and solidarity become.  Agency and a robust community are 
mutually reinforcing, and, as Benhabib writes, ‘the cultivation of one’s moral imagination 
flourishes in such a culture in which the self-centred perspective of the individual is 
constantly challenged by the multiplicity and diversity of perspectives that constitute the 
public life.’318  The more we are able to speak and be heard by others, the more likely we 
are to risk articulating what we really think rather than to repeat what others think.   
 A subject’s unique perspective is, as we have seen, a product of her rootedness.  
She simultaneously makes moral judgments in the web of action into which she is 
constantly thrown and political judgments based on the consideration, as a spectator, of 
that moral action.  The distinction between agent and spectator is crucial for making 
judgments within a set of social norms, though agent and spectator coexist in each 
individual subject.  Benhabib clarifies this distinction: 
…all analyses of cultures, whether empirical or normative, must begin by 
distinguishing the standpoint of the social observer from that of the social agent.  
The social observer—whether an eighteenth-century narrator or chronicler; a 
nineteenth-century general, linguist, or educational reformer; or a twentieth-
century anthropologist, secret agent, or development worker—is the one who 
imposes, together with local elites, unity and coherence on cultures as observed 
entities.  Any view of cultures as clearly delineable wholes is a view from the 
outside that generates coherence for the purposes of understanding and control.  
Participants in the culture, by contrast, experience their traditions, stories, rituals 
and symbols, tools, and material living conditions through shared, albeit contested 
and contestable, narrative accounts.  From within, a culture need not appear as a 
whole; rather, it forms a horizon that recedes each time one approaches it.319 
 																																																								318 Benhabib 1992, 141. 319 Benhabib 2002, 5. 
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Here is the cultural antiessentialism with which Zerilli takes issue, for in it she sees the 
temptation to smuggle one’s prejudices into what ought to be impartial thinking from the 
standpoint of others.  In other words, Benhabib’s insistence that cultural homogeneity is 
artificially imposed by spectators seems, to Zerilli, an opportunity for Benhabib to 
assume a problematic sameness among moral agents, no matter the cultural context.  
Preferable to Zerilli’s interpretation is the conception of the spectator as endowed with 
the critical capacity to consult the opinions of others in order to come up with 
contingently valid judgments, which make up the stuff of democratic conversation.  The 
spectator, when giving an account of a particular that cannot be subsumable under a 
universal, takes the risk that her judgment may not be communicable to others.   
 My argument throughout this thesis has been that an individual cannot take such a 
risk without the support of ‘a community that listens to and sustains one.’320  The 
capacity to speak and act in public is constant and irreducible, but it is compromised 
when speech and action are not communicable.  Communicability is, indeed, the measure 
of sanity, and it is also the lifeblood of narrative agency.  If agency and communication 
are two sides of the same coin, our ability to give an account of ourselves flourishes as 
the community around us recognises and listens to us.  We ‘find ourselves’, i.e. come to 
appreciate our own uniqueness, through conversation with others who are also unique.   
 
5.4 Finding Ourselves in Conversation: Communicating the Harm of Rape 
 
																																																								320 Benhabib 1999, 350. 
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To give a better sense of what simultaneous political and moral judgment looks like, I’d 
like to treat an example from a book that has been read in a number of different ways—
Susan Brison’s (2002) Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self.  Brison, in her 
rigorously philosophical account of her own recovery from sexual assault, describes in 
vivid detail her struggle to communicate with others in the wake of the attack.  
Overwhelmingly, the insight that emerges from Brison’s account is the inextricable 
relationality of self and world, the insight that, as she puts it ‘the self exists 
fundamentally in relation to others.’321  
The assault on Brison occurred while she was on a walk one morning on a holiday 
in France.  She was pulled off the road by a stranger, sexually assaulted, and severely 
beaten.  For the first months after the attack, she was unable to communicate to anyone 
what had happened to her.  She gave the brute facts at repeated inquiries by medical and 
law enforcement officials and was often speechless in interactions with family and 
friends who were unable to understand the significance of the assault.  No one else had 
gone through what she had gone through, and in attempting to explain herself to others, 
and to accept the support they offered, she often ran up against the boundaries of 
communicability.  
What allowed her, slowly, to rejoin the world was not advocacy or activism—was 
not political participation of any kind.  It was, instead, working on rebuilding her moral 
intuitions (about who she is, how other people see her, how she wants to be seen) through 
sustained interaction with sympathetic others.  Without a sense of community (a sense 
that she was an agent capable of communicating with other agents), she was unable to be 
																																																								321 Brison 2002, 40. 
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a self at all.  She writes:  ‘On this view [the feminist view of the relational self] the self is 
both autonomous and socially dependent, vulnerable enough to be undone by violence 
and yet resilient enough to be reconstructed with the help of empathic others.’322  Brison 
took self-defence classes, she found a therapist, she was diagnosed with PTSD and found 
the right medication, and she joined support groups for survivors of rape and of for 
groups for survivors attempted murder.  Very, very slowly she was able to regain the 
ability to make everyday moral judgments.  She was able to recount the story of her 
assault to others and be recognised by those others as a person who had experienced, and 
was able to communicate, a trauma.    
It takes practice, and many conversations in which one feels recognised, for moral 
judgments to again seem second nature. Brison’s attempts to narrate the experience of 
being a rape survivor were often thwarted by the lack of a common language to discuss 
rape.  She writes, ‘In the case of rape, the intersection of multiple taboos—against talking 
openly about trauma, about violence, about sex—causes conversational gridlock, 
paralyzing the would be supporter.  We lack the vocabulary for expressing appropriate 
concern, and we have no social conventions to ease the awkwardness.’323 
Communicability depends on a shared language and a shared common sense, but these 
emerge only after individuals have the confidence to push past this awkwardness to 
mutual understanding (and this is easier when listeners are receptive and solicitous).324  
																																																								322 Ibid., 38. 323 Ibid., 12. 324 What’s at stake here is not a more contemporary psychological or ‘self-help’ 
definition of confidence, but, rather, a confidence to risk the sense of invisibility and 
loneliness that accompanies not being recognised at all.  I will speak at length about this 
risk in Chapter 6.
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We confirm our agency through appearing to others in everyday ways, through 
attempting to articulate our judgments in private conversation, through interrogating the 
boundaries of what is communicable to people who recognise us in our whoness and who 
care for us.  Brison writes of confirming her own agency through therapy, through 
conversations with friends, and through the support of her partner.  These supportive 
relationships do not always take the form of conversation, but they constitute the 
foundation for communicability by providing a world in which the agent can be certain 
she will appear as herself.  Brison spends quite a bit of time writing about the difficult 
process of relationship building and support that allowed her to write her book in the first 
place and to identify publicly, while carrying out her work as a feminist philosopher and 
a feminist activist, and as a rape survivor.  She distinguishes between ‘living to tell’ about 
the assault, by which she means being able to give an account of it to others, and ‘telling 
to live’, by which she means coming up with a way to make sense of the assault to herself 
in order that at she may regain the world and her relationship to the world.  Before she 
was able to make political judgments as a rape survivor and an activist, she had to 
practice being an agent by talking to supportive and sympathetic others. 
 Bolstered by the continued recognition by others, Brison began again to have a 
sense of herself as a spectator capable of expressing a variety of interests germane to 
collective action.  Even after regaining the sense that she had politically relevant things to 
say, however, Brison was reluctant to risk the articulation of her judgments about the 
harm of rape in public (this harm, for Brison, is nothing less than the complete the 
eradication of selfhood).  Certainly, many victims of harms like rape and sexual assault 
never become spectators at all.  Indeed, even after she had begun to write academically 
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and to speak publically about the assault, she was riddled with doubt about whether her 
judgments were communicable.  She writes: 
I still wonder why I wanted the sexual aspect of the assault—so salient to me—
kept secret.  I was motivated, in part, by shame, I suppose, and I wanted to avoid a 
too easy stereotyping of myself-as-victim.  I did not want academic work (that I 
had already done) on pornography and violence against women to be dismissed as 
the ravings of ‘an hysterical rape victim.’ Also, I felt I had very little control over 
the meaning of the term ‘rape.’  People would think they knew what had 
happened if they labeled the assault that way…but they wouldn’t.325   
 
These concerns about how she would be seen and whether she would be understood are 
perhaps exaggerated in the wake of such a traumatic event as violent rape, but they are 
also the concerns that we all face as we decide whether and how to become spectators. 
Becoming a spectator who can test the bounds of communicability in public by risking 
making judgments in public is an essential part of the work of feminist theory, but it is 
impossible without, as Arendt puts it, ‘the elementary confidence in the world which is 
necessary to make experiences at all.’326   
Through activism and through academic work in feminist theory and philosophy, 
Brison did eventually gain confidence as a spectator after her sexual assault. She has 
made, over the last several years, political judgments about rape in order to shift the 
common understanding of the harm of rape.  But it is only because there has been a series 
of feminist communities, each with its own sensus communis, that have succeeded, 
slowly but surely, in articulating the harm of rape that Brison has been able to make the 
specific harm done to her publicly communicable.  Without a constantly evolving 
consensus about how rape is harmful (how it eradicates agency), it is impossible to 
describe the harm of rape.  Becoming a spectator has meant engaging with various 																																																								325 Brison 2002, 90. 326 Arendt 1976, 477. 
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communities in order to articulate various aspects of her particular experience.  She 
writes: 
At different times and for different purposes, I have identified myself as a crime 
(attempted murder) victim, a rape survivor, a hate crime survivor, a person with a 
disability (PTSD and some other, stress-triggered neurological malfunctions), 
among other categories.  The groups with which I identify expand (from rape 
survivors to all trauma survivors), contract (victims of attempted sexual murder), 
expand in other ways (hate crime survivors), contract (rape survivors), and so on, 
seemingly endlessly.327 
 
Depending on the set of interests in question, Brison identifies with many different 
identities.  Through conversations with each of these solidaristic concentrations of 
identity, Brison is able to hash out, and articulate in an increasingly public way, various 
ways in which she, in her uniqueness, wants to address, and change, the world.  The key 
point here is that the continued risk of misrecognition through the articulation of one’s 
own experience to others in a public space makes communication easier.   
In each of these communities, Brison is able to articulate her own judgments in 
the context of similar judgments and, thus, as a unique spectator, shift the common sense 
of that community a little bit by and through her participation.  She is not reducible to her 
identity as a member of any one of these groups; rather, she is a participant in the 
negotiation of political judgment-making within each of these groups.  This process of 
political judgment-making, as we have seen, involves enlarged thinking by each member 
of a given community.  It involves imaginatively occupying the position of other 
spectators in the same community to negotiate and to refine one’s own account of a very 
specific harm—a ‘hate crime’, a ‘rape’—through consideration of what other spectators 
have said about that harm.  The new meaning collaboratively created by each community 
																																																								327 Brison 2002, 94-95. 
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listed here becomes communicable beyond the constituency of that community through 
enlarged thinking between members of different communities. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold.  First, I have emphasised the importance of 
making judgments for feminist theory.  When we make judgments about what is harmful 
for, or beneficial to, women, we must be able to give communicable reasons for the 
judgments we have made.  Second, I have argued that the spectator who makes feminist 
political judgments is always also an agent.  To flesh out the process of judgment making 
in a feminist theory not beholden to a set of normative rules (a feminism, in other words, 
that does not offer in advance a set of rules by which to determine what is ‘right’ and 
what is ‘wrong’), I borrowed Arendt’s phenomenology of judgment making.  Arendt 
argues that judgments gain their validity through intersubjective consensus, rather than 
through objective rightness.  In order to make better judgments, according to Arendt, we 
must consider the situation from as many points of view as possible, a process Arendt 
calls ‘enlarged thinking’.  The more possible perspectives we consider when making 
judgments, the more communicable our judgments will be to others. 
 I considered this intersubjective method for making judgments as an appropriate 
model for judgment making in feminist theory through a reading of Linda Zerilli’s work 
on Arendt’s theory of judgment.  I endorse Zerilli’s argument that a feminist theory of 
judgment based on enlarged thinking does, in fact, allow us to consider creatively 
specific questions in feminism as they arise without having to fall back on a strictly 
normative liberalism or to sink into relativism.  By the processes of enlarged thinking and 
political judgment, feminists are able to articulate points of view around a particular set 
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of circumstances and to voice agreements with other similar points of view as they arise.  
Solidarity, by these lights arises organically out of the public articulation of a particular 
set of judgments. 
 Zerilli’s theory of judgment seems to me to suffer from two separate problems, 
however; the first is that she overestimates our ability to think beyond the judgments 
already available to us in the form of political narratives and, second, she underestimates 
the importance of recognition by others for having the courage to voice judgments in 
public in the first place.  To address these problems, I turned to Benhabib’s account of the 
moral foundations of Arendtian politics.  I argued that the spectator who makes political 
judgments is always also an agent who makes moral judgments about action as it occurs. 
Being embedded (or ‘rooted’, as Zerilli calls it) in action does not only mean that we 
have a specific point of view when we make political judgments, it also means that we 
have a whole host of biases and prejudices, along with psychic blocks and vulnerabilities.  
In order to articulate political judgments so that they are communicable to others, we first 
have to check in with our notion of ourselves as ‘I’s’ through a series of moral 
judgments, which we make as moral agents within a plurality of other moral agents.  
Without the universal mutual recognition at the heart of this process (the realisation by 
each of us that each of us is an ‘I’ capable of moral judgment and, eventually, political 
judgment), we cannot have the confidence that we will appear to others at all.  Susan 
Brison’s account of her own capacity to make political judgments after suffering a violent 
sexual assault helps me emphasise the importance of the moral content of judgment-
making.  Throughout her recovery, she found that she had to rebuild her sense of herself 
as an ‘I’ in order to articulate the kinds of political judgments necessary to explain what 
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had happened to her, the kind of wrong she had suffered, and the importance of talking 
about, and organising politically in order to prevent, rape.  Her confidence that she would 
appear as a unique self to others, or as a moral agent, was an essential part of her 
willingness to risk the formulation of political judgments in public.  In the next chapter, I 
look at the mutual dependence between the confidence that one will appear in the world 
in the first place (which I call ontological agency) and the world created through the 
mutual sharing of political judgments (through the sustained exercise of political agency). 
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Chapter 6: Loneliness as the Lack of Narrative Agency 
 
 
Recall that narrative agency is the capacity to make sense of oneself as an ‘I’ over time 
and in relation to other ‘I’s’.  Narrative agency, I have argued, is an irreducible and 
constant capacity.  It is an indispensible aspect of every human life.  An unexplored 
corollary to this argument is that without narrative agency, a life ceases to be meaningful, 
ceases to be livable, and in some essential way ceases to be human.  What can this mean?  
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that narrative agency is indeed an irreducible and 
constant capacity of each human being by approaching this concept of narrative agency 
negatively, by asking, in other words, ‘what might it mean to lack narrative agency?’   
 Narrative agency is relevant in two registers of human life: the ontological and the 
political.  Each agent enters into a plurality with a particular whoness, which, through 
natality, is disclosed in action again and again.328  The ontological agent exercises this 
self-disclosure simply through being in the world as a unique individual.  For whoness to 
be disclosed in the world, however, there must exist a world in the first place (though it 
is, perhaps, misleading to suggest that the world precedes the self or vice versa, since, as 
we shall see, ontological and political agency are mutually interdependent).  The world is 
what we build between ourselves and hold in common through action.  It is made up of 
laws, institutions, imaginaries and norms (and, crucially, of the conversations we are 
always having about these things).  The political agent exercises narrative agency, as we 
																																																								328 Recall that Arendt defines whoness as an individual’s uniqueness which is disclosed 
through appearance in the world and perceived by others. It may seem, at first glance, 
that natality (the disclosure of whoness in the world) is essentially passive; I argue, 
however, that natality requires initiative on the part of the agent, though most of the time 
this initiative is ‘irresistible’. 
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saw in Chapter 5, when she gives an account of her discrete, particular judgment as part 
of a worldly conversation.  These two aspects of narrative agency, the ontological and the 
political, both depend on the worldly coexistence of plurality and uniqueness—they both 
depend, in other words, on a conception of the singular narrative agent in conversation 
with a plurality of other narrative agents, each of them also unique.  The absence of 
narrative agency, then, means the absence of plurality, uniqueness or both: this is the 
condition of loneliness.  Loneliness is the ever-present threat of incommunicability 
between individuals in a plurality.  It eradicates the world held in common, and, at its 
worst, may eradicate individual whoness entirely.329 
 It is my contention, in this chapter, that an account of loneliness buttresses my 
account of narrative agency by revealing the consequences of its absence.  First, I 
reconstruct Arendt’s phenomenology of loneliness, which she defines as the total absence 
of a world in common. I canvass Arendt’s account of how this eradication of the world 
(and, ultimately, the individual) came to pass during the rise of totalitarianism in Nazi 
Germany and further argue that the final result of the eradication of the world is the 
absence of agency.  I then offer an account of the reconstruction of agency in both the 
ontological and the political registers. I argue that ontological agency, when eradicated by 
																																																								329 Arendt concludes the Origins of Totalitarianism with an affirmation of natality 
(though here she calls it ‘beginning’): ‘Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is 
the supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom.  Initium ut 
esset homo creates est—“that a beginning be made man was created” said Augustine.  
This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man.’ 1976, 479.  As 
we saw in Chapter 4, natality is marked by its givenness—beginning again in the world is 
an innate initiative.  However, as we shall see, this initiative ceases to matter in the 
camps—there is no world between men there and so action (even birth and death 
themselves) is no longer meaningful.  
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loneliness, can be restored through narrative.330  Second, I show that political agency is 
sustained by conversation, which I define as the mutually recognitive sharing of 
narratives.  I argue that the political institutions that make up the world we hold in 
common, including the solidaristic associations of feminism, can only be successful when 
the conditions for narrative agency—natality, plurality, and narrativity—are satisfied.  
Ontological agency and political agency reinforce one another.  At the close of the 
chapter, I illustrate the interdependence of these two ways of thinking about narrative 
agency through a brief look at the relationship between the characters of Elena and Lila 
in Elena Ferrante’s Neopolitan novels.  It is only because Elena has the confidence that 
she will appear as a self to Lila (ontological agency) that she is able to risk articulating 
her point of view in public through writing novels, writing articles for the papers, and 
giving intellectual talks (political agency). 
 
6.1 Arendt on Loneliness and Totalitarianism 
 
Seyla Benhabib draws attention to Arendt’s tendency to conflate the phenomenological 
and political-philosophical approaches to loneliness: on the one hand, Arendt uses 
loneliness to denote the existential state of being without the world; on the other, she 
insists that action through association serves as a bulwark against loneliness.  It is this 
latter ‘capacity to focus on the phenomena of history, sociology, and culture instead of 
																																																								330 Narrative refers both to appearance in the world as an ‘I’ and to extended sense-
making about the world. I will rely throughout this chapter on the distinction made in 
Chapter 3 between narrative agency, which is the capacity to conceive of oneself as a 
unique ‘I’ in a world of other ‘I’s’ and narrative identity, which is the self that emerges 
out of the exercise of narrative agency across time. 
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taking flight into metaphysical abstractions’ that Benhabib sees as the aspect of Arendt’s 
work on totalitarianism most relevant to contemporary discussions in normative political 
theory.331  But it seems to me that Arendt’s methodological slippage in this part of her 
work is precisely what lends her account of loneliness its richness, and what makes it so 
pertinent to the present discussion of agency.  Arendt’s account of loneliness is very 
much concerned with the interdependence of being and doing.  She writes, ‘[f]reedom as 
an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a 
political reality is identical with a space of movement between men.’332 In other words, 
ontological agency arises out of the disclosure of whoness, but, at the same time, political 
agency is sustained by the plurality that makes up this space of disclosure.333 
We find Arendt’s brief but compelling thoughts on loneliness in the final chapter 
of The Origins of Totalitarianism, “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of 
Government”.334 Here, Arendt distinguishes between solitude, isolation, and loneliness.  
In solitude, one is engaged in an imaginary dialogue with oneself or with others but is not 
cut off from them.335  The solitary individual is still in conversation with the world, even 
though she is not physically present in the world.  The pleasure of solitude is made 																																																								331 Benhabib 2003, 69. 332 Arendt 1976, 473. 333 What Arendt means by the space between men is not always clear, but it certainly 
needs to be a public space and cannot only consist of private life.  Though Arendt argues, 
in her address on Lessing and elsewhere, that the space between friends is enriched by the 
world and that the world is enriched by conversations between friends, the space between 
friends is not enough to constitute a world.   334 Arendt added this chapter, Chapter 13, to her second edition of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism in 1958.  As Martin Shuster points out, Arendt’s remarks on loneliness, 
though they arguably form the foundation for Arendt’s analytical framework in this 
enormous study, have rarely been treated in a systematic way. 335 Arendt’s friend and correspondent Paul Tillich wrote, ‘Language has created the word 
loneliness to express the pain of being alone and the word solitude to express the glory of 
being alone.’ 1963, 5.   
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possible by a robust political realm, of which the solitary individual feels herself a part; 
without the potential ‘redeeming grace’ of companionship, the confirmation of one’s 
identity by others, solitude can slip into loneliness.  
Isolation, too, is distinct from, but a potential precursor to, loneliness.  The 
condition of isolation arises when the political realm is impoverished; that is, when 
individuals are no longer invested enough in shared interests and concerns to act in 
concert.  In isolation, the individual may still enjoy relationships with friends, family, and 
intimate community.  The pariah, for example, exists without the world but often within a 
community of other pariahs.336  The isolated individual may also enjoy the pleasures of 
work (the making of art, for example) without care for the world.  Isolation becomes 
loneliness when politically isolated individuals lose the sense that they have something 
unique to contribute to the world in common; that is, when they feel superfluous.  
The decline of the public sphere, and the isolation it engenders, is the prerequisite 
for totalitarianism, which does away with the public sphere entirely in order to implement 
a suprahuman law.  Totalitarianism ‘executes the law of History or of Nature without 
translating it into standards of right and wrong for individual behaviour.’337  Within a 
totalitarian regime, there are no longer institutions in place—courts of law, the free 
press—that allow people to raise publicly problems that inevitably arise out of living 
together in society.  Rather, the intent of a totalitarian government is to dispense with the 
individual action of men altogether in order to address the demands of a suprahuman 																																																								336 ‘…the pariahs of this world enjoy the great privilege of being unburdened by care for 
the world.’ 1995, 14.  Indeed, by ‘dark times’, Arendt means periods of world 
impoverishment.  The exemplary men and women about whom she writes maintain the 
integrity of their uniqueness, in spite of the isolation brought on by the decline of the 
political realm. 337 Arendt 1976, 462. 
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ideology, embodied in the Stalinist regime by the concept of History (the convictions of 
dialectical materialism) and in Hitler’s Germany by the concept of Nature (the 
preservation and perpetuation of the German nation).  Adherence to these ideologies 
necessarily demands dispensing with the everyday laws of man and appealing to a higher 
Law, which is in motion toward some ultimate end.  In this view, humankind itself 
becomes nothing more than an obstacle for the ideology to overcome.  As Arendt writes: 
‘In these ideologies, the term “law” changed its meaning: from expressing the framework 
of stability within which human actions and motions can take place, it became the 
expression of the motion itself.’338  ‘Law’, in a totalitarian regime, seeks to eradicate 
human action, rather than to enable it. 
Because this law of movement is not concerned with unique individual lives, its 
enforcement in the world takes the form of terror.  The usual hallmarks of positive law, in 
other words, collapse in a totalitarian society.  Men are no longer judged by their deeds, 
and guilt and innocence cease to be relevant concepts.  Terror, then, is the application of 
suprahuman Law to the whole of a society. The ultimate aim of terror is to transform the 
discrete members of society into a single unit of mankind, one from which plurality and 
individualism have been eradicated.  Within a system of terror, individual human life 
becomes arbitrary and meaningless.  Each member of society is marked by the higher law 
as either victim or executioner.  These designations are not based on crime and 
punishment.339  They are, instead, bestowed by terror itself.  Arendt writes: 
																																																								338 Ibid., 464. 339 Arendt gives an interesting example of the collapse of executioner into victim and 
victim into executioner at the behest of the law of Nature: ‘The introduction of purely 
objective criteria into the selective system of SS troops was Himmler’s great 
organisational invention; he selected the candidates from photographs according to purely 
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Terror as the execution of a law of movement whose ultimate goal is not the 
welfare of men or the interest of one man but the fabrication of mankind, 
eliminates individuals for the sake of the species, sacrifices the “parts” for the 
sake of the “whole.”  The suprahuman force of Nature or History has its own 
beginning and its own end, so that it can only be hindered by the new beginning 
and the individual end which the life of each man actually is.340  
 
The political non-space of totalitarianism is hostile to the uniqueness represented by each 
individual, and terror, understood as the principle of absolute motion toward a 
suprahuman Law, therefore seeks to stamp out plurality.  As Benhabib puts it, ‘societal 
atomization; the breakdown of civic, political, cultural associations and the loneliness of 
atomized masses, prepares them for the reception of authoritarian and totalitarian 
movements.’341  On a mass scale, the totalitarian state strives to homogenise the entire 
population in the service of universally installing the laws of Nature or History.  A pure 
totalitarian regime thus consists of one mass of mankind, within which individual human 
beings are interchangeable.   
 In order for such Law to be successfully implemented, the totalitarian regime 
must destroy not only the structure of positive law and the possibility for meaningful 
political action, it must also destroy the human capacity for creativity on a more intimate 
scale.  Terror, as a principle, is not enough to guide the behaviour of each individual 
within a society, and even a regime that has converted the entire public sphere over to the 
advance of terror has not necessarily eradicated the capacity for free, creative interaction 
and thought.  This tendency toward freedom is present in every human being because it is 
‘identical with the fact that men are being born and that therefore each of them is a new 
																																																																																																																																																																					
racial criteria.  Nature itself decided, not only who was to be eliminated, but also who 
was to be trained as executioner’ 1976, 468. 340 Arendt 1976, 465. 341 Benhabib 2003, 55. 
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beginning.’342 A totalitarian government must also indoctrinate its subjects into the 
(il)logic of terror through the dissemination of its ideology.  Totalitarian logic is able to 
explain ‘every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise.’343  Totalitarianism 
cancels out any possibility to think freely beyond the bounds of its own logic. Arendt 
writes: 
Totalitarian rulers rely on the compulsion with which we can compel ourselves, 
for the limited mobilization of people which even they still need; this inner 
compulsion is the tyranny of logicality against which nothing stands but the great 
capacity of men to start something new.344  
 
This tyrannical logic strikes down the birth of new ideas within the individual just as the 
tyranny of terror acts in opposition to the birth of unique individuals into the streamlined 
society of Law.  Adherence to the single premise of an ideology, within a totalitarian 
regime, becomes a subject’s everyday reality.  Each subject is force-fed, through 
indoctrination in the form of institutionalised education and propaganda, the foundational 
idea (the idea of class struggle in the case of Soviet Russia and the idea of racial 
supremacy in the case of Nazi Germany) and ever-after the consistent system of logic that 
grows out of this one accepted idea is enforced upon the indoctrinated subject.   
For, once one has accepted the original premise of an ideology, to deny its 
‘logical outcome’ is to contradict oneself and, by extension, to contradict the movement.  
This totalitarian logic cancels out freedom of thought: 
As terror is needed lest with the birth of each new human being a new beginning 
arise and raise its voice in the world, so the self-coercive force of logicality is 
																																																								342 Arendt 1976, 466, emphasis in original. 343 Ibid., 468. 344 Arendt 1976, 473. 
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mobilized lest anybody ever start thinking—which as the freest and purest of all 
human activities is the very opposite of the composite process of deduction.345  
 
And once inner freedom has been surrendered, the individual becomes one with the 
movement.  Her social reality is that of the movement, and her interaction with others is 
governed entirely by the shared acceptance of the movement’s ultimate premise.  Her 
capacity to create judgments on both a political scale and a moral scale is destroyed.  This 
is the heart of loneliness: the destruction of both the agent and the spectator.  The 
successful propagation of terror robs of the individual of her narrative agency, of her 
capacity to communicate new meaning through action. Creation, according to Arendt, is 
very simply ‘the capacity to add something of one’s own to the common world’.346  But 
under totalitarianism, both the capacity to create something new and the common world 
in which a new creation might be recognised have been destroyed.   
The concentration camp represents, for Arendt, the condition of loneliness in its 
most extreme and purest form. In the camp, neither birth nor death means anything.  Both 
victims and executioners are part of the same closed system that does not and cannot 
constitute a common world; they might as well not exist.  They are outside of law, 
outside of morality—in short, outside of the human experience altogether.  Most 
appallingly though, the living dead in the camp see themselves as completely unnecessary 
for Nature’s inexorable advance: 
We may say that radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in which 
all men have become equally superfluous.  The manipulators of this system 
believe in their own superfluousness as much as in that of all others, and the 																																																								345 Ibid., 473.  The total domination of a mass of people by ideology is the extreme case 
of the tendency away from action and toward behaviour (and away from interactive 
republicanism and toward bureaucracy) that Arendt bemoans in modern society (1958, 
322). 346 Arendt 1976, 475. 
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totalitarian murderers themselves are all the more dangerous because they do not 
care if they are alive or dead, if they ever lived or never were born.347 
 
The ‘radical evil’ here is the lack of distinction between one individual and the next, the 
state in which human uniqueness is no longer of any consequence.  Thus, in the political 
sphere, in the private sphere, and within the individual herself, loneliness has the same 
target: agency.  Arendt’s portrait of totalitarianism in power reveals the extent to which it 
is this very capacity that makes us human.  Totalitarianism, in trying to rob humanity of 
its creative potential, is doomed to fail; for basic human agency, which is guaranteed by 
natality (which is itself guaranteed by the birth of new individuals into the world), cannot 
be expunged.348  ‘This beginning,’ Arendt writes in her final lines, ‘is guaranteed by each 
new birth; it is indeed every man.’349  The camp cannot be a world.  It is, as Benhabib 
points out, a space where humanity has ceased to be recognisable as human.  She writes: 
‘The destruction of the individual in concentration camps by methods of torture, terror, 
and behaviour manipulation only shows that a humanity that has become worldless, 
homeless, and superfluous is also wholly eliminable.’350 Extreme loneliness, which is the 
internalisation of our own superfluousness was temporarily possible in the camps and is a 
constant threat wherever human beings lose their common world.  But it cannot be a 
permanent condition because it is impossible to permanently eradicate human agency. 
   
6.2 Ontological Agency: Agency as Appearance 
																																																								347 Ibid., 459. 348 Recall that in The Human Condition, Arendt claims that the capacity to act is 
ontologically rooted natality.  In other words, our capacity to appear in the world is due to 
the fact that we are first born into the world as unique beings 349 Arendt 1976, 479.	350 Benhabib 2003, 66-67. 
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The concentration camp is, of course, not the only place that extreme loneliness prevails.  
The internalisation of a sense of superfluousness might just as aptly describe the 
experience of others whose sense that they belong to a common world has been 
destroyed, whether through depression, homelessness, social marginalisation, 
displacement, extreme pain, illness, or the inability to overcome past trauma.351  The 
sense of loneliness haunts each of us from time to time.  Arendt certainly saw loneliness 
as a ubiquitously imminent threat to plurality.  Natality is ‘the miracle that saves the 
world’ because it staves off this threat.  By the capacity to create something new to 
others, we keep the world intact.  It is easy enough to be certain of this capacity in an 
abstract way—to endorse the thesis that agency is grounded in the ontological fact of 
birth.  It is much more alarming to realise that there is nothing at all, apart from our own 
individual exercise of agency, that guarantees us a place in the world.  Appearance is 
difficult, recognition is fragile, and successful communication is rare. Dread, 
melancholia, alienation, misunderstanding, apathy, physical pain, grief—all of these 
things tempt us to resist the initiative to participate in the common world and to surrender 
to loneliness.352  Even for those who participate in the world with ease, who are 
																																																								351 The connections between loneliness and mental illness and loneliness and extreme 
physical pain have, of course, been explored in a number of ways and are a perennial 
theme in art and literature.  For more some compelling thoughts on the former, see 
Solomon 2015.  For an account of the latter, see Scarry 1985.   352 The desire to give in to loneliness is perhaps close to Sartre’s notion of bad faith.  It is 
as fruitless and unsustainable to deny one’s own uniqueness in favour of superfluousness 
as it is to deny one’s own freedom in favor of unfreedom.  See Sartre 1984, especially 
Part I. 
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surrounded by friends, who are involved in ongoing discussions about worldly concerns, 
loneliness is an ever-present threat.353 
In this section, I will elaborate on the idea that loneliness can be productively 
understood as the absence of agency and will explore the notion of recovering the world 
lost to loneliness through the exercise of ontological agency.  In the process, we will see 
how this version of agency dovetails with the concept of narrative agency we have been 
building throughout: a non-sovereign concept of agency, one which does not commit us 
to the idea of a self who is fully in control of her narratives, and a communicative concept 
of agency, one which reveals that agency needs to be recognised by others to be 
meaningful.  Appearance, or the exercise of ontological agency, in the face of loneliness 
is the result of a self’s disclosure of her individuality just when that individuality seems 
particularly tenuous.  Indeed, I do not want to give the impression that ontological agency 
is a simple solution to the problem of loneliness.  It is always a difficult prospect when an 
individual is struggling with incommunicability—attempts at communication during such 
times are often ugly and are occasionally devastating.   
Loneliness is cumulative; it seems to breed more loneliness.  Once the world is 
lost, it is very difficult to get it back.  The inability to explain oneself to others feels more 
and more insurmountable the less frequently we undertake such explanations.  Without 
the feeling that one is listened to and recognised, one is less capable of even attempting to 																																																								353 Many, including Arendt herself, see loneliness, understood as world poverty, as a 
distinctly modern threat. The first complete acknowledgment by human beings of their 
own superfluousness occurs, for Arendt in the camps.  There, for the first time, the 
distinction between life and death ceases to matter. Giorgio Agamben (1998) has gone so 
far as to take up this internalised superfluity as the basic condition for contemporary 
politics. For more on loneliness as a modern condition (and a condition of modernity) see 
Dumm 2010. 
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express one’s thoughts, feelings, opinions, or judgments.   In loneliness one ‘loses trust in 
himself as the partner of his thoughts and that elementary confidence in the world which 
is necessary to make experiences at all.’354  Here is the initiative upon which appearance 
rests—the ‘elementary confidence’ that one will be seen at all, that one can be seen at 
all.355  Losing trust in oneself as a thinking partner means losing the ability to be alone in 
solitude, which amounts to losing the ability to think at all.  Extended loneliness does not 
allow for meaningful thought, which Arendt defines as a process of the thinker in 
conversation with herself.356  
Thomas Dumm (2010) sees in Arendt’s conception of loneliness as loss of the 
world what he calls ‘the paradox of experience’, a concept which he uses to underpin his 
definition of loneliness as the inability to be ‘present in the present moment’. 
‘Loneliness’, Dumm writes, ‘is the existential realisation of a strange fantasy—the loss of 
self, world, experience, and thought.’357  A strange fantasy indeed, for what could 
consciousness be without these four ontological categories?  Arendt’s schematic of action 
helps us expand Dumm’s definition.  The condition of natality allows us to insert 
ourselves into the world again and again through action.  When we act, we appear in the 
world as unique individuals.  Two things happen simultaneously during this appearance: 
one, an agent understands that she appears as unique; and two, the world experiences the 																																																								354 Arendt 1976, 477, emphasis added. 355 Another way of expressing this insight is to say that being a conversation partner with 
myself in solitude depends on first knowing how to be a conversation partner in the 
common world: ‘Only because we have common sense, that is only because not one man, 
but men in the plural inhabit the earth can we trust our immediate sensual experience.’ 
Arendt 1976, 476. 356 Martin Shuster (2012) argues, intriguingly, that the insight that in loneliness thinking 
becomes impossible is the real payoff of Arendt’s chapter on loneliness and 
totalitarianism.  357 Dumm 2010, 45. 
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agent’s uniqueness.358  Being present in the present moment might therefore be 
understood as experiencing one’s own uniqueness; feeling, in other words, as though one 
can add something to the common world.  Experience and thought are possible when 
action is possible, though, as Leslie Thiele points out, this is a necessarily circular 
thesis.359 Appearance, then, occurs when the four prerequisites for being—self, world, 
experience, and thought—are satisfied. Appearance is, in other words, the exercise of 
ontological agency.     
Appearance always discloses an agent’s uniqueness.  In other words, it always 
makes ‘patent’ the ‘latent’ self, to paraphrase the quote of Dante’s that Arendt places as 
an epigraph to her section on action in The Human Condition.360  But what is the 
motivation for appearance (for the exercise of ontological agency)?  Recall that Arendt, 
in her discussion of the ubiquity of natality, sees the initiative toward disclosure of one’s 
whoness in the space of appearance as irresistible.  We can take this to mean that, in a 
reasonably robust world, the agent cannot help but disclose her own uniqueness.  She 
gives a lecture to an eager group of students, she amuses a group of friends over lunch, 
she is remembered, and recognised, by the clerk at the corner book shop.  In each of these 																																																								358 Recall that the agent cannot witness her own whoness she cannot see herself as others 
see her.  She understands, however, that she appears to others as a unique ‘who’. 359 Thiele writes:  ‘Actions do not simply allow for retrospective storytelling.  Action is 
made possible because as a species we are capable of narrative existences…The events 
that compose our lives are not simply random events that await historians or storytellers 
to gain meaning.  We act in particular ways because such efforts correspond well to our 
(anticipated) roles in unfolding tales.  Actions are often taken, one might say, to fulfill 
stories in the making.’ 2009, 1. 360 For in every action what is primarily intended by the doer, whether he acts from 
natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image.  Hence it comes 
about that every doer, in so far as he does, takes delight in doing; since everything that is 
desires its own being, and since in action the being of the doer is somehow intensified, 
delight necessarily follows…Thus, nothing acts unless [by acting] it makes patent its 
latent self.  From Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia, quoted in Arendt 1958, 175. 
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situations, the agent’s whoness is disclosed as she acts within, and is recognised by, the 
world.  The students, the friends, and the book clerk each possess a definite idea of the 
agent’s uniqueness; each has a concept of her whoness.  Importantly, the agent also 
experiences her self as a unique being through each of these interactions.  Her recognition 
by others reinforces her understanding of herself as an individual in the world.  Thus, the 
agent has exercised her ontological agency, as I put it earlier in the chapter, simply by 
being in the world as a unique individual.   
Now imagine that each of these moments occurs in a slightly impoverished world: 
the students do not listen, the lunch companions do not appreciate the agent’s humour, 
and the bookstore clerk does not remember her even though she comes into the store 
often.  Repeated lack of recognition erodes the agent’s sense of her own uniqueness, and 
thus, erodes her agency.  The less she is recognised by the world, the less she is able to 
appear in the world.  The associations of a world, which confirm the agent’s uniqueness, 
protect her from loneliness.  When an individual’s initiative to appear in the world is too 
often thwarted, she begins to feel less and less sure of her own capacity to appear.  The 
repeated lack of recognition is the worst part of loneliness, according to Arendt: ‘What 
makes loneliness so unbearable’, she writes ‘is the loss of one's own self which can be 
realised in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy 
company of my equals.’361  Without confirmation of one’s uniqueness, of ‘one’s own self 
which can be realised in solitude’, an individual loses the capacity—perhaps we ought to 
say the confidence—to articulate what he or she thinks and feels.  In other words, 
communicability becomes impossible when ontological agency is compromised.    
																																																								361 Arendt 1976, 477. 
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Ontological agency can be compromised in a number of ways, ranging from the 
mundane (the alienation of a factory-like work environment) to the extreme (the total 
worldlessness of the refugee).  Trauma, grief, extreme pain, and other world-destroying 
events can compromise ontological agency and can leave a trail of incommunicability in 
their wakes.  Returning for a moment to the last chapter’s discussion of Susan Brison’s 
difficulty communicating what had happened to her after her sexual assault will help 
make this point.  Repeatedly, over the course of her book, Brison talks about the feeling 
(common among trauma survivors) that she died during the assault, and has been living a 
life after death ever since.  The result of trauma is, very literally, a death of the self.  The 
very basic capacity of narrative agency—to make sense of oneself as a unique ‘I’—is lost 
as a result of trauma.  The utterance of the ‘I’ is meaningful to no one because the ‘I’ has 
been convinced of her or his own superfluousness and others are unable to see her as her 
‘old self’, as the self they had previously known.  A survivor of trauma, in other words, is 
often plunged into loneliness.  Brison writes:  
The relational nature of the self is also revealed by a further obstacle confronting 
trauma survivors attempting to reconstruct coherent narratives: the difficulty of 
regaining one’s voice, one’s subjectivity, after one has been reduced to silence, to 
the status of an object, or, worse, made into someone else’s speech, an instrument 
of another’s agency.  Those entering Nazi concentration camps had the speech of 
their captors literally inscribed on their bodies.362 
 
Loneliness, here as in Arendt, is the result of being made into an object—whether the 
object of the suprahuman law of totalitarianism or the object of the violence of a single 
																																																								362 Brison 2002, 55. 
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other person.  If basic agency consists of being able to make sense of oneself as an ‘I’, 
loneliness is the condition in which the self cannot say ‘I’.363   
Throughout, Brison describes the experience of feeling her own superfluousness 
using this language of life beyond death, beginning with her examination by two doctors 
shortly after the assault: ‘For about an hour the two of them went over me like a piece of 
meat, calling out measurements of bruises and other assessments of damage, as if they 
were performing an autopsy.  This was just the first of many incidents in which I felt as if 
I was experiencing things posthumously.’364  Here is a very powerful picture of non-
recognition in loneliness.  The self is totally eradicated by the event of the sexual assault 
and seems, even to herself, to be a manifestation of that event.  
Rape is world destroying both because it eradicates the victim’s sense of self 
(because she has been ‘reduced to an instrument of another’s agency’) and sets her at 
odds with the world (because we lack the shared linguistic and emotional resources to 
communicate about rape).  ‘Unlike survivors of wars or earthquakes, who inhabit a 
common shattered world’, Brison writes, ‘rape victims face the cataclysmic destruction 
of their world alone, surrounded by people who find it hard to understand what’s so 
distressing.’365  Because the experience of rape is often incommunicable, the self is 
unsure of her own capacity to say ‘I’ in the wake of the destruction wrought by the rapist 
and the self is unable to appear in the world.  The result of this double difficulty was, for 
Brison, a deep and inexorable loneliness.  She describes this loneliness: ‘In my case, each 
																																																								363 Simone Weil also thinks of the power to say ‘I’ this way: ‘We possess nothing in the 
world—a mere chance can strip us of everything—except the power to say “I”.’  2002, 
26. 364 Brison 2002, 8. 365 Ibid., 15. 
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time someone failed to respond I felt as though I were alone again in the ravine, dying, 
screaming.  And still no one could hear me.  Or worse, they heard me, but refused to 
help.’366  The sense of being closer to death than life prevailed for as long as Brison felt 
unable to re-enter the world.   
Quite often, over the course of her book, one gets the feeling that Brison is 
writing herself back to life.  Coming back to life, like massaging the blood back into foot 
that has fallen asleep, is painful. Adriana Cavarero emphasises the necessity of 
appearance understood as ontological agency—we might also call it the necessity of 
coming back to life through narrative agency—for understanding the possibility of 
political agency.  She speaks of the ‘redemptive power’ of narrative, which saves human 
lives from disappearance.367  The ontological category of uniqueness carries with it the 
ineradicability of whoness.  The self, in other words, is redeemed from the 
meaninglessness (the internalisation of her own superfluousness, for example) by 
appearance as an individual self before others.  Cavarero, then, also reads Arendt as 
chiefly concerned with the prepolitical, or ontological, aspects of selfhood (or whoness).  
She insists that appearance is something we cannot resist, even though we might want to 
resist it.368  We are drawn out of even the deepest loneliness by the irresistible initiative 
to appear as selves.  
																																																								
366 Ibid., 16. 
367 Cavarero 2015, 5. 
368	Cavarero has written at length about the relationship between narrative and selfhood in 
Arendt (see especially Relating Narratives, 2000).  I do not engage with her earlier work 
in a sustained way in this thesis because she is chiefly concerned with a conception of 
narrative selfhood that is other-oriented.  That is, she thinks of whoness in terms of the 
desire to be seen by (and to have one’s story told by) others.  In this thesis I am more 
concerned with thinking about appearance in terms of agency (to make sense of one’s 
story through conversation with others).  The difference between these two approaches (if 
	 227 
But appearance as our selves may cause us more pain than we can bear—instead 
of massaging the blood back into one’s extremities, one might reopen a wound that will 
not stop bleeding.  Cavarero writes of this inescapable desire for narrative through 
exploring the work of W.G. Sebald.  She finds in Sebald many eloquent examples of the 
difficulties that plague a self who attempts to re-enter the world.  She writes of Sebald’s 
characters in The Emigrants—each of whom has survived the Holocaust, has lived in 
loneliness, has come out of loneliness through appearance, and has committed suicide 
because he is unable to bear the pain of re-entering the world—lifting themselves out of 
loneliness through narration.  Unlike Brison, who manages to regain her capacity for 
contributing to the common world, these characters are thwarted at the edge of that 
world.  Sebald’s work shows us that people can be (and certainly many people are) 
destroyed by loneliness.  These people only seem to be alive, but they have lost their 
capacity to tell a story about themselves that makes any sense.  Thus, they seem 
themselves to the world, but they have lost their own sense that they are selves.  When 
appearance does not reveal the ‘I’s’ uniqueness to both the self and the world, it is not 
ontological agency.369  
																																																																																																																																																																					
there is one—it might be that they are complementary) to thinking about appearance in 
plurality is subtle but complex.  It merits its own in-depth discussion which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 369 A story from another work of Sebald’s which suggests that the shell of a lonely self 
convinced of its own superfluousness can sometimes appear to the world as whole: ‘At 
Regensburg he crossed the Danube on his cloak, and there made a broken glass whole 
again; and, in the house of a wheel-wright too mean to spare the kindling, lit a fire with 
icicles.  This story of the burning of the frozen substance of life has, of late, meant much 
to me, and I wonder now whether inner coldness and desolation may not be the pre-
condition for making the world believe, by a kind of fraudulent showmanship, that one’s 
own wretched heart is still aglow.’ 1999, 86. 
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For Brison, attempts to restore her sense of self, to exercise her ontological 
agency, failed repeatedly in the aftermath of the assault.  Writing herself back to life is 
something she has been able to do because she has found ways to appear, over time, to 
others as a unique moral agent capable of meaning creation.  The continuous exercise of 
ontological agency is necessary for an individual to gain the kind of confidence necessary 
to support her convictions and judgments; for her to feel strong enough, in other words, 
to exercise her political agency.   
 
6.3 Political Agency: Preserving the World of Action 
 
If ontological agency redeems the agent from loneliness, then political agency protects 
the world against the spread of loneliness.  Political agency, which is the capacity to 
articulate one’s thoughts, opinions and judgments in public, is impossible in 
loneliness.370  As we have seen, this notion of agency does not rest on a static vision of 
identity.  Each of us has multiple identities which are subject to constant revision but 
which are, at the same time, marked by individual uniqueness.  Individuals in association 
with one another are able to enrich their communicative horizons through repeated 
mutually recognitive conversation.  In other words, we are able, through talking to one 
another, to shore up our agency through strengthening the world.  Political agency, to put 
it in the terms of Chapter 5, is the capacity to articulate a judgment in public. 																																																								370 The tendency to be concerned with private affairs rather than public involvement 
bespeaks the condition of isolation, not loneliness.  Arendt points out the increase in this 
tendency in Europe but also, importantly, as a trenchant problem in America (originally 
diagnosed by Tocqueville).  See Chapter 5 in The Origins of Totalitarianism: “The 
Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie”.  For more on a distinctly American 
understanding of Arendtian isolation and loneliness, see Richard King (2012). 
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This section is concerned with the relationship between ontological agency and 
political agency.  These two forms of agency, I argue, are interdependent.  The continued 
exercise of ontological agency, or appearance in the world as a unique individual, makes 
political agency possible.  In other words, we risk appearance in public, whether this 
entails justifying an opinion on office politics in a meeting between colleagues or giving 
a speech at a ‘take back the night’ rally, because we have a firm grasp on our basic 
ontological agency.  Without this basic confidence in our own capacity to appear to 
others as unique individuals, we are subject to loneliness—we do not get the confirmation 
of uniqueness which keeps us from feeling superfluous.  The exercise of political agency 
involves risking incommunicability and, as I argued in Chapter 5, this is a big risk when 
misrecognition can so easily plunge an individual back into loneliness.  Friendship, love, 
support groups and other intimate forms of recognition provide the confidence necessary 
for political agency, which consists in the articulation of a judgment to others who may or 
may not understand it.  The more this risk is taken, and is successful, the more the agent 
is able to experience solidarity.  Agents who share, communicatively, a set of judgments 
and concerns, are able to organise around those concerns and act in concert.371  This 
communicative access to action in concert is the hallmark of a robust world. 
Of course, this bipartite view of agency is not uncontroversial.372  For one thing, 
there is the vexing problem of how to square the notion of appearance to another through 
																																																								371 Recall that action in concert never determines the permanent content of a collective’s 
political needs but concern, rather, ‘the practical, ad-hoc organisations of citizens 
pursuing “actual” and “short-term” goals’ and ‘disappear[s] as soon as these goals have 
been achieved.’ Borren 2013, 206. 372 Other complications include the rejection of the implicit assumption, defended 
throughout, that all agency is narrative and the rejection of the Arendtian concept of 
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conversations, which often occur in therapy, in support groups, or among friends with 
what we know about Arendt’s strict conceptual division between private and public 
space.  For another, this notion of agency might seem at first glance to rob of political 
agency those people who need it the most—namely, people who are mired in loneliness.  
It is my contention, despite these potential criticisms, that conceiving of political agency 
as dependent on the mastery of ontological agency allows us to practice a form of politics 
that takes into account the unique complexity of each of its practitioners. 
The importance of a healthy private sphere for maintaining a healthy public 
sphere is evident throughout Arendt’s work.373  The controversy arises when we try to 
nail down exactly what, for Arendt, constitutes action and what does not.  My reading of 
this problem is that, by taking Arendt at her word that action is what occurs between 
people, we can define all conversation—all interaction, even—as (tentatively) political (if 
not public).  The ‘space’ between us, which makes up the world, is what is lost in 
totalitarianism because in fully realised totalitarianism (that is, in the camps) we cannot 
have any mutually recognitive conversations, not even in private, not even among 
friends.  We cannot, in other words, appear at all.  The logical extension of thinking 
about the world this way seems to me to be that all appearance is action. 
As has been established, loneliness is the condition in which appearance is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible.  This condition often affects, it is important to 
remember, the most vulnerable among us, the people, in other words, most in need of 
																																																																																																																																																																					
politics as action between individuals. I have addressed these two broader potential 
concerns elsewhere in the thesis. 373 Though Arendt believed that being a citizen properly entailed thinking of private 
interest as secondary to the public good.  See especially her late essay “Public Rights and 
Private Interests” (1977). 
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political representation, such as the physically disabled, the homeless, and the mentally 
ill.  Arendt’s example par excellence of the human being confronted time and again with 
his or her own political invisibility is the refugee.  ‘The world found nothing sacred’, she 
wrote about the failure to extend universal human rights to refugees on the basis of their 
humanity alone, ‘in the abstract nakedness of being human.’374  Existence is not enough, 
I take her to mean, to warrant appearance.  It is all too common for human beings to 
ignore suffering and injustice.  The condition of loneliness, wherein an individual has ‘no 
place in the world, recognised and guaranteed by others’, is not something that can be 
corrected by abstract calls for social justice (though the more robust the world, the more 
concerned it will be with social justice).375  It is, rather, necessary for the specific 
individual struggling with the condition of loneliness to appear in the world as a unique 
individual.  Appearance—being recognised as a unique human being—is what allows an 
individual to make the particular aspects of her situation communicable.  Without 
appearance, the world may perceive the individual as a statistic, a stereotype, or a ‘single 
story’ rather than as complex and unique. 
Where does this leave the people who struggle to appear to others?  Unless they 
are included in, and recognised by, some kind of community, they will lack a sense of 
ontological agency: and this is precisely the problem at which our calls for justice ought 
to be aimed.  The correction of structural inequality and systematic injustice begins with 
listening to the victims of inequality and injustice, with perceiving them as unique agents 
with a number of different stories to tell.  Arendt wrote of the tendency among refugees 
(and she considered herself a refugee) to form pariah communities, rich in ‘humour’ and 																																																								374 Arendt 1976, 299. 375 Ibid., 475.	
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‘warmth’.376  The struggle for appearance can be made easier by a sense of belonging, 
whether to a family or to a community at a homeless shelter, and by publicly valuing the 
sharing of individual stories over (though obviously alongside) policy-making.  Sharing 
narratives, furthermore, is often a productive way to facilitate appearance.  
Agency, I have argued, is always narrative because it always involves reflective 
self-awareness (an idea of the self as an ‘I’).  In ontological agency, this awareness comes 
in the form of recognising that one appears as a unique being to others.  In political 
agency, on the other hand, it takes the form of the practical self-conception that 
accompanies judgment-making.  Political agency may take many different forms.  It may 
entail the encouragement of difficult conversations about a certain kind of harm, or taking 
part in a protest, what Lisa Disch refers to the practice of ‘articulating solidarity’, which 
she sees as the constant re-negotiation of what we have in common as our interests shift: 
Rather than defining what we believe in or declaring who we are, we now need to 
assess how we are implicated in a worldly event.  This is the task of articulating 
solidarity: constructing the ‘facts’ of a contingent situation in a way that makes 
possible a coordinated response by a plurality of actors who—apart from that 
contingency—may have more differences than affinities.377 
 
A robust world, in which members are able to appear in action, makes political judgment 
easier.  When we exercise political agency, we claim our current interests in common and 
make explicit our associations.  We make clear the reasons behind our convictions, listen 
to others explain why their convictions are important to them and attempt to articulate 
what it is that we have in common.   
																																																								376 Arendt 1995, 16. 377 Disch 1994, 288. 
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A world where this kind of give-and-take is possible is the opposite of 
totalitarianism.  Instead of one suprahuman law that erodes the space between citizens, 
there are negotiable laws that reflect the democratic reality of a plurality of perspectives.  
The more we articulate our interests in common, the easier it is to articulate our interests 
in common: political agency, like loneliness, is contagious. The loneliness of the 
concentration camps and the solidarity of the participants in a ‘take back the night’ march 
(or in Brison’s releasing her book to her readers) are at opposite ends of the agency 
spectrum.  The former is the nadir of agency, and the latter represents its productive 
political exercise.  These two ways of exercising agency are, indeed, interdependent. 
 
6.4 Ontological and Political Agency in Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels 
 
The protagonist of Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels is a woman named Elena Greco. 
The books follow her journey from her early childhood in an impoverished 
neighbourhood in Naples, through her education, her love affairs, her career as a writer 
and public intellectual, raising her children, and growing old.  But this story of ‘Elena’ is 
also the story of her closest friend, Lila.  Ferrante’s focus on this relationship over the 
course of the four books illustrates this chapter’s thesis that ontological and political 
agency are mutually reinforcing.  Elena is unable to understand herself, to perceive 
herself as a self, without appearing to Lila.  Her success as a student, as a writer, and as 
an intellectual is meaningless if not witnessed by Lila.   And, though Lila does not always 
tell Elena what she wants to hear (at times she can be cruel and antagonistic), it is 
recognition by Lila (ontological agency) that gives Elena the confidence necessary to do 
	 234 
things that frighten her (political agency): to write sexually explicit novels, to give talks 
on women’s liberation, and to write controversial articles about workers for the national 
papers.   
 Moreover, understanding Lila’s uniqueness is essential to Elena’s ability to 
understand herself as unique.  Many times over the course of the four novels, Elena 
marvels at Lila’s intelligence, Lila’s beauty, and Lila’s character.  She understands, 
through perceiving Lila as exceptional—a perception heightened by knowing her so 
intimately and for so long—what it is to be a self.  Lila’s capacities for self-disclosure 
and critical thinking are proof that such capacities exist at all.  A passage in the first 
novel, My Brilliant Friend, illuminates this point: 
It was from Lila.  I tore open the envelope.  There were five closely written pages, 
and I devoured them, but I understood almost nothing of what I read.  It may seem 
strange today, and yet it really was so: even before I was overwhelmed by the 
contents, what struck me was that the writing contained Lila’s voice.  Not only 
that.  From the first lines I thought of The Blue Fairy, the only text of hers than I 
had read, apart from our elementary-school homework, and I understood what, at 
the time, I had liked so much.  There was, in The Blue Fairy, the same quality that 
struck me now: Lila was able to speak through writing; unlike me when I wrote, 
unlike Sarratore in his articles and poems, unlike even the many writers I had read 
and was reading, she expressed herself in sentences that were well constructed, 
and without error, even though she had stopped going to school, but—further—
she left no trace of effort, you weren’t aware of the artifice of the written word.  I 
read and I saw her, I heard her.378 
 
Lila appears before Elena as Elena reads Lila’s letter.  Her unique whoness is palpable 
here, such that the reader feels that he or she, too, knows Lila. 
 Lila is less assured of her ability to contribute to the common world than Elena is.  
Her self-perception is more fractured, and her assurance that she will be heard and 
understood by others more tenuous.  This does not mean that Lila lacks agency, however.  
																																																								378 Ferrante 2012, 226-227. 
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She is, all her life, in the thrall of subordinating power relations—she is married at 
seventeen to a man she does not love and is forced by her poverty to work a gruelling job 
at a sausage factory—but she is no victim.  Throughout her life she acts in a number of 
surprising and affecting ways—she designs shoes for her brother and father to make, she 
creates a troubling work of art (which represents her feelings of alienation and 
fragmentation) to hang in her husband’s store, and she articulates in a single speech the 
worker’s plight more eloquently than any of the activists who make it their job to fight 
for workers’ rights. Lila appears in the world as startlingly unique. She is all action, and 
she ‘feels her freedom’, as Zerilli might put it, through this action, but she does not seem 
to have the conviction that she is a coherent ‘I’.  Though she lacks Elena’s confidence 
that she is a whole self (the same confidence lacked by Sebald’s emigrants), she throws 
herself into the world again and again. 
Lila thus lacks the conviction that she will appear to others that is necessary for a 
robust sense of ontological agency.  She lacks, also, a sense of sustained political agency.  
Often, when asked for an opinion on what she has read or asked to join the ranks of the 
workers’ movement, Lila baulks, saying she does not understand complex ideas (though 
she does) or that she can’t possibly find time to devote to activism.  She lacks the sense 
that she is an important part of the common world.  Elena describes this lack in Lila in 
book four, The Story of the Lost Child: 
She used that term dissolving boundaries.  It was on that occasion that she 
resorted to it for the first time; she struggled to elucidate the meaning, she wanted 
me to understand what the dissolution of boundaries meant and how much it 
frightened her.  She was still holding my hand tight, breathing hard.  She said that 
the outlines of things and people were delicate, that they broke like cotton thread.  
She whispered that for her it had always been that way, an object lost its edges 
and poured into another, into a solution of heterogenous materials, a merging and 
mixing.  She exclaimed that she had always had to struggle to believe that life had 
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firm boundaries, for she had known since she was a child that it was not like 
that—it was not like that—and so she couldn’t trust in their resistance to being 
banged and bumped.379 
 
I read this passage as an allegory for loneliness.  Without the sense that we are unique 
selves—when our capacity for narrative agency is compromised, in other words—we are 
thrown into a vision of the world as undifferentiated—the world as a mass of sameness.  
Nothing matters, in this picture, because there is no common world in which meaning can 
be created, shared, and built upon.  Lila struggles to understand herself as an ontological 
agent—she struggles to see herself as an ‘I’ in time and in relation to other ‘I’s’, and she 
is not confident that she will appear to others as a unique self with something to offer to 
the common world. 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that narrative agency is exercised in two different but 
overlapping registers: the ontological and the political.  I have argued that the basic view 
of narrative agency defended in this thesis (the capacity to make sense of oneself as an ‘I’ 
in time and with relation to other ‘I’s’) depends first on the confidence that one will 
appear in the world as a unique ‘I’.  The world in which the ‘I’ appears arises out of 
political action (out of the exchange of political judgments about interests held in 																																																								379 Ferrante 2015, 175-176.  Lila experiences this fear of dissolving boundaries all her 
life.  She alludes to it in that early letter to Lila also: ‘She was alone in the kitchen 
washing the dishes and was tired, really without energy, when there was an explosion.  
She had turned suddenly and realised that the big copper pot had exploded.  Like that, by 
itself.  It was hanging on the nail where it normally hung, but in the middle there was a 
large hole and the rim was lifted and twisted and the pot itself was all deformed, as if it 
could no longer maintain its appearance as a pot.  Her mother had hurried in in her 
nightgown and had blamed her for dropping it and ruining it.  But a copper pot, even if 
you drop it, doesn’t break and doesn’t become misshapen like that.  “It’s this sort of 
thing,” Lila concluded, “that frightens me.  More than Marcello, more than anyone.  And 
I feel that I have to find a solution, otherwise, everything, one thing after another, will 
break, everything, everything.”’ 2012, 227.	
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common).  Ontological and political agency, then, are mutually reinforcing.  To act 
politically, one must be sure that one will appear to others; Elena is able to risk the 
misrecognition of the entire Italian public because she knows that she is recognised by 
Lila.  Being unsure one will appear at all, on the other hand, makes political action seem 
somehow hollow; Lila is often unsure she appears in her uniqueness to anyone, including 
Elena, and therefore her radical assertions of political agency (through public art, through 
activism, through rebelliousness) are merely performative.  Lila is unsure of her 
ontological agency, and so she feels superfluous, even as she acts. 
 I have supported this account of appearance and action through a reading of 
Arendt’s phenomenology of the loneliness of world poverty in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism.  Loneliness is the condition in which the individual has internalised an 
understanding of him or herself as superfluous—as having nothing new to contribute to 
the common world.  Loneliness is made absolutely manifest in the concentration camps, 
where all human action has become superfluous, but it is an ever-present threat to the 
common world.  There is no shortage of contemporary examples of endemic loneliness as 
the result of worldlessness, from the post-industrial confusion of middle America to the 
despair in the refugee detainment centres off the coast of Australia.  There are, 
furthermore, countless everyday instances of individuals experiencing the loneliness of 
extreme pain, depression, or trauma.  Loneliness is not a solvable problem; it is, rather, an 
ever-present threat to human action.  Loneliness can be kept at bay, however, through the 
cultivation of narrative agency in both the ontological and the political registers.  
Cultivating interpersonal relationships, within which one feels seen and supported, allows 
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us to risk political action, by which we make communicable more broadly the kinds of 
resources that might allow others to be seen and supported.      
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Conclusion 
 
My aim in this project has been to defend a non-sovereign, narrative concept of agency as 
the appropriate model of agency for feminist theory.  Though contemporary feminism 
encompasses a plurality of problems, approaches, normative commitments, modes of 
identification, and ways to define central concepts, I hope that the understanding of 
agency I have proposed in this project may help unite feminists across these differences.  
This thesis arises out of the conviction that feminist theory must have a strong concept of 
agency, and it is committed to the goal of increasing feminist theory’s emancipatory 
potential for anyone who identifies as a woman.  I contend that the widespread and global 
problems of misrecognition, subordination to harmful gender norms, and the systematic 
harassment of and violence against women mean that feminist theory cannot afford to be 
ambivalent about agency.  Individual women must have the confidence to judge and to 
reject these harms.  I have offered a defence of agency, then, even in the face of the 
trenchant critiques of agency from within feminist theory—especially the 
poststructuralist critique that agency is a ruse of power relations and the intersectional 
feminist critique that ‘agency’, more often than not, refers to a conventional 
understanding of autonomy, or freedom of choice, which is disproportionately available 
to women who conform to privileged ways of being in the world (who are white, 
Western, heterosexual, upper-middle class, and so on). 
 My concept of narrative agency helps alleviate these concerns.  I have broadly 
defined narrative agency as follows: (1) it is primary to narrative content; (2) it is 
grounded in uniqueness;  (3) it is non-sovereign; (4) it is communicative; (5) it is 
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(theoretically) infinitely generative.  I have rested this definition on two claims; first, the 
ontological claim that selves are essentially relational and, second, the practical claim that 
self-understanding (whether of our own selves as ‘I’s’ or of other selves) is narrative. I 
have defended both of these claims through a critical-hermeneutical engagement with 
other theorists of agency, subjectivity, and identity. I have looked to the work of these 
theorists (some feminist, some not) in order to clarify challenges to a narrative theory of 
agency, develop a narrative theory of agency that stands up to these challenges, and, 
ultimately, borrow from Hannah Arendt a political theoretical framework that maximises 
narrative agency.    
 In this thesis, I have explored the richness of Seyla Benhabib’s insistence that 
agency and communicability are ‘two sides of the same coin’.  At the heart of my 
argument is the notion that recognition and political action are mutually reinforcing.  I 
have fleshed out this central argument in a number of different ways.  First, I traced the 
tension between agency and subjection from the 1990s subjectivity debates in feminist 
theory to contemporary discussions of the same set of problems.  The central question in 
this debate was the extent to which agency is possible, considering the subject’s 
constitution by and through subordinating power relations.  Poststructuralist feminists, on 
the one hand, argued that agency and empowerment are best understood as the 
performative rearrangement of relations of power in such a way as to reveal the 
systematic inequality of those relations.  In this view, we should be suspicious of theories 
of the ‘self’ as capable of possessing the constant capacity to exercise agency and should 
think, instead, of agency in terms of resistance to subordination by dominant narratives.  
Critical theoretical feminists, on the other hand, were interested to show that the 
	 241 
resignification of norms through performance produces something beyond its own 
moment of resistance.  It produces the recognition by others of why and how an act of 
resistance is meaningful. 
 For this understanding of resistance to occur, the subject must have some capacity 
to make sense of action and to recognise other subjects as sense-makers.  This does not 
mean we have to understand the subject as autonomous in the sense that she is the author 
of her own story (or that she is in complete control of the meaning she makes): only that 
each of us is an agent capable of making sense recognisable to others.  With this view in 
mind, I have endorsed a framework for subjectivity which leaves open possibilities for 
mutual recognition even as it confirms the extent to which we are constituted by (often 
subordinating and systematically unequal) relationships with others.  I have considered 
the possibility of jettisoning the subject-centred frame altogether in favour of a feminist 
theory that focuses on the arena of sense-making, rather than the subject, but found that 
we cannot ignore that the engine of sense-making in this arena is the unique individual 
subject. It is important, in other words, both to ‘feel our freedom’ as it arises in the 
unpredictable world of action and to appreciate the importance of recognition as a 
precondition for entering the world of action in the first place.  A view of agency 
appropriate to contemporary feminism, therefore, must have a strong sense that the 
unique individual has agency, understood as the capacity to make sense among agents. 
 This engagement with the productive tension between agency and subjection led 
me to investigate what distinguishes a unique individual human being.  How, I asked, can 
we understand individual personal identity?  Through a sustained reading of the literature 
in the philosophy of personal identity, I argued that our practical understanding of 
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individual personal identity from both the first personal and the third personal 
perspectives is narrative.  We have in mind a notion of ourselves as ‘I’s’ when we act, 
and this notion is narrative because it involves both situating oneself in time (thinking ‘I 
did this’ or ‘I am responsible for that’) and involves asking questions of characterisation 
(asking, for example, ‘Who am I?’ or ‘Am I the kind of person that would do x?’).  These 
questions of characterisation are also the questions we ask when identifying other people 
as discrete individuals.  We are interested in more than just the problem of identifying 
individuals as the same over time (the question of reidentification); we want to know 
what defines them as individuals (the question of characterisation).  We use narrative to 
address the characterisation of third personal individuals.  Some of these narratives are 
particular to our understanding of discrete individuals (as in, ‘that behaviour is so typical 
of Susan’), and some of these narratives are political (as in, ‘that behaviour is typical of a 
young, middle-class, white, cis-gendered lesbian’).   
 The practical narrative model of identity is not without its normative baggage.  On 
the one hand, it seems that understanding identity as narrative requires that we imagine a 
version of the good life involves the pursuit of a unified or coherent story about who one 
is.  Asking questions of characterisation does, certainly, require that we ask moral 
questions about who we are and who we think we should be.  On the other hand, we tend 
to proscribe the narrative identities of others through the repetition of strongly normative 
political narratives.  Asking questions about who others are often means reducing them to 
what they are politically.  I have rejected the strong version of both of these critiques of 
narrative and argue that narrative need not be overly normative.  Against the first, I 
argued that a practical narrative self-conception need not entail a search for one’s true or 
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authentic self.  Indeed, in my reading, there exists no true or core self.  The self, rather, is 
the site of meaning creation; she makes sense of who she is through communication with 
others.  Against the second, I conceded that normative political narratives are often 
problematically reductive and often (over)determine both first and third personal 
narrative accounts of identity.  I argued, however, a) that political narratives can 
sometimes be appropriated in a way that increases an individual’s sense of narrative 
agency (one can identify with an alternative narrative, in order to feel solidarity with 
others) and b) that the narrative agent always has the capacity to confront and change 
political narratives, no matter how intractable these narratives may seem (political 
narratives may extend to the subject’s most basic sense of herself as an ‘I’, but they do 
not constitute the subject’s capacity to make sense and therefore may be changed). 
 The capacity of the self to make sense in the face of subordinating political 
narratives remains uncompromised even in the most extreme situations, provided that self 
has access to recognition by others as a unique individual capable of making sense.  I 
looked at two different possible challenges to this capacity (which is narrative agency): 
the extent to which we are subordinated by harmful gender norms and the potentially 
problematic assumption that ‘sense’ is communicable through narrative.  I maintained 
that even a self utterly constituted by harmful gender narratives has the capacity to 
confront and change these narratives—not because she exists as an ‘I’ apart from the web 
of gender narratives in question but because her constitution by these narratives is 
contingent.  There is no essence of the narrative self, composed of a specific 
configuration of narratives.  Instead, there exists a fluid and constantly changing self; the 
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only constant/necessary aspect of this self is her capacity to make sense of herself as an 
‘I’ in time and with relation to other ‘I’s’.   
The communicability of ‘sense’ arises out of mutually respectful conversation 
between agents who recognise one another as sense-makers.  Conversations between 
sense-makers are often riddled with power relations, and, what’s more, even mutually 
respectful relationships between individuals are marked by misrecognition.  Not every 
initiative toward appearance in the common world is successful, and, quite often, 
attempts at communication with others fail.  The capacity to make sense to, and in 
solidarity with, others, is, however, given in the subject’s uniqueness.  She cannot be 
reduced to sameness; she will always have the capacity to introduce new meaning into a 
plurality of other irreducibly unique ‘I’s’.  Thus, I established that narrative agency is an 
irreducible and constant capacity.  It is the irreducible capacity of the subject to make 
sense of herself as an ‘I’ in time and with relation to other ‘I’s’.  It is, in other words the 
most basic capacity of individual selfhood.  It is also the constant capacity of the subject 
to ‘make sense’ of experience.  Even when confronted with nonsense, fragmentation, 
loneliness, and misrecognition, the situated self will attempt to make sense of herself as 
an ‘I’. 
 Having established an understanding of the self as ontologically relational 
(constituted by relations with others) and practically narrative (marked by an 
understanding of first and third personal identity as narrative), and having established 
narrative agency as the constant and irreducible capacity of this self to make sense, I 
theorised a politics which maximises narrative agency.  Arendt’s action-based politics, 
with its emphasis on the articulation of constantly shifting interests held in common, 
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meets this task.  In Arendt’s view of action, facts about identity (what I have called 
political narratives) are secondary to the alignment of publicly articulated judgments 
about the world.  Politics, by this understanding, arises organically out of commonly 
understandable and communicable judgments, instead of being organised around pre-
existing identity categories.    
 This dynamic view of politics is sustained through plurality, natality, and 
narrativity, which are necessary conditions for public sense-making.  Plurality is the 
condition of sameness-in-difference, which makes possible the addition of new meaning 
to action by the unique individual self.  If we were not all unique selves, constituted by 
entirely discrete sets of narratives not shared by any other human being who has ever 
lived or will live, then we would not need to create a collaborative world of meaning 
between ourselves.  Natality refers to the fact that this radical uniqueness was given to us 
by birth (by virtue of being situated differently than any other human being who has ever 
lived or ever will live). Natality refers also to our entrance again and again into the 
common world, or our ‘second birth’.  It is the irresistible initiative by which each unique 
self inserts herself into the common world. The meaning which arises out of this insertion 
is unpredictable, and the common world is constantly changing because of the 
introduction of meaning by unique agents.  Narrativity is the mode by which we 
understand the meaning created in action, and by which we make concrete sense of what 
happens in action.  A politics based on the dynamic negotiation of interests held in 
common is useful for voicing intersectional and constantly changing feminist concerns. 
 Participating in such a feminist politics means being able to voice publicly 
judgments about women’s experience—about what is harmful for women, what is 
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beneficial for women, and so on.  Arendt offers a phenomenology of judgment-making 
which requires that we engage in the sustained consideration of the particular set of 
circumstances we are judging from as many other points of view as possible, a process 
which she refers to as enlarged thinking.  In enlarged thinking, we become spectators, 
capable of imagining conversations with other spectators, in which we share reasons for 
the judgments we have made.  The more points of view we consider when making a 
political judgment, the more communicable our judgment will be.  Judgments gain their 
validity through consensus.  This model of consensus-building adds to our picture of 
feminist politics as the shared articulation of interests held in common.  Feminist politics 
should not consist of women making judgments based on a pre-determined set of ideas 
about what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ for women; it should, rather, consist of women coming to 
new understandings of what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ for women through the open-ended 
and collaborative investigation of particular circumstances women face. 
 It is inaccurate, however, to imagine that we can make purely political judgments 
through the practice of enlarged thinking.  These judgments that we make as spectators 
are always accompanied by the moral judgments we make as embedded, partial, and self-
conscious agents.  The sense of self that arises out of the making of moral judgments 
both compromises our ability to be totally impartial when making political judgments and 
gives rise to our understanding of others as being similarly compromised by their 
constitution through similar moral considerations.  The recognition that each of us always 
already exercises moral judgments in action is an important resource for making political 
judgments more broadly communicable.  Understanding that each spectator is always 
also an agent means appreciating other members of a plurality in their uniqueness. 
	 247 
 Making political judgments is, therefore, only possible when one has the 
confidence that one will appear to others as a unique agent.  The feminist theory of the 
self I put forth in this thesis is based on the notion that agency and recognition are 
mutually reinforcing. Understanding agency in this way means that we take seriously the 
ever-present threat of loneliness, which is the lack of confidence that we will appear to 
others as unique sense-makers.  Feminist politics must, therefore, continue to cultivate 
safe spaces in which consciousness may be raised through supportive and recognitive 
conversation.  It must attend to the project of encouraging agency in individual women 
alongside the projects of communicating beyond the constituency of feminist publics the 
important political judgments about what social change is necessary to improve the lives 
of women. The more confident an agent is that she will be recognised by others as a 
unique individual with an infinite number of stories to tell, the more confident that agent 
will be in exercising her capacity for telling stories.   
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